<h2>CHAPTER XLI.</h2>
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<h3>ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA—OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES—BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE—ON THE PICKET LINE.</h3>
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<p>The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal
inspection, taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the
members of my personal staff. We crossed to the north side of the
river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached
the Tennessee at Brown's Ferry, some three miles below Lookout
Mountain, unobserved by the enemy. Here we left our horses back
from the river and approached the water on foot. There was a picket
station of the enemy on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in
full view, and we were within easy range. They did not fire upon us
nor seem to be disturbed by our presence. They must have seen that
we were all commissioned officers. But, I suppose, they looked upon
the garrison of Chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or
starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of
them except in self-defence.</p>
<p>That night I issued orders for opening the route to
Bridgeport—a cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately
termed it. They had been so long on short rations that my first
thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach
them.</p>
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<p>Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that
river runs nearly due west. It is at the northern end of a valley
five or six miles in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs.
To the east of the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to
eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating somewhat
abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the Tennessee. On the
west of the valley is Lookout Mountain, twenty-two hundred feet
above-tide water. Just below the town the Tennessee makes a turn to
the south and runs to the base of Lookout Mountain, leaving no
level ground between the mountain and river. The Memphis and
Charleston Railroad passes this point, where the mountain stands
nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the South
Chickamauga River; west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and
west of that, Raccoon Mountains. Lookout Mountain, at its northern
end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks
off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit,
where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height. On the
gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there
is a single farmhouse, which is reached by a wagon-road from the
valley east.</p>
<p>The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of
Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance
south, thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain.
Lookout Mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also
kept troops in Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with
pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the
north bank and render it useless to us. In addition to this there
was an intrenched line in Chattanooga valley extending from the
river east of the town to Lookout Mountain, to make the investment
complete. Besides the fortifications on Mission Ridge, there was a
line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits
half-way up the front. The enemy's pickets extended out into the
valley towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies
could converse. At one point they were separated only by the narrow
creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which
both sides drew water. The Union lines were shorter than those of
the enemy.</p>
<p>Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly
fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river
below. Practically, the Army of the Cumberland was besieged. The
enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the passing
of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies. The Union
army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's
fighting.</p>
<p>General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field,
ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by
Generals Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from
the Army of the Potomac to reinforce Rosecrans. It would have been
folly to send them to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations
left there. They were consequently left on the railroad, where
supplies could be brought to them. Before my arrival, Thomas
ordered their concentration at Bridgeport.</p>
<p>General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for
the move which I was now about to make, and so clear in his
judgment about the manner of making it, that I deemed it but just
to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to
execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer
and was not in command of troops.</p>
<p>On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the
following details were made: General Hooker, who was now at
Bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee
and march up by Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry. General
Palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland,
was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back
road, until opposite Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in
Hooker's rear after he had passed. Four thousand men were at the
same time detailed to act under General Smith directly from
Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, under General Hazen, were to
take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of night float by the
pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout, down to Brown's
Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the
pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the remainder of the
detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river
to Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the
bridge as soon as the crossing was secured.</p>
<p>On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and
commenced his eastward march. At three o'clock on the morning of
the 27th, Hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and
eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men. Smith started enough
in advance to be near the river when Hazen should arrive. There are
a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at
Chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream,
sheltered from the view from the top of Lookout. It was over this
road Smith marched. At five o'clock Hazen landed at Brown's Ferry,
surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. By seven
o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and in
possession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedily
fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. By ten
o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout
valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army. The
two bridges over the Tennessee River—a flying one at
Chattanooga and the new one at Brown's Ferry—with the road
north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the
enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker found but slight
obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into
Lookout valley at Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown's Ferry,
while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped
three miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were
now cut off, and soon came in and surrendered.</p>
<p>The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to
Bridgeport. Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee
runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the
stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an
ordinary steamer to stem it. To get up these rapids, steamers must
be cordelled; that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore. But there
is no difficulty in navigating the stream from Bridgeport to
Kelly's Ferry. The latter point is only eight miles from
Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road, which runs
through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side of
the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the river
opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport,
and abundance of forage, clothing and provisions.</p>
<p>On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville
for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops
had been so long deprived of. Hooker had brought with him from the
east a full supply of land transportation. His animals had not been
subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in
good condition. In five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way
was open to Bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's
teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. It is hard
for any one not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought.
The men were soon reclothed and also well fed, an abundance of
ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before
enjoyed in many weeks. Neither officers nor men looked upon
themselves any longer as doomed. The weak and languid appearance of
the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once. I do not know
what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been
correspondingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visited Bragg but a short
time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as
Bragg described it in his subsequent report. "These dispositions,"
he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy
evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessed of
the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which
reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his
destruction was only a question of time." But the dispositions were
not "faithfully sustained," and I doubt not but thousands of men
engaged in trying to "sustain" them now rejoice that they were not.
There was no time during the rebellion when I did not think, and
often say, that the South was more to be benefited by its defeat
than the North. The latter had the people, the institutions, and
the territory to make a great and prosperous nation. The former was
burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not
brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in
ignorance, and enervated the governing class. With the outside
world at war with this institution, they could not have extended
their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled, nor
allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becoming
degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash."
The system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the
people poor. The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and
the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate
neighbor. Soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and,
not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might
and exterminated them. The war was expensive to the South as well
as to the North, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all
it cost.</p>
<p>The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a
line of supplies. He appreciated its importance, and hastened to
try to recover the line from us. His strength on Lookout Mountain
was not equal to Hooker's command in the valley below. From
Missionary Ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from
Chattanooga, in order to reach Lookout Valley; but on the night of
the 28th and 29th an attack was made on Geary at Wauhatchie by
Longstreet's corps. When the battle commenced, Hooker ordered
Howard up from Brown's Ferry. He had three miles to march to reach
Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a
foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road was
commanded. Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and
captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many
prisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on
to reinforce Geary. Before he got up, Geary had been engaged for
about three hours against a vastly superior force. The night was so
dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by
the light of the flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and
uproar Hooker's teamsters became frightened and deserted their
teams. The mules also became frightened, and breaking loose from
their fastenings stampeded directly towards the enemy. The latter,
no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn. By four
o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our
"cracker line" was never afterward disturbed.</p>
<p>In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man
killed and four or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets
at the ferry, captured. In the night engagement of the 28th-9th
Hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the
enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead
and captured more than a hundred.</p>
<p>After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring
our supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the
situation of the pickets of the two armies. As I have stated,
Chattanooga Creek comes down the centre of the valley to within a
mile or such a matter of the town of Chattanooga, then bears off
westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the Tennessee River at
the foot of Lookout Mountain. This creek, from its mouth up to
where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and
the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream. As
I would be under short-range fire and in an open country, I took
nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed some
distance to the rear. I rode from our right around to our left.
When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard
the call, "Turn out the guard for the commanding general." I
replied, "Never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went
back to their tents. Just back of these, and about equally distant
from the creek, were the guards of the Confederate pickets. The
sentinel on their post called out in like manner, "Turn out the
guard for the commanding general," and, I believe, added, "General
Grant." Their line in a moment front-faced to the north, facing me,
and gave a salute, which I returned.</p>
<p>The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets
of the two armies. At one place there was a tree which had fallen
across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both
armies in drawing water for their camps. General Longstreet's corps
was stationed there at the time, and wore blue of a little
different shade from our uniform. Seeing a soldier in blue on this
log, I rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked
whose corps he belonged to. He was very polite, and, touching his
hat to me, said he belonged to General Longstreet's corps. I asked
him a few questions—but not with a view of gaining any
particular information—all of which he answered, and I rode
off.</p>
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