<h2>CHAPTER XX.</h2>
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<h3>GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND—MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT—BATTLE OF BELMONT—A NARROW ESCAPE—AFTER THE BATTLE.</h3>
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<p>From the occupation of Paducah up to the early part of November
nothing important occurred with the troops under my command. I was
reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled and
disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to come. By
the 1st of November I had not fewer than 20,000 men, most of them
under good drill and ready to meet any equal body of men who, like
themselves, had not yet been in an engagement. They were growing
impatient at lying idle so long, almost in hearing of the guns of
the enemy they had volunteered to fight against. I asked on one or
two occasions to be allowed to move against Columbus. It could have
been taken soon after the occupation of Paducah; but before
November it was so strongly fortified that it would have required a
large force and a long siege to capture it.</p>
<p>In the latter part of October General Fremont took the field in
person and moved from Jefferson City against General Sterling
Price, who was then in the State of Missouri with a considerable
command. About the first of November I was directed from department
headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the
Mississippi River with the view of detaining the rebels at Columbus
within their lines. Before my troops could be got off, I was
notified from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the
enemy on the St. Francis River about fifty miles west, or
south-west, from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force
against them. I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops
sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy. On the
5th word came from the same source that the rebels were about to
detach a large force from Columbus to be moved by boats down the
Mississippi and up the White River, in Arkansas, in order to
reinforce Price, and I was directed to prevent this movement if
possible. I accordingly sent a regiment from Bird's Point under
Colonel W. H. L. Wallace to overtake and reinforce Oglesby, with
orders to march to New Madrid, a point some distance below
Columbus, on the Missouri side. At the same time I directed General
C. F. Smith to move all the troops he could spare from Paducah
directly against Columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from
the town to await further orders from me. Then I gathered up all
the troops at Cairo and Fort Holt, except suitable guards, and
moved them down the river on steamers convoyed by two gunboats,
accompanying them myself. My force consisted of a little over 3,000
men and embraced five regiments of infantry, two guns and two
companies of cavalry. We dropped down the river on the 6th to
within about six miles of Columbus, debarked a few men on the
Kentucky side and established pickets to connect with the troops
from Paducah.</p>
<p>I had no orders which contemplated an attack by the National
troops, nor did I intend anything of the kind when I started out
from Cairo; but after we started I saw that the officers and men
were elated at the prospect of at last having the opportunity of
doing what they had volunteered to do—fight the enemies of
their country. I did not see how I could maintain discipline, or
retain the confidence of my command, if we should return to Cairo
without an effort to do something. Columbus, besides being strongly
fortified, contained a garrison much more numerous than the force I
had with me. It would not do, therefore, to attack that point.
About two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, I learned that the
enemy was crossing troops from Columbus to the west bank to be
dispatched, presumably, after Oglesby. I knew there was a small
camp of Confederates at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus, and
I speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the Missouri
side, capture Belmont, break up the camp and return. Accordingly,
the pickets above Columbus were drawn in at once, and about
daylight the boats moved out from shore. In an hour we were
debarking on the west bank of the Mississippi, just out of range of
the batteries at Columbus.</p>
<p>The ground on the west shore of the river, opposite Columbus, is
low and in places marshy and cut up with sloughs. The soil is rich
and the timber large and heavy. There were some small clearings
between Belmont and the point where we landed, but most of the
country was covered with the native forests. We landed in front of
a cornfield. When the debarkation commenced, I took a regiment down
the river to post it as a guard against surprise. At that time I
had no staff officer who could be trusted with that duty. In the
woods, at a short distance below the clearing, I found a
depression, dry at the time, but which at high water became a
slough or bayou. I placed the men in the hollow, gave them their
instructions and ordered them to remain there until they were
properly relieved. These troops, with the gunboats, were to protect
our transports.</p>
<p>Up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our
intentions. From Columbus they could, of course, see our gunboats
and transports loaded with troops. But the force from Paducah was
threatening them from the land side, and it was hardly to be
expected that if Columbus was our object we would separate our
troops by a wide river. They doubtless thought we meant to draw a
large force from the east bank, then embark ourselves, land on the
east bank and make a sudden assault on Columbus before their
divided command could be united.</p>
<p>About eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation,
marching by the flank. After moving in this way for a mile or a
mile and a half, I halted where there was marshy ground covered
with a heavy growth of timber in our front, and deployed a large
part of my force as skirmishers. By this time the enemy discovered
that we were moving upon Belmont and sent out troops to meet us.
Soon after we had started in line, his skirmishers were encountered
and fighting commenced. This continued, growing fiercer and
fiercer, for about four hours, the enemy being forced back
gradually until he was driven into his camp. Early in this
engagement my horse was shot under me, but I got another from one
of my staff and kept well up with the advance until the river was
reached.</p>
<p>The officers and men engaged at Belmont were then under fire for
the first time. Veterans could not have behaved better than they
did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point they
became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full
reward. The enemy had been followed so closely that when he reached
the clear ground on which his camp was pitched he beat a hasty
retreat over the river bank, which protected him from our shots and
from view. This precipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the
National forces to pick their way without hinderance through the
abatis—the only artificial defence the enemy had. The moment
the camp was reached our men laid down their arms and commenced
rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. Some of the higher
officers were little better than the privates. They galloped about
from one cluster of men to another and at every halt delivered a
short eulogy upon the Union cause and the achievements of the
command.</p>
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<p>All this time the troops we had been engaged with for four
hours, lay crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up
and surrender if summoned to do so; but finding that they were not
pursued, they worked their way up the river and came up on the bank
between us and our transports. I saw at the same time two steamers
coming from the Columbus side towards the west shore, above us,
black—or gray—with soldiers from boiler-deck to roof.
Some of my men were engaged in firing from captured guns at empty
steamers down the river, out of range, cheering at every shot. I
tried to get them to turn their guns upon the loaded steamers above
and not so far away. My efforts were in vain. At last I directed my
staff officers to set fire to the camps. This drew the fire of the
enemy's guns located on the heights of Columbus. They had abstained
from firing before, probably because they were afraid of hitting
their own men; or they may have supposed, until the camp was on
fire, that it was still in the possession of their friends. About
this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank were seen in
line up the river between us and our transports. The alarm
"surrounded" was given. The guns of the enemy and the report of
being surrounded, brought officers and men completely under
control. At first some of the officers seemed to think that to be
surrounded was to be placed in a hopeless position, where there was
nothing to do but surrender. But when I announced that we had cut
our way in and could cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new
revelation to officers and soldiers. They formed line rapidly and
we started back to our boats, with the men deployed as skirmishers
as they had been on entering camp. The enemy was soon encountered,
but his resistance this time was feeble. Again the Confederates
sought shelter under the river banks. We could not stop, however,
to pick them up, because the troops we had seen crossing the river
had debarked by this time and were nearer our transports than we
were. It would be prudent to get them behind us; but we were not
again molested on our way to the boats.</p>
<p>From the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried
to the houses at the rear, near the place of debarkation. I now set
the troops to bringing their wounded to the boats. After this had
gone on for some little time I rode down the road, without even a
staff officer, to visit the guard I had stationed over the approach
to our transports. I knew the enemy had crossed over from Columbus
in considerable numbers and might be expected to attack us as we
were embarking. This guard would be encountered first and, as they
were in a natural intrenchment, would be able to hold the enemy for
a considerable time. My surprise was great to find there was not a
single man in the trench. Riding back to the boat I found the
officer who had commanded the guard and learned that he had
withdrawn his force when the main body fell back. At first I
ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some
time to get the men together and march them back to their position,
I countermanded the order. Then fearing that the enemy we had seen
crossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, I rode
out in the field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe
whether the enemy was passing. The field was grown up with corn so
tall and thick as to cut off the view of even a person on
horseback, except directly along the rows. Even in that direction,
owing to the overhanging blades of corn, the view was not
extensive. I had not gone more than a few hundred yards when I saw
a body of troops marching past me not fifty yards away. I looked at
them for a moment and then turned my horse towards the river and
started back, first in a walk, and when I thought myself concealed
from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse could carry me.
When at the river bank I still had to ride a few hundred yards to
the point where the nearest transport lay.</p>
<p>The cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge
of a dense forest. Before I got back the enemy had entered this
forest and had opened a brisk fire upon the boats. Our men, with
the exception of details that had gone to the front after the
wounded, were now either aboard the transports or very near them.
Those who were not aboard soon got there, and the boats pushed off.
I was the only man of the National army between the rebels and our
transports. The captain of a boat that had just pushed out but had
not started, recognized me and ordered the engineer not to start
the engine; he then had a plank run out for me. My horse seemed to
take in the situation. There was no path down the bank and every
one acquainted with the Mississippi River knows that its banks, in
a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from the
perpendicular. My horse put his fore feet over the bank without
hesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid
down the bank and trotted aboard the boat, twelve or fifteen feet
away, over a single gang plank. I dismounted and went at once to
the upper deck.</p>
<p>The Mississippi River was low on the 7th of November, 1861, so
that the banks were higher than the heads of men standing on the
upper decks of the steamers. The rebels were some distance back
from the river, so that their fire was high and did us but little
harm. Our smoke-stack was riddled with bullets, but there were only
three men wounded on the boats, two of whom were soldiers. When I
first went on deck I entered the captain's room adjoining the
pilot-house, and threw myself on a sofa. I did not keep that
position a moment, but rose to go out on the deck to observe what
was going on. I had scarcely left when a musket ball entered the
room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through it and lodged in
the foot.</p>
<p>When the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats
returned it with vigor. They were well out in the stream and some
distance down, so that they had to give but very little elevation
to their guns to clear the banks of the river. Their position very
nearly enfiladed the line of the enemy while he was marching
through the cornfield. The execution was very great, as we could
see at the time and as I afterwards learned more positively. We
were very soon out of range and went peacefully on our way to
Cairo, every man feeling that Belmont was a great victory and that
he had contributed his share to it.</p>
<p>Our loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing.
About 125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. We
returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other
pieces. The loss of the enemy, as officially reported, was 642 men,
killed, wounded and missing. We had engaged about 2,500 men,
exclusive of the guard left with the transports. The enemy had
about 7,000; but this includes the troops brought over from
Columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of Belmont.</p>
<p>The two objects for which the battle of Belmont was fought were
fully accomplished. The enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops
from Columbus. His losses were very heavy for that period of the
war. Columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead
kin, to take them home for medical treatment or burial. I learned
later, when I had moved further south, that Belmont had caused more
mourning than almost any other battle up to that time. The National
troops acquired a confidence in themselves at Belmont that did not
desert them through the war.</p>
<p>The day after the battle I met some officers from General Polk's
command, arranged for permission to bury our dead at Belmont and
also commenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. When our
men went to bury their dead, before they were allowed to land they
were conducted below the point where the enemy had engaged our
transports. Some of the officers expressed a desire to see the
field; but the request was refused with the statement that we had
no dead there.</p>
<p>While on the truce-boat I mentioned to an officer, whom I had
known both at West Point and in the Mexican war, that I was in the
cornfield near their troops when they passed; that I had been on
horseback and had worn a soldier's overcoat at the time. This
officer was on General Polk's staff. He said both he and the
general had seen me and that Polk had said to his men, "There is a
Yankee; you may try your marksmanship on him if you wish," but
nobody fired at me.</p>
<p>Belmont was severely criticised in the North as a wholly
unnecessary battle, barren of results, or the possibility of them
from the beginning. If it had not been fought, Colonel Oglesby
would probably have been captured or destroyed with his three
thousand men. Then I should have been culpable indeed.</p>
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