<h2>CHAPTER XVI.</h2>
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<h3>RESIGNATION—PRIVATE LIFE—LIFE AT GALENA—THE COMING CRISIS.</h3>
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<p>My family, all this while, was at the East. It consisted now of
a wife and two children. I saw no chance of supporting them on the
Pacific coast out of my pay as an army officer. I concluded,
therefore, to resign, and in March applied for a leave of absence
until the end of the July following, tendering my resignation to
take effect at the end of that time. I left the Pacific coast very
much attached to it, and with the full expectation of making it my
future home. That expectation and that hope remained uppermost in
my mind until the Lieutenant-Generalcy bill was introduced into
Congress in the winter of 1863-4. The passage of that bill, and my
promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming a citizen of the
further West.</p>
<p>In the late summer of 1854 I rejoined my family, to find in it a
son whom I had never seen, born while I was on the Isthmus of
Panama. I was now to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new
struggle for our support. My wife had a farm near St. Louis, to
which we went, but I had no means to stock it. A house had to be
built also. I worked very hard, never losing a day because of bad
weather, and accomplished the object in a moderate way. If nothing
else could be done I would load a cord of wood on a wagon and take
it to the city for sale. I managed to keep along very well until
1858, when I was attacked by fever and ague. I had suffered very
severely and for a long time from this disease, while a boy in
Ohio. It lasted now over a year, and, while it did not keep me in
the house, it did interfere greatly with the amount of work I was
able to perform. In the fall of 1858 I sold out my stock, crops and
farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming.</p>
<p>In the winter I established a partnership with Harry Boggs, a
cousin of Mrs. Grant, in the real estate agency business. I spent
that winter at St. Louis myself, but did not take my family into
town until the spring. Our business might have become prosperous if
I had been able to wait for it to grow. As it was, there was no
more than one person could attend to, and not enough to support two
families. While a citizen of St. Louis and engaged in the real
estate agency business, I was a candidate for the office of county
engineer, an office of respectability and emolument which would
have been very acceptable to me at that time. The incumbent was
appointed by the county court, which consisted of five members. My
opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was a citizen by
adoption) and carried off the prize. I now withdrew from the
co-partnership with Boggs, and, in May, 1860, removed to Galena,
Illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store.</p>
<p>While a citizen of Missouri, my first opportunity for casting a
vote at a Presidential election occurred. I had been in the army
from before attaining my majority and had thought but little about
politics, although I was a Whig by education and a great admirer of
Mr. Clay. But the Whig party had ceased to exist before I had an
opportunity of exercising the privilege of casting a ballot; the
Know-Nothing party had taken its place, but was on the wane; and
the Republican party was in a chaotic state and had not yet
received a name. It had no existence in the Slave States except at
points on the borders next to Free States. In St. Louis City and
County, what afterwards became the Republican party was known as
the Free-Soil Democracy, led by the Honorable Frank P. Blair. Most
of my neighbors had known me as an officer of the army with Whig
proclivities. They had been on the same side, and, on the death of
their party, many had become Know-Nothings, or members of the
American party. There was a lodge near my new home, and I was
invited to join it. I accepted the invitation; was initiated;
attended a meeting just one week later, and never went to another
afterwards.</p>
<p>I have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of
the American party; for I still think native-born citizens of the
United States should have as much protection, as many privileges in
their native country, as those who voluntarily select it for a
home. But all secret, oath-bound political parties are dangerous to
any nation, no matter how pure or how patriotic the motives and
principles which first bring them together. No political party can
or ought to exist when one of its corner-stones is opposition to
freedom of thought and to the right to worship God "according to
the dictate of one's own conscience," or according to the creed of
any religious denomination whatever. Nevertheless, if a sect sets
up its laws as binding above the State laws, wherever the two come
in conflict this claim must be resisted and suppressed at whatever
cost.</p>
<p>Up to the Mexican war there were a few out and out
abolitionists, men who carried their hostility to slavery into all
elections, from those for a justice of the peace up to the
Presidency of the United States. They were noisy but not numerous.
But the great majority of people at the North, where slavery did
not exist, were opposed to the institution, and looked upon its
existence in any part of the country as unfortunate. They did not
hold the States where slavery existed responsible for it; and
believed that protection should be given to the right of property
in slaves until some satisfactory way could be reached to be rid of
the institution. Opposition to slavery was not a creed of either
political party. In some sections more anti-slavery men belonged to
the Democratic party, and in others to the Whigs. But with the
inauguration of the Mexican war, in fact with the annexation of
Texas, "the inevitable conflict" commenced.</p>
<p>As the time for the Presidential election of 1856—the
first at which I had the opportunity of voting—approached,
party feeling began to run high. The Republican party was regarded
in the South and the border States not only as opposed to the
extension of slavery, but as favoring the compulsory abolition of
the institution without compensation to the owners. The most
horrible visions seemed to present themselves to the minds of
people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better. Many
educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe that
emancipation meant social equality. Treason to the Government was
openly advocated and was not rebuked. It was evident to my mind
that the election of a Republican President in 1856 meant the
secession of all the Slave States, and rebellion. Under these
circumstances I preferred the success of a candidate whose election
would prevent or postpone secession, to seeing the country plunged
into a war the end of which no man could foretell. With a Democrat
elected by the unanimous vote of the Slave States, there could be
no pretext for secession for four years. I very much hoped that the
passions of the people would subside in that time, and the
catastrophe be averted altogether; if it was not, I believed the
country would be better prepared to receive the shock and to resist
it. I therefore voted for James Buchanan for President. Four years
later the Republican party was successful in electing its candidate
to the Presidency. The civilized world has learned the consequence.
Four millions of human beings held as chattels have been liberated;
the ballot has been given to them; the free schools of the country
have been opened to their children. The nation still lives, and the
people are just as free to avoid social intimacy with the blacks as
ever they were, or as they are with white people.</p>
<p>While living in Galena I was nominally only a clerk supporting
myself and family on a stipulated salary. In reality my position
was different. My father had never lived in Galena himself, but had
established my two brothers there, the one next younger than myself
in charge of the business, assisted by the youngest. When I went
there it was my father's intention to give up all connection with
the business himself, and to establish his three sons in it: but
the brother who had really built up the business was sinking with
consumption, and it was not thought best to make any change while
he was in this condition. He lived until September, 1861, when he
succumbed to that insidious disease which always flatters its
victims into the belief that they are growing better up to the
close of life. A more honorable man never transacted business. In
September, 1861, I was engaged in an employment which required all
my attention elsewhere.</p>
<p>During the eleven months that I lived in Galena prior to the
first call for volunteers, I had been strictly attentive to my
business, and had made but few acquaintances other than customers
and people engaged in the same line with myself. When the election
took place in November, 1860, I had not been a resident of Illinois
long enough to gain citizenship and could not, therefore, vote. I
was really glad of this at the time, for my pledges would have
compelled me to vote for Stephen A. Douglas, who had no possible
chance of election. The contest was really between Mr. Breckinridge
and Mr. Lincoln; between minority rule and rule by the majority. I
wanted, as between these candidates, to see Mr. Lincoln elected.
Excitement ran high during the canvass, and torch-light processions
enlivened the scene in the generally quiet streets of Galena many
nights during the campaign. I did not parade with either party, but
occasionally met with the "wide awakes"—Republicans—in
their rooms, and superintended their drill. It was evident, from
the time of the Chicago nomination to the close of the canvass,
that the election of the Republican candidate would be the signal
for some of the Southern States to secede. I still had hopes that
the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of a
Presidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slavery
extension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment to
cool down; for the Southerners to think well before they took the
awful leap which they had so vehemently threatened. But I was
mistaken.</p>
<p>The Republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial
people of the North-west, and I presume the same order of people
throughout the entire North, felt very serious, but determined,
after this event. It was very much discussed whether the South
would carry out its threat to secede and set up a separate
government, the corner-stone of which should be, protection to the
"Divine" institution of slavery. For there were people who believed
in the "divinity" of human slavery, as there are now people who
believe Mormonism and Polygamy to be ordained by the Most High. We
forgive them for entertaining such notions, but forbid their
practice. It was generally believed that there would be a flurry;
that some of the extreme Southern States would go so far as to pass
ordinances of secession. But the common impression was that this
step was so plainly suicidal for the South, that the movement would
not spread over much of the territory and would not last long.</p>
<p>Doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them
at least, regarded the confederation of the colonies as an
experiment. Each colony considered itself a separate government;
that the confederation was for mutual protection against a foreign
foe, and the prevention of strife and war among themselves. If
there had been a desire on the part of any single State to withdraw
from the compact at any time while the number of States was limited
to the original thirteen, I do not suppose there would have been
any to contest the right, no matter how much the determination
might have been regretted. The problem changed on the ratification
of the Constitution by all the colonies; it changed still more when
amendments were added; and if the right of any one State to
withdraw continued to exist at all after the ratification of the
Constitution, it certainly ceased on the formation of new States,
at least so far as the new States themselves were concerned. It was
never possessed at all by Florida or the States west of the
Mississippi, all of which were purchased by the treasury of the
entire nation. Texas and the territory brought into the Union in
consequence of annexation, were purchased with both blood and
treasure; and Texas, with a domain greater than that of any
European state except Russia, was permitted to retain as state
property all the public lands within its borders. It would have
been ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for this
State to withdraw from the Union after all that had been spent and
done to introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred,
Texas must necessarily have gone with the South, both on account of
her institutions and her geographical position. Secession was
illogical as well as impracticable; it was revolution.</p>
<p>Now, the right of revolution is an inherent one. When people are
oppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy to
relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough,
either by withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and
substituting a government more acceptable. But any people or part
of a people who resort to this remedy, stake their lives, their
property, and every claim for protection given by
citizenship—on the issue. Victory, or the conditions imposed
by the conqueror—must be the result.</p>
<p>In the case of the war between the States it would have been the
exact truth if the South had said,—"We do not want to live
with you Northern people any longer; we know our institution of
slavery is obnoxious to you, and, as you are growing numerically
stronger than we, it may at some time in the future be endangered.
So long as you permitted us to control the government, and with the
aid of a few friends at the North to enact laws constituting your
section a guard against the escape of our property, we were willing
to live with you. You have been submissive to our rule heretofore;
but it looks now as if you did not intend to continue so, and we
will remain in the Union no longer." Instead of this the seceding
States cried lustily,—"Let us alone; you have no
constitutional power to interfere with us." Newspapers and people
at the North reiterated the cry. Individuals might ignore the
constitution; but the Nation itself must not only obey it, but must
enforce the strictest construction of that instrument; the
construction put upon it by the Southerners themselves. The fact is
the constitution did not apply to any such contingency as the one
existing from 1861 to 1865. Its framers never dreamed of such a
contingency occurring. If they had foreseen it, the probabilities
are they would have sanctioned the right of a State or States to
withdraw rather than that there should be war between brothers.</p>
<p>The framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the
very best possible to secure their own liberty and independence,
and that also of their descendants to the latest days. It is
preposterous to suppose that the people of one generation can lay
down the best and only rules of government for all who are to come
after them, and under unforeseen contingencies. At the time of the
framing of our constitution the only physical forces that had been
subdued and made to serve man and do his labor, were the currents
in the streams and in the air we breathe. Rude machinery, propelled
by water power, had been invented; sails to propel ships upon the
waters had been set to catch the passing breeze—but the
application of stream to propel vessels against both wind and
current, and machinery to do all manner of work had not been
thought of. The instantaneous transmission of messages around the
world by means of electricity would probably at that day have been
attributed to witchcraft or a league with the Devil. Immaterial
circumstances had changed as greatly as material ones. We could not
and ought not to be rigidly bound by the rules laid down under
circumstances so different for emergencies so utterly
unanticipated. The fathers themselves would have been the first to
declare that their prerogatives were not irrevocable. They would
surely have resisted secession could they have lived to see the
shape it assumed.</p>
<p>I travelled through the Northwest considerably during the winter
of 1860-1. We had customers in all the little towns in south-west
Wisconsin, south-east Minnesota and north-east Iowa. These
generally knew I had been a captain in the regular army and had
served through the Mexican war. Consequently wherever I stopped at
night, some of the people would come to the public-house where I
was, and sit till a late hour discussing the probabilities of the
future. My own views at that time were like those officially
expressed by Mr. Seward at a later day, that "the war would be over
in ninety days." I continued to entertain these views until after
the battle of Shiloh. I believe now that there would have been no
more battles at the West after the capture of Fort Donelson if all
the troops in that region had been under a single commander who
would have followed up that victory.</p>
<p>There is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing
sentiment of the South would have been opposed to secession in 1860
and 1861, if there had been a fair and calm expression of opinion,
unbiased by threats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had
counted for as much as that of any other. But there was no calm
discussion of the question. Demagogues who were too old to enter
the army if there should be a war, others who entertained so high
an opinion of their own ability that they did not believe they
could be spared from the direction of the affairs of state in such
an event, declaimed vehemently and unceasingly against the North;
against its aggressions upon the South; its interference with
Southern rights, etc., etc. They denounced the Northerners as
cowards, poltroons, negro-worshippers; claimed that one Southern
man was equal to five Northern men in battle; that if the South
would stand up for its rights the North would back down. Mr.
Jefferson Davis said in a speech, delivered at La Grange,
Mississippi, before the secession of that State, that he would
agree to drink all the blood spilled south of Mason and Dixon's
line if there should be a war. The young men who would have the
fighting to do in case of war, believed all these statements, both
in regard to the aggressiveness of the North and its cowardice.
They, too, cried out for a separation from such people. The great
bulk of the legal voters of the South were men who owned no slaves;
their homes were generally in the hills and poor country; their
facilities for educating their children, even up to the point of
reading and writing, were very limited; their interest in the
contest was very meagre—what there was, if they had been
capable of seeing it, was with the North; they too needed
emancipation. Under the old regime they were looked down upon by
those who controlled all the affairs in the interest of
slave-owners, as poor white trash who were allowed the ballot so
long as they cast it according to direction.</p>
<p>I am aware that this last statement may be disputed and
individual testimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum
days the ballot was as untrammelled in the south as in any section
of the country; but in the face of any such contradiction I
reassert the statement. The shot-gun was not resorted to. Masked
men did not ride over the country at night intimidating voters; but
there was a firm feeling that a class existed in every State with a
sort of divine right to control public affairs. If they could not
get this control by one means they must by another. The end
justified the means. The coercion, if mild, was complete.</p>
<p>There were two political parties, it is true, in all the States,
both strong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal
to the institution which stood paramount in Southern eyes to all
other institutions in state or nation. The slave-owners were the
minority, but governed both parties. Had politics ever divided the
slave-holders and the non-slave-holders, the majority would have
been obliged to yield, or internecine war would have been the
consequence. I do not know that the Southern people were to blame
for this condition of affairs. There was a time when slavery was
not profitable, and the discussion of the merits of the institution
was confined almost exclusively to the territory where it existed.
The States of Virginia and Kentucky came near abolishing slavery by
their own acts, one State defeating the measure by a tie vote and
the other only lacking one. But when the institution became
profitable, all talk of its abolition ceased where it existed; and
naturally, as human nature is constituted, arguments were adduced
in its support. The cotton-gin probably had much to do with the
justification of slavery.</p>
<p>The winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of
to-day as one of great excitement. South Carolina promptly seceded
after the result of the Presidential election was known. Other
Southern States proposed to follow. In some of them the Union
sentiment was so strong that it had to be suppressed by force.
Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky and Missouri, all Slave States, failed
to pass ordinances of secession; but they were all represented in
the so-called congress of the so-called Confederate States. The
Governor and Lieutenant-Governor of Missouri, in 1861, Jackson and
Reynolds, were both supporters of the rebellion and took refuge
with the enemy. The governor soon died, and the lieutenant-governor
assumed his office; issued proclamations as governor of the State;
was recognized as such by the Confederate Government, and continued
his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion. The South
claimed the sovereignty of States, but claimed the right to coerce
into their confederation such States as they wanted, that is, all
the States where slavery existed. They did not seem to think this
course inconsistent. The fact is, the Southern slave-owners
believed that, in some way, the ownership of slaves conferred a
sort of patent of nobility—a right to govern independent of
the interest or wishes of those who did not hold such property.
They convinced themselves, first, of the divine origin of the
institution and, next, that that particular institution was not
safe in the hands of any body of legislators but themselves.</p>
<p>Meanwhile the Administration of President Buchanan looked
helplessly on and proclaimed that the general government had no
power to interfere; that the Nation had no power to save its own
life. Mr. Buchanan had in his cabinet two members at least, who
were as earnest—to use a mild term—in the cause of
secession as Mr. Davis or any Southern statesman. One of them,
Floyd, the Secretary of War, scattered the army so that much of it
could be captured when hostilities should commence, and distributed
the cannon and small arms from Northern arsenals throughout the
South so as to be on hand when treason wanted them. The navy was
scattered in like manner. The President did not prevent his cabinet
preparing for war upon their government, either by destroying its
resources or storing them in the South until a de facto government
was established with Jefferson Davis as its President, and
Montgomery, Alabama, as the Capital. The secessionists had then to
leave the cabinet. In their own estimation they were aliens in the
country which had given them birth. Loyal men were put into their
places. Treason in the executive branch of the government was
estopped. But the harm had already been done. The stable door was
locked after the horse had been stolen.</p>
<p>During all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the Southerners
were so defiant that they would not allow within their borders the
expression of a sentiment hostile to their views, it was a brave
man indeed who could stand up and proclaim his loyalty to the
Union. On the other hand men at the North—prominent
men—proclaimed that the government had no power to coerce the
South into submission to the laws of the land; that if the North
undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have to
march over the dead bodies of the speakers. A portion of the press
of the North was constantly proclaiming similar views. When the
time arrived for the President-elect to go to the capital of the
Nation to be sworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him to
travel, not only as a President-elect, but as any private citizen
should be allowed to do. Instead of going in a special car,
receiving the good wishes of his constituents at all the stations
along the road, he was obliged to stop on the way and to be
smuggled into the capital. He disappeared from public view on his
journey, and the next the country knew, his arrival was announced
at the capital. There is little doubt that he would have been
assassinated if he had attempted to travel openly throughout his
journey.</p>
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