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<h2> LETTER L </h2>
<h3> LONDON, September 13, O. S. 1748. </h3>
<p>DEAR BOY: I have more than once recommended to you the "Memoirs" of the
Cardinal de Retz, and to attend particularly to the political reflections
interspersed in that excellent work. I will now preach a little upon two
or three of those texts.</p>
<p>In the disturbances at Paris, Monsieur de Beaufort, who was a very
popular, though a very weak man, was the Cardinal's tool with the
populace.</p>
<p>Proud of his popularity, he was always for assembling the people of Paris
together, thinking that he made a great figure at the head of them. The
Cardinal, who was factious enough, was wise enough at the same time to
avoid gathering the people together, except when there was occasion, and
when he had something particular for them to do. However, he could not
always check Monsieur de Beaufort; who having assembled them once very
unnecessarily, and without any determined object, they ran riot, would not
be kept within bounds by their leaders, and did their cause a great deal
of harm: upon which the Cardinal observes most judiciously, 'Que Monsieur
de Beaufort me savoit pas, que qui assemble le peuple, l'emeut'. It is
certain, that great numbers of people met together, animate each other,
and will do something, either good or bad, but oftener bad; and the
respective individuals, who were separately very quiet, when met together
in numbers, grow tumultuous as a body, and ripe for any mischief that may
be pointed out to them by the leaders; and, if their leaders have no
business for them, they will find some for themselves. The demagogues, or
leaders of popular factions, should therefore be very careful not to
assemble the people unnecessarily, and without a settled and
well-considered object. Besides that, by making those popular assemblies
too frequent, they make them likewise too familiar, and consequently less
respected by their enemies. Observe any meetings of people, and you will
always find their eagerness and impetuosity rise or fall in proportion to
their numbers: when the numbers are very great, all sense and reason seem
to subside, and one sudden frenzy to seize on all, even the coolest of
them.</p>
<p>Another very just observation of the Cardinal's is, That, the things which
happen in our own times, and which we see ourselves, do not surprise us
near so much as the things which we read of in times past, though not in
the least more extraordinary; and adds, that he is persuaded that when
Caligula made his horse a Consul, the people of Rome, at that time, were
not greatly surprised at it, having necessarily been in some degree
prepared for it, by an insensible gradation of extravagances from the same
quarter. This is so true that we read every day, with astonishment, things
which we see every day without surprise. We wonder at the intrepidity of a
Leonidas, a Codrus, and a Curtius; and are not the least surprised to hear
of a sea-captain, who has blown up his ship, his crew, and himself, that
they might not fall into the hands of the enemies of his country. I cannot
help reading of Porsenna and Regulus, with surprise and reverence, and yet
I remember that I saw, without either, the execution of Shepherd,—[James
Shepherd, a coach-painter's apprentice, was executed at Tyburn for high
treason, March 17, 1718, in the reign of George I.]—a boy of
eighteen years old, who intended to shoot the late king, and who would
have been pardoned, if he would have expressed the least sorrow for his
intended crime; but, on the contrary, he declared that if he was pardoned
he would attempt it again; that he thought it a duty which he owed to his
country, and that he died with pleasure for having endeavored to perform
it. Reason equals Shepherd to Regulus; but prejudice, and the recency of
the fact, make Shepherd a common malefactor and Regulus a hero.</p>
<p>Examine carefully, and reconsider all your notions of things; analyze
them, and discover their component parts, and see if habit and prejudice
are not the principal ones; weigh the matter upon which you are to form
your opinion, in the equal and impartial scales of reason. It is not to be
conceived how many people, capable of reasoning, if they would, live and
die in a thousand errors, from laziness; they will rather adopt the
prejudices of others, than give themselves the trouble of forming opinions
of their own. They say things, at first, because other people have said
them, and then they persist in them, because they have said them
themselves.</p>
<p>The last observation that I shall now mention of the Cardinal's is, "That
a secret is more easily kept by a good many people, than one commonly
imagines." By this he means a secret of importance, among people
interested in the keeping of it. And it is certain that people of business
know the importance of secrecy, and will observe it, where they are
concerned in the event. To go and tell any friend, wife, or mistress, any
secret with which they have nothing to do, is discovering to them such an
unretentive weakness, as must convince them that you will tell it to
twenty others, and consequently that they may reveal it without the risk
of being discovered. But a secret properly communicated only to those who
are to be concerned in the thing in question, will probably be kept by
them though they should be a good many. Little secrets are commonly told
again, but great ones are generally kept. Adieu!</p>
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