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<ANTIMG id="coverpage" src="images/cover.jpg" alt="The Road Past Kennesaw: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864" width-obs="500" height-obs="804" /></div>
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<h1><span class="small">THE ROAD PAST KENNESAW</span> <br/><span class="smallest">THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN OF 1864</span></h1>
<p><i>RICHARD M. McMURRY</i></p>
<p><i>Foreword by Bell I. Wiley</i></p>
<div class="verse">
<p class="t0">Office of Publications</p>
<p class="t0">National Park Service</p>
<p class="t0">U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR</p>
<p class="t0">Washington, D. C. 1972</p>
</div>
<hr class="dwide" />
<p class="center smaller">For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
<br/>Washington, D.C. 20402—Price $1.70
<br/><span class="small">Stock No. 024-005-00288-O/Catalog No. I 29.2:K39</span></p>
</div>
<p>The author: <i>Richard M. McMurry, a long-time student of the Army of
Tennessee and the Atlanta Campaign, is associate professor of history at
Valdosta State College, Valdosta, Ga.</i></p>
<h2><span class="small">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORY SERIES</span></h2>
<p>Publication of this volume was made possible by a grant from the Kennesaw
Mountain Historical Association.</p>
<p class="tb">This publication is one of a series of booklets describing the significance of
historical and archeological areas in the National Park System administered
by the National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. It is printed
by the Government Printing Office and can be purchased from the Superintendent
of Documents, Washington, DC 20402. Price $1.70.</p>
<p class="center">Stock Number 024-005-00288-O <span class="hst">Catalog Number I 29.2:K 39</span></p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_i">i</div>
<h2 id="c1"><span class="small">FOREWORD</span></h2>
<p>The turning point of the Civil War is a perennial matter of
dispute among historians. Some specify the Henry-Donelson-Shiloh
operation of early 1862 as the pivotal campaign;
others insist that Antietam was the key event; still others
are equally sure that Gettysburg and Vicksburg marked the watershed
of military activities. Regardless of when the tide turned,
there can be little doubt that the Federal drive on Atlanta,
launched in May 1864, was the beginning of the end for the
Southern Confederacy. And Sherman’s combination assault-flanking
operation of June 27 at Kennesaw Mountain may very
well be considered the decisive maneuver in the thrust toward
Atlanta. For when Joseph E. Johnston found it necessary to pull
his forces back across the Chattahoochee, the fate of the city was
sealed.</p>
<p>The Atlanta Campaign had an importance reaching beyond the
immediate military and political consequences. It was conducted
in a manner that helped establish a new mode of warfare. From
beginning to end, it was a railroad campaign, in that a major
transportation center was the prize for which the contestants
vied, and both sides used rail lines to marshal, shift, and sustain
their forces. Yanks and Rebs made some use of repeating rifles,
and Confederate references to shooting down “moving bushes”
indicate resort to camouflage by Sherman’s soldiers. The Union
commander maintained a command post under “signal tree” at
Kennesaw Mountain and directed the movement of his forces
through a net of telegraph lines running out to subordinate headquarters.
Men of both armies who early in the war had looked
askance at the employment of pick and shovel, now, as a matter
of course, promptly scooped out protective ditches at each change
of position.</p>
<p>The campaign was also tremendously important as a human
endeavor, and one of the most impressive features of Richard
McMurry’s account is the insight—much of it gleaned from unpublished
letters and diaries—into the motivations, experiences,
and reactions of the participants. The officers and men who endured
the heat and the mud of what must have been one of the
wettest seasons in the history of Georgia and who lived in the
shadow of death day after day for 4 months of as arduous campaigning
<span class="pb" id="Page_ii">ii</span>
as occurred during the whole conflict, stand out as flesh
and blood human beings. This time of severe testing led to the
undoing of some of the generals, including Joseph E. Johnston
and John Bell Hood. Others, notably William Tecumseh Sherman,
capitalized on the opportunities afforded by the campaign to
prove their worth and carve for themselves lasting niches in the
military hall of fame. Still others had their careers cut short by
hostile bullets, among them Leonidas Polk, a leader whose Civil
War experience makes inescapable the conclusion that he should
never have swapped his clerical robes for a general’s stars. In
marked contrast stood James B. McPherson, great both as a man
and a combat commander, whose premature passing elicited moving
statements of grief from leaders on both sides.</p>
<p>Human aspects of the campaign found most vivid and revealing
expression in the letters of the lesser officers and the men whom
they led. Robert M. Gill, a Mississippi lieutenant promoted from
the ranks, poured out in full and frequent letters to his wife his
homesickness, his hopes, his fears, and his spiritual concern; in so
doing, he revealed his virtues and his frailties and his ups and
downs of morale until a Yankee fusillade snuffed out his life at
Jonesborough. On June 22, 1864, he wrote from near Marietta: “I
saw a canteen on which a heavy run was made during and after
the charge. I still like whiskey but do not want any when going
into a charge for I am or at least was drunk enough yesterday
without drinking a drop.” Lieutenant Gill tried very hard to
live up to his wife’s admonitions against “the sins of the camp,”
but he had great difficulty with profanity, especially in the excitement
of battle. After the action at Resaca, he wrote apologetically:
“The men did not move out to suit me, and I forgot everything
and began to curse a cowardly scamp who got behind.” Six
weeks later he reported another lapse, and following the Battle of
Atlanta he wrote: “I done some heavy swearing, I am told.... I
try to do right but it seems impossible for me to keep from
cursing when I get under fire. I hope I will do better hereafter. I
do not wish to die with an oath on my lips.” Gill’s morale
remained relatively good until after the fall of Atlanta. Shortly
after that event, he wrote: “I think this cause a desperate one ...
there is no hope of defeating Lincoln.... I wish I could be
sanguine of success.”</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_iii">iii</div>
<p>John W. Hagan, a stalwart sergeant of Johnston’s army, in
poorly spelled words and awkwardly constructed paragraphs addressed
to his wife, demonstrated the character and strength of
the lowly men who were the backbone of both armies. From near
Marietta on June 17, 1864, Hagan wrote: “the yankees charged
us ... & we finelly drove them back we all had as much to do as
we could do. James & Ezekiel acted very brave the boys Say
Ezekiel went to shooting like he was spliting rails; in fact all the
Regt acted there parts.” The combat performance of Hagan and
his men contrasted markedly with that of one of the officers who
was the acting company commander, a Lieutenant Tomlinson. On
June 21, Hagan wrote his wife: “I have been in command of our
company 3 days. Lieut. Tomlinson stays along but pretends to be
so sick he can not go in a fight but so long as I Keepe the right
side up Co. ‘K’ will be all right.” Hagan’s morale remained high,
despite the fact that he had not received any pay for more than a
year. On July 4, he wrote that “some of our troops grow despondent
but it is only thoes who are all ways despondent,” and added:
“all good soldiers will fight harder the harder he is prest but a
coward is allways ready to want an excuse to run or say they or
we are whiped. I never Knew there was so many cowards untill
Since we left Dalton. I do not Speak of our Regt but some troops
have behaved very badly.”</p>
<p>Sergeant Hagan and other Rebs who fought in the Atlanta
Campaign had a wholesome respect for the men in blue who opposed
them; and rightfully so, for the Union rank and file, mostly
lads and young adults from the farms of the Midwest, were admirable
folk, deeply devoted to the cause of Union. One of them,
Pvt. John F. Brobst of the 25th Wisconsin Regiment, wrote his
sweetheart before the campaign was launched: “Home is sweet
and friends are dear, but what would they all be to let the country
go to ruin and be a slave. I am contented with my lot ... for I
know that I am doing my duty, and I know that it is my duty to
do as I am now a-doing. If I live to get back, I shall be proud of
the freedom I shall have, and know that I helped to gain that
freedom. If I should not get back, it will do them good who do get
back.”</p>
<p>Despite the publication during the past century of many studies
on the subject, the Atlanta Campaign—overshadowed both
<span class="pb" id="Page_iv">iv</span>
during the war and later by the engagements in Virginia—has not
received anything like its due share of attention. Now for the first
time, thanks to Richard McMurry’s thoroughness as a researcher
and skill as a narrator, students of the Civil War have a clear,
succinct, balanced, authoritative, and interesting account of the
tremendously important Georgia operations of May to September
1864. This excellent work should be as comprehensible and appealing
to those who read history and tour battle areas for fun as
it is to those who have achieved expertness in Civil War history.</p>
<p><span class="lr">Bell I. Wiley</span></p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_v">v</div>
<h2 id="toc" class="center">CONTENTS</h2>
<br/><SPAN href="#c1">Foreword by Bell I. Wiley</SPAN> i
<br/><SPAN href="#c2">Spring 1864</SPAN> 1
<br/><SPAN href="#c3">Resaca</SPAN> 7
<br/><SPAN href="#c4">To the Etowah</SPAN> 14
<br/><SPAN href="#c5">New Hope Church</SPAN> 18
<br/><SPAN href="#c6">Kennesaw Mountain</SPAN> 23
<br/><SPAN href="#c7">Across the Chattahoochee</SPAN> 29
<br/><SPAN href="#c8">Johnston Removed From Command</SPAN> 32
<br/><SPAN href="#c9">In the Ranks</SPAN> 34
<br/><SPAN href="#c10">Peachtree Creek</SPAN> 42
<br/><SPAN href="#c11">The Battle of Atlanta</SPAN> 46
<br/><SPAN href="#c12">Ezra Church</SPAN> 48
<br/><SPAN href="#c13">The Month of August</SPAN> 51
<br/><SPAN href="#c14">Jonesborough</SPAN> 54
<br/><SPAN href="#c15">Epilogue</SPAN> 57
<br/><SPAN href="#c16">Sherman in Atlanta: A Photographic Portfolio</SPAN> 59
<br/><SPAN href="#c17">For Further Reading</SPAN> 70
<br/><SPAN href="#c18">Civil War Sites in Georgia</SPAN> 71
<div class="pb" id="Page_vi">vi</div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p01.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width-obs="500" height-obs="712" /></div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_1">1</div>
<h2 id="c2"><span class="small">SPRING 1864</span></h2>
<p>One of the most important military campaigns of the
American Civil War was fought in northwestern Georgia
during the spring and summer of 1864 between Northern
forces under Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman and Confederates
commanded first by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston and then by Gen.
John B. Hood. This campaign resulted in the capture of Atlanta
by the Unionists, prepared the way for Sherman’s “March to the
Sea,” and, in the opinion of many historians, made inevitable the
reelection of Abraham Lincoln and the consequent determination
of the North to see the war through to final victory rather than
accept a compromise with secession and slavery.</p>
<p>Spring 1864 marked the beginning of the war’s fourth
year. In the eastern theater, 3 years of fighting had led to a
virtual stalemate, with the opposing armies hovering between
Washington and Richmond—about where they had been when
the war began in 1861. However, the situation was quite different
in the vast area between the Appalachian Mountains and the
Mississippi River, a region known in the 1860’s as “the West.”
There in 1862 Federal armies had driven the Southerners out of
Kentucky and much of Tennessee. In the following year the
Northerners secured control of the Mississippi River and captured
the important city of Chattanooga. By early 1864, Union armies
were poised for what they hoped would be a quick campaign to
dismember the Confederacy and end the war. This feeling was
well illustrated by an Illinois soldier who wrote his sister on April
22, “I think we can lick the Rebs like a book when we start to do
it & hope we will Clean Rebeldom out this summer so we will be
able to quit the business.”</p>
<p>To realize these hopes, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, commander
of the Northern armies, planned a simultaneous move on all
fronts, with the greatest efforts devoted to Virginia, where he
would personally direct operations, and to the region between the
Tennessee and Chattahoochee Rivers, where the Federals would
be led by Sherman and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks. Grant
hoped that Banks would move from New Orleans, seize Mobile,
and advance northward toward Montgomery, while Sherman’s
force struck southward from Chattanooga. Had these plans succeeded,
the Confederacy would have been reduced to a small area
along the coast of Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia. Confederate
victories in Louisiana, however, made Banks’ projected campaign
infeasible, and Sherman’s drive southward into Georgia,
with Atlanta as the initial goal, became the major Union effort in
the West.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_2">2</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig1"> <ANTIMG src="images/p02.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="715" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_3">3</div>
<p>Leaders on both sides had long recognized the importance of
Atlanta, located a few miles south of the Chattahoochee and
about 120 miles from Chattanooga. In 1864, only Richmond was
more important to the South. Atlanta’s four railroads were not
only the best means of communication between the eastern and
western parts of the Confederacy but they were also the major
lines of supply for the Southern armies in Virginia and north
Georgia. The city’s hospitals cared for the sick and wounded and
her factories produced many kinds of military goods. In the words
of a Northern editor, Atlanta was “the great military depot of
Rebeldom.” In addition, the city’s capture would give the Union
armies a base from which they could strike further into Georgia
to reach such vital manufacturing and administrative centers as
Milledgeville, Macon, Augusta, and Columbus. All of these things
were clear to the men who led the opposing armies.</p>
<p>William Tecumseh Sherman was a thin, nervous, active man,
with a wild shock of reddish or light-brown hair. A 44-year-old
native of Ohio, he had been graduated from the U.S. Military
Academy in 1840 and, after several years’ service in the Army,
had resigned his commission to go into banking and later into
education. The outbreak of war had found him serving as superintendent
of a military college in Louisiana. He resigned this position
and returned to the North, where he entered Federal service.
Rising rapidly in the Army, he was chosen as supreme commander
in the West in early 1864. His soldiers liked him and
affectionately called him “Uncle Billy.” An officer who was with
him in 1864 described the Federal commander as “tall and lank,
not very erect, with hair like a thatch, which he rubs up with his
hands, a rusty beard trimmed close, a wrinkled face, prominent
red nose, small bright eyes, coarse red hands ... he smokes
constantly.” Sherman was also a dogged fighter unawed by obstacles
that would have broken lesser men, and Grant knew he could
be counted on to carry out his part of the grand strategical plan
for 1864.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_4">4</div>
<p>Sherman’s assignment was to break up the Confederate army
in north Georgia and “to get into the interior of the enemy’s
country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can
against their war resources.” To accomplish this mission, he had
almost 100,000 men organized into three armies—the Army of the
Cumberland, commanded by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas; the
Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Maj. Gen. James B.
McPherson; and the Army of the Ohio, commanded by Maj. Gen.
John M. Schofield. By early May, Sherman had assembled these
troops around Chattanooga and was prepared to march with them
into Georgia.</p>
<p>Opposed to Sherman’s host was the Confederate Army of Tennessee,
commanded by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston was a
Virginian and, like Sherman, a graduate of West Point (Class of
1829). He had served in the U.S. Army until Virginia seceded in
the spring of 1861, when he resigned and entered Confederate
service. In December 1863 he was named commander of the major
Confederate force in the West and given the mission of defending
the area against further Northern advance. Johnston had an almost
uncanny ability to win the loyal support of his subordinates.
An Arkansas officer who met the Southern commander in early
1864 noted in his diary: “General Johnston is about 50 years of
age—is quite gray—and has a spare form, an intelligent face, and
an expressive blue eye. He was very polite, raising his cap to me
after the introduction.”</p>
<p>Unfortunately for the Confederacy, Johnston was also secretive,
stubborn when dealing with his superiors, petulant, and too
prone to see difficulties rather than opportunities. He constantly
worried about defeat and retreat, and was hesitant to act. In sum,
he was a man whose personality prevented him from effectively
utilizing his many abilities.</p>
<p>At the beginning of May, the 55,000 men of Johnston’s army
were concentrated around Dalton, Ga., 35 miles southeast of
Chattanooga. The Southern force consisted of two infantry corps
commanded by Lt. Gens. William J. Hardee and John Bell Hood,
and a cavalry corps led by Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler. What
Johnston would do with these troops was still very much in
doubt. The Confederate government wanted him to march into
Tennessee and reestablish Southern authority over that crucial
<span class="pb" id="Page_5">5</span>
State. Johnston, however, believed that conditions for such an
offensive were not favorable and that he should await Sherman’s
advance, defeat it, and then undertake to regain Tennessee. At
the opening of the campaign in early May, this issue had not been
settled. The lack of understanding and cooperation between the
government in Richmond and the general in Georgia, illustrated
by this incident, was to hamper Confederate efforts throughout
the campaign.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig2"> <ANTIMG src="images/p03.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="573" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Gen. Joseph E. Johnston</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_6">6</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig3"> <ANTIMG src="images/p04.jpg" alt="" width-obs="517" height-obs="800" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">ATLANTA CAMPAIGN<br/>1864</span></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_7">7</div>
<h2 id="c3"><span class="small">RESACA</span></h2>
<p>Three major rivers—the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the
Chattahoochee—flow from northeast to southwest across
northern Georgia, dividing the area into four distinct geographical
regions. Between Chattanooga and the Oostanaula, several
parallel mountain ridges slice across the State in such a
manner as to hamper military movements. The most important of
these was Rocky Face Ridge which ran from near the Oostanaula
to a point several miles north of Dalton. This ridge rose high
above the surrounding valleys and was the barrier between Johnston’s
army at Dalton and Sherman’s forces at Chattanooga.
There were three important gaps in this ridge: Mill Creek Gap
west of Dalton, Dug Gap a few miles to the south, and Snake
Creek Gap west of the little village of Resaca near the Oostanaula.</p>
<p>Dalton is on the eastern side of Rocky Face Ridge. The Western
and Atlantic Railroad, which connected Chattanooga and Atlanta
and served as the line of supply for both armies, crossed the
Oostanaula near Resaca, ran north for 15 miles to Dalton, then
turned westward to pass through Rocky Face Ridge at Mill Creek
Gap, and continued on to Chattanooga. During the winter, the
Confederates had fortified the area around Dalton to such an
extent that they believed it to be secure against any attack.
Johnston hoped that the Federals would assault his lines on
Rocky Face Ridge, for he was confident that he could hurl the
Northerners back with heavy loss.</p>
<p>Sherman, however, had no intention of smashing his army
against what one of his soldiers called the “Georgian Gibraltar.”
Northern scouts had found Snake Creek Gap unguarded and the
Federal commander decided to send McPherson’s Army of the
Tennessee through this gap to seize the railroad near Resaca.
Meanwhile, Thomas and Schofield would engage the Confederates
at Dalton to prevent their sending men to oppose McPherson.
Sherman hoped that when Johnston discovered his line of supply
in Federal hands, he would fall back in disorder and his army
could be routed by the Northerners. By May 6, the Federals were
ready to begin the campaign. Sherman moved Thomas and Schofield
toward Dalton while McPherson prepared to strike for Snake
Creek Gap.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_8">8</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig4"> <ANTIMG src="images/p05.jpg" alt="" width-obs="400" height-obs="402" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson</i></p> </div>
<p>Johnston had not been idle. He had deployed his men in strong
positions to block the expected advance. He had also requested
reinforcements, and these were on the way. Some coastal garrisons
had been withdrawn from their posts and were being sent to
join Johnston. More important, though, was the large body of
troops from Mississippi that was moving across Alabama toward
Dalton. These men, numbering about 15,000, constituted the
Army of Mississippi and were commanded by Lt. Gen. Leonidas
Polk. A West Point graduate (1827), Polk had resigned from the
Army to enter the Episcopal ministry. In 1861 he was Bishop of
Louisiana and entered the Confederate service where he was
known as the Bishop-General. When Polk joined Johnston the
Confederate strength would be raised to about 70,000.</p>
<p>Before Polk arrived, however, Sherman sent Thomas and Schofield
against Johnston’s position. On May 7 and 8, there was
heavy fighting all along the lines from the area north of Dalton
south along Rocky Face Ridge to Dug Gap. The Federals
made no real headway, but the demonstration served its purpose,
for McPherson reached Snake Creek Gap on the evening of the
8th and found it open.</p>
<p>James Birdseye McPherson, who stood at Snake Creek Gap on
<span class="pb" id="Page_9">9</span>
the morning of May 9 with an opportunity to strike Johnston a
crippling blow, was one of the Civil War’s most attractive leaders.
Like Sherman, he was an Ohioan and a West Pointer (1853). In
1864 he was only 35 years old. His entire adult life had been
spent in the Army, and in the Civil War his abilities had carried
him from captain to major general in slightly more than a year’s
time. Both Sherman and Grant looked upon him as an outstanding
leader—a belief shared by the Confederate editor who called
McPherson “the most dangerous man in the whole Yankee
army.” He was handsome, with flowing hair and whiskers, and he
had a special reason for wanting the war to end: when it was over
he would be able to marry the beautiful girl who was waiting for
him in Baltimore. He was courteous to men of all ranks, and his
adoring soldiers remembered long afterwards his habit of riding
in the fields to leave the roads open for them.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig5"> <ANTIMG src="images/p05a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="650" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">OPENING BATTLES OF THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN</span></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_10">10</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig6"> <ANTIMG src="images/p06.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="318" /> <p class="pcap"><i>For four long and bloody months, officers and men alike endured the heat and mud of what must have been one of the wettest seasons in the history of Georgia.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_12">12</div>
<p>On May 9, while skirmishing continued about Dalton, McPherson
led his army eastward, hoping to reach the railroad near
Resaca and break Johnston’s communications with Atlanta. Unknown
to the Federals, there were some 4,000 Confederates in
Resaca. These included the advance elements of Polk’s army, as
well as infantry and cavalry units assigned to guard the Oostanaula
bridges and to protect the area.</p>
<p>The Northern advance met these Southerners near the town.
McPherson, surprised at finding so large a force in his front,
moved with great caution. Late in the afternoon, he became worried
that Johnston might rush troops southward and cut him off
from Sherman. This fear, and the fact that some of his men were
without food, led him to break off the engagement and fall back
to a position at Snake Creek Gap which he fortified that night.</p>
<p>In the following days, both armies shifted to the Resaca area.
Sherman began by sending a division of Thomas’ army to aid
McPherson. Soon orders followed for almost all of the Federals to
march southward, with only a small detachment left to watch
Johnston. All day on the 11th the roads west of Rocky Face were
crowded with troops, wagons, and guns. Although the march was
slowed by a heavy rain, nightfall of the 12th found the Northern
army concentrated at Snake Creek Gap. Johnston discovered the
Federal move and during the night of May 12-13 ordered his men
to Resaca where Polk’s troops had been halted.</p>
<p>Skirmishing on the 13th developed the positions of the armies.
Johnston had posted his men on the high ground north and west
of Resaca. Polk’s Corps (as the Army of Mississippi was called)
held the Confederate left, Hardee’s men occupied the center, and
Hood was on the right, with his right flank curved back to the
Conasauga River. The Federal advance, McPherson’s army, had
moved directly toward Resaca. When the advance was slowed,
Thomas moved to the north and formed his army on McPherson’s
left. Schofield moved into position on Thomas’ left.</p>
<p>The Battle of Resaca, fought May 13-15, was the first major
engagement of the campaign. The 13th was spent in skirmishing
<span class="pb" id="Page_13">13</span>
and establishing the positions of the two armies. The 14th saw
much heavy fighting. Sherman delivered a major attack against
the right center of Johnston’s line and was hurled back with a
heavy loss. One Northerner described the Confederate fire as
“<i>terrific and deadly</i>.” Later, Hood made a determined assault on
the Federal left and was prevented from winning a great victory
when Union reinforcements were hurried to the scene from other
sectors of the line. Late in the day, troops from McPherson’s
army made slight gains against the Confederate left. Fighting
ceased at dark, although firing continued throughout the night.
There was no time for the men to rest, however; both Johnston
and Sherman kept their soldiers busy digging fortifications, caring
for the wounded, moving to new positions, and preparing for the
next day’s battle.</p>
<p>The heaviest fighting on the 15th occurred at the northern end
of the lines. There, both sides made attacks that achieved some
local success but were inconclusive. Meanwhile, a Federal detachment
had been sent down the Oostanaula to attempt a crossing.
At Lay’s Ferry, a few miles below Resaca, it got over the river
and secured a position from which to strike eastward against
Johnston’s rail line. The Southern commander believed that this
left him no choice but to retreat. Accordingly, during the night of
May 15-16, the Confederates withdrew and crossed to the southern
bank of the Oostanaula, burning the bridges behind them.</p>
<p>As is the case with many Civil War battles, no accurate casualty
figures are available for the engagement at Resaca. Federal
losses were probably about 3,500; Confederate casualties were
approximately 2,600.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_14">14</div>
<h2 id="c4"><span class="small">TO THE ETOWAH</span></h2>
<p>South of the Oostanaula, steep ridges and heavy woods
give way to gently rolling hills with only a light cover of
vegetation. The area was almost without defensible terrain
and thus afforded a great advantage to Sherman, whose
larger forces would have more opportunities for maneuver than
they had found in the mountainous region to the north.</p>
<p>Once across the Oostanaula, Johnston sought to make a stand
and draw the Federals into a costly assault. He expected to find
favorable terrain near Calhoun, but in this he was disappointed
and during the night of May 16-17 he led the Confederates on
southward toward Adairsville. The Federals followed—Sherman
dividing his forces into three columns and advancing on a broad
front. There were skirmishes all along the route during the 16th
and 17th, but the main bodies were not engaged.</p>
<p>At Adairsville Johnston again hoped to find a position in which
he could give battle, but there too the terrain was unsuitable for
defense and the Confederate commander was forced to continue
his retreat. As he fell back, however, Johnston devised a stratagem
that he hoped would lead to the destruction of a part of Sherman’s
forces. There were two roads leading south from Adairsville—one
south to Kingston, the other southeast to Cassville. It seemed
likely that Sherman would divide his armies so as to use both
roads. This would give Johnston the opportunity to attack one
column before the other could come to its aid.</p>
<p>When the Southerners abandoned Adairsville during the night
of May 17-18, Johnston sent Hardee’s Corps to Kingston while
he fell back toward Cassville with the rest of his army. He hoped
that Sherman would believe most of the Southerners to be in
Kingston and concentrate the bulk of his forces there. Hardee
would then hold off the Northerners at Kingston while Johnston,
with Polk and Hood, destroyed the smaller Federal column at
Cassville.</p>
<p>Sherman reacted as Johnston hoped, ordering McPherson and
the bulk of Thomas’ army toward Kingston while sending only
Schofield and one corps of Thomas’ army along the road to Cassville.
On the morning of May 19, Johnston ordered Hood to
march along a country road a mile or so east of the Adairsville-Cassville
Road and form his corps for battle facing west. While
<span class="pb" id="Page_15">15</span>
Polk attacked the head of the Federal column, Hood was to assail
its left flank. As Hood was moving into position, he found Northern
soldiers to the east. This was a source of great danger, for had
Hood formed facing west, these Federals would have been in
position to attack the exposed flank and rear of his corps. After a
brief skirmish with the Northerners, Hood fell back to rejoin
Polk. Johnston, believing that the opportunity for a successful
battle had passed, ordered Hood and Polk to move to a new line
east and south of Cassville, where they were joined by Hardee
who had been pushed out of Kingston. Johnston formed his
army on a ridge and hoped that Sherman would attack him there
on May 20. As usual, the Southern commander was confident of
repulsing the enemy.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig7"> <ANTIMG src="images/p07.jpg" alt="" width-obs="700" height-obs="701" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">TO THE ETOWAH</span></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_16">16</div>
<p>That night the Confederate leaders held a council of war. Exactly
what happened at the council is a matter of dispute.
According to Johnston, Polk and Hood reported that their lines
could not be held and urged that the army retreat. Believing that
the fears of the corps commanders would be communicated to
their men and thus weaken the army’s confidence, Johnston
yielded to these demands, even though he thought the position to
be defensible. According to Hood, whose recollection of the
council differs markedly from Johnston’s, he and Polk told Johnston
that the line could not be held against an attack but that it
was a good position from which to move against the enemy.
Johnston, however, was unwilling to risk an offensive battle and
decided to fall back across the Etowah. No definite resolution of
this dispute is possible, but most of the available evidence supports
Hood’s version of the conference. Certainly Johnston was
not obligated to allow the advice of subordinates to overrule his
own judgment. The responsibility for abandoning the Cassville
position rests on the Southern commander.</p>
<p>During the night, the Confederates withdrew across the Etowah.
As they fell back, their feelings were mixed. They had lost a
very strong position at Dalton, and had fallen back from Resaca,
Calhoun, and Adairsville. Now they were retreating again under
cover of darkness. That morning as they prepared for battle, their
spirits had been high. Now their disappointment was bitter. Although
morale would revive in the next few days, many Southern
soldiers would never again place as much confidence in Johnston’s
abilities as they once had.</p>
<p>By contrast, morale in the Federal ranks soared. In a short
time of campaigning, the Northerners had “driven” their enemy
from one position after another. Sherman was satisfied with the
progress his armies had made and, after learning that the Confederates
were south of the Etowah, he decided to give his men a
short rest. On May 20, one of the Northern generals summarized
the situation in a letter to his wife:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Thus far our campaign has succeeded though it must be confessed the
rebels have retreated in very good order and their army is still
unbroken. Our hard work is still before us. We are still 53 miles from
Atlanta and have to pass over a rugged Country. We will have some
bloody work before we enter that place.</p>
</blockquote>
<div class="pb" id="Page_17">17</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig8"> <ANTIMG src="images/p08.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="483" /> <p class="pcap"><i>After a council with Hood and Polk, Johnston abandoned the Cassville position.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_18">18</div>
<h2 id="c5"><span class="small">NEW HOPE CHURCH</span></h2>
<p>The region south of the Etowah was one of the wildest parts
of north Georgia. The area was sparsely settled, hilly,
heavily wooded, and, in 1864, little known and poorly
mapped. Sherman expected to push through this region with little
delay. On May 23 he wrote, “The Etowah is the Rubicon of Georgia.
We are now all in motion like a vast hive of bees, and expect
to swarm along the Chattahoochee in a few days.” His optimism
was ill-founded, for the rough terrain and heavy rains favored
Johnston’s smaller force and helped delay the Federal advance for
5 weeks.</p>
<p>Johnston posted his army around Allatoona Pass, a gap in the
high hills south of the Etowah through which the railroad ran on
its way southward to Marietta. He had again occupied a strong
position hoping that Sherman would attack it. The Federal commander,
however, aware of the natural strength of the terrain,
was determined to avoid a direct assault and crossed the river to
the west where the country was more open. Dallas, a small town
about 14 miles south of the river and about the same distance
west of the railroad, was the first objective.</p>
<p>The Northerners began their advance on the 23d. McPherson
swung far to the west through Van Wert and then moved eastward
toward Dallas. Thomas was in the center moving via Stilesboro
and Burnt Hickory. Schofield was on the left, closest to the
Etowah. The day was hot and the men suffered greatly from
thirst. Nevertheless, the Federals made progress toward their
objective and, on the 24th, were closing in on Dallas.</p>
<p>Confederate cavalry soon discovered Sherman’s movement and
Johnston took steps to meet it. By evening of the 24th, the
Southerners held a line east of Dallas which ran from southwest
to northeast. The key to the position was a crossroads at a Methodist
church named New Hope. Hood’s Corps held this part of the
line. Polk and Hardee were to his left.</p>
<p>On May 25, some troops of Thomas’ army ran up against
Hood’s line at New Hope Church. In a late afternoon battle
fought under dark skies and rolling bursts of thunder, Thomas’
men made a series of gallant assaults against the Southern line.
The Federals met a withering hail of bullets and shells that
quickly halted each advance. In this short engagement, Thomas
lost about 1,500 men. The Confederates suffered little during the
battle and were elated at their success.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_19">19</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig9"> <ANTIMG src="images/p09.jpg" alt="" width-obs="514" height-obs="795" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">BATTLES AROUND NEW HOPE CHURCH</span></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_20">20</div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p10.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width-obs="500" height-obs="632" /></div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_21">21</div>
<p>Sunrise on the 26th found both commanders working to position
their men in the woods east of Dallas. Except for skirmishing,
there was little fighting during the day.</p>
<p>On the following day, Sherman attempted to defeat the right of
the Southern line by a surprise attack. In a battle known as
Pickett’s Mill, the Northerners were hurled back with about 1,500
casualties. For the Federals, this engagement was one of the most
desperate of the campaign. One company of the 41st Ohio Regiment
lost 20 of its 22 men. The 49th Ohio carried slightly over
400 men into the battle and lost 203 of them. The commander of
another regiment wrote that he lost a third of his men in the first
few yards of the advance. “The rebel fire ... swept the ground
like a hailstorm,” wrote another Unionist, adding, “this is surely
not war it is butchery.” A third Northerner noted in his diary
that evening, “our men were slaughtered terribly 2 brigades of
infantry were almost cut to pieces.” The Southerners lost about
500 men.</p>
<p>Over the next few days fighting continued almost incessantly.
Both sides made assaults with strongly reinforced skirmish lines,
seeking to hold the enemy in position. This type of combat was
very tiring on the men. One soldier wrote after a night battle, “O
God, what a night. They may tell of hell and its awful fires, but
the boys who went thru the fight at Dallas ... are pretty well
prepared for any event this side of eternity.”</p>
<p>The days spent in the jungles near New Hope Church were
among the most arduous of the war for the soldiers of both armies.
In addition to the normal dangers of combat, the men had
to undergo unusual physical hardships. Rain, heat, constant
alarms, continuous sharpshooting, the stench of the dead, the
screams of the wounded, and a serious shortage of food all added
to the normal discomforts of life in the field. One Federal soldier
described the time spent near Dallas as “Probably the most
wretched week” of the campaign. Another wrote of it as “a wearisome
waste of life and strength.” A third Northerner, referring to
an unsuccessful foray against the Confederate lines, wrote, “We
have struck a hornet nest at the business end.” So severe had the
fighting been that Sherman’s men would ever afterward refer to
<span class="pb" id="Page_22">22</span>
the struggle around New Hope Church as the “Battle of the Hell
Hole.”</p>
<p>When it became clear that no decisive battle would be fought
at Dallas, Sherman gradually sidled eastward to regain the railroad.
On June 3, advance elements of the Federal forces reached
the little town of Acworth, and within a few days, almost all the
Northern troops were in that general area. Sherman had outmaneuvered
Johnston and bypassed the strong Confederate position
at Allatoona, but he had not seriously weakened his opponent.
Once again the Federal commander ordered a short halt to rest
his troops and allow time to repair the railroad and for reinforcements
to arrive.</p>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p11.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width-obs="500" height-obs="534" /></div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_23">23</div>
<h2 id="c6"><span class="small">KENNESAW MOUNTAIN</span></h2>
<p>By June 10, Sherman was ready to resume the advance. The
Southerners had taken up a line north of Marietta that
ran from Brush Mountain on the east to Pine Mountain in
the center to Lost Mountain on the west. McPherson moved
against the right flank of this line, Thomas against the center,
and Schofield against the left. Rain fell almost every day and
hampered the Northern advance. For several days there was
heavy skirmishing in which the Federals captured Pine Mountain
and made gains at other points. Bishop-General Polk was killed
on Pine Mountain by a Union artillery shell on June 14, when he
foolishly exposed himself to enemy fire. Maj. Gen. William W.
Loring commanded Polk’s Corps for several weeks until a permanent
replacement, Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, took command.</p>
<p>By the 16th, Schofield’s advance had been so successful that
the Southerners were forced to give up Lost Mountain. For several
days, Johnston tried to hold a new line that ran west from
Brush Mountain and then turned southward. This line was enfiladed
by the Federal artillery, however, and during the night of
June 18-19 the Confederates abandoned it and took up a new
position extending along the crest of Kennesaw Mountain and off
to the south. Hardee’s Corps held the left of this line, Loring’s
was in the center, and Hood’s was on the right.</p>
<p>When Sherman encountered this strong position, he extended
his lines to the south to try to outflank Johnston. He moved most
of McPherson’s army to the area directly in front of Kennesaw
Mountain and placed Thomas’ army in line on McPherson’s right
with orders to extend to the right. In the days that followed,
McPherson and Thomas were engaged in what amounted to a
siege of the Southern position. Little progress could be made on
the ground but the artillery on both sides was used in attempts to
batter and weaken the enemy. Day after day, the big Union guns
pounded the Southern line, their fire being answered by Confederate
cannon high on Kennesaw Mountain.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Sherman drew Schofield’s army in from the Lost
Mountain area and ordered it to move south on the Sandtown
Road, which ran west of the Federal position toward the Chattahoochee.
After a long and muddy march, Schofield’s men reached
<span class="pb" id="Page_24">24</span>
Nose’s Creek at dark on June 19. On the following day, they
crossed the swollen stream and drove the Southerners away. The
bridge was rebuilt; on the 21st their advance was resumed. That
same day, the right of Thomas’ army established contact with
Schofield near Powder Springs Road.</p>
<p>Johnston had seen the Federal right being extended and was
aware of the dangers it presented to his line of communications.
To meet this threat the Confederate commander shifted Hood’s
Corps from the right of his line to the left during the night of
June 21-22. By early afternoon of the 22d, Hood’s men were in
position on Hardee’s left.</p>
<p>Early on the 22d, the right of the Northern line resumed
its advance. The XX Corps of Thomas’ army moved east on
Powder Springs Road, supported by some of Schofield’s troops.
By midafternoon, they reached the vicinity of Valentine Kolb’s
farm. The rest of Schofield’s army continued down Sandtown
Road to the Cheney farm, where it occupied a position overlooking
Olley’s Creek.</p>
<p>In the early part of the afternoon, the Federals captured several
Southerners from whom they learned that Hood had moved
to the Confederate left. From this they concluded that an attack
upon the Federal line was imminent. Quickly the Northern commanders
closed up their units and began to construct protecting
works, using fence rails or whatever material was at hand. Skirmishers
were thrown out, and they soon encountered an advancing
line of Southerners. Just what brought about this attack is
not clear. Perhaps the activities of the Northern skirmishers led
the Confederates to think that the Federals were attacking. Hood
may have believed that when the skirmishers fell back he had
defeated an assault on his new position and decided to pursue the
beaten enemy. At any rate, the Southern advance precipitated a
battle at the Kolb farmhouse in which several Confederate attacks
were hurled back by the Federals. Hood lost about 1,000
men. Northern casualties were about 300. After the battle, Hood
fell back to his original position, extending the Southern line
southward to Olley’s Creek. For several days, there was relative
calm along the lines which now ran from the railroad north of
Marietta to Olley’s Creek southwest of the town. Meanwhile, the
rains ceased and the June sun began to dry the land.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_25">25</div>
<p>Several days after the battle at Kolb’s farm, Sherman decided
on a change in tactics—he would make a direct assault on Johnston’s
lines. It was a bold decision that offered the possibility of a
great victory. The Southern line was thinly held and a successful
attack could lead to the isolation and destruction of a large part
of Johnston’s army. The Federal commander decided to strike
the Confederates at three points: McPherson would assault the
southern end of Kennesaw Mountain, Thomas would move
against a salient known as the “Dead Angle” (on what is now
called Cheatham’s Hill) several miles to the south, and Schofield
would push south on Sandtown Road and attempt to cross
Olley’s Creek. June 27 was set as the date for the assault, but
Schofield was to begin demonstrations on the 26th to draw Southerners
away from other portions of the line.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig10"> <ANTIMG src="images/p12.jpg" alt="" width-obs="700" height-obs="448" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">KENNESAW MOUNTAIN</span></p> </div>
<p>Early on the 27th, the Federals began to probe at various
points along the Confederate trenches to distract the defenders.
At 8 a.m. the Northern artillery opened a brief but heavy fire to
prepare the way for the assaults. A few minutes later, the Federal
infantry moved forward. McPherson’s troops, advancing on both
sides of Burnt Hickory Road, swept over the Southern outposts
and moved rapidly across the broken ground toward the
main Confederate trenches. Although their lines were disordered,
<span class="pb" id="Page_26">26</span>
the blue-clad soldiers scrambled over rocks and fallen trees until
they were finally halted by the heavy fire from their entrenched
enemies. A few reached the Confederate line and were killed or
captured while fighting in their opponents’ works. Southerners on
Little Kennesaw added to the Northerners’ discomfort by rolling
huge rocks down the mountainside at them. When the Union
troops realized that their attack could not reach the Confederate
lines, they broke off the engagement. Some were able to find
protection in the advanced Confederate rifle-pits they had overrun
and some managed to reach the positions from which they
had begun the assault. A few were forced to seek shelter among
the trees and large rocks on the slopes of the mountain where
they remained until darkness offered a chance to return to their
own lines.</p>
<p>To the south, Thomas fared no better. Two columns were directed
against the Southern position—one at Cheatham’s Hill,
the other a short distance to the north. The Southerners expected
no attack. Many of them were off duty and others were relaxing
in the lines. The Federal artillery, however, alerted them to the
danger and when Thomas’ infantry started forward, the Confederates
were ready.</p>
<p>As soon as the dense blue columns appeared in the cleared area
between the lines, the Confederates opened what one Northerner
called a “terrible” fire upon them. Men dropped rapidly but the
columns continued up the long slope toward the Southern position.
“The air,” one Federal remembered, “seemed filled with
bullets, giving one the sensation experienced when moving swiftly
against a heavy rain or sleet storm.” As the Union soldiers neared
the crest of the ridge, they met the full fury of the defenders’ fire.
To one Federal it seemed as if the Confederate trenches were
“veritable volcanoes ... vomiting forth fire and smoke and raining
leaden hail in the face of the Union boys.”</p>
<p>Most of the attackers never reached the Confederate line.
Those who did were too few to overpower the defenders and were
quickly killed or captured. For a few brief seconds, two Northern
battle flags waved on the breastworks, but the bearers were soon
shot down and within a short time the attack had failed.</p>
<p>As Thomas’ left assaulting column struck that portion of the
Southern line held by the consolidated 1st and 15th Arkansas
<span class="pb" id="Page_27">27</span>
Regiments, the gunfire ignited the underbrush and many wounded
Federals faced the terrifying prospect of being burned to death.
In one of the notable acts of the war, Lt. Col. William H. Martin,
commanding the Arkansans, jumped from his trenches waving a
white handkerchief and shouting to the Northerners to come and
get the wounded men. For a few minutes, fighting was suspended
along that short stretch of the line and some of Martin’s soldiers
went to assist in moving their helpless enemies away from the
flames. When the wounded had been removed to safety, the two
sides resumed hostilities, but here too it was clear that the attack
would not be able to break Johnston’s lines.</p>
<p>At the Dead Angle, some of the attacking Northerners remained
under the crest of the ridge within a few yards of the
Confederate trenches. There they dug rifle pits of their own and
started to burrow under the hill, hoping to fill the tunnel with
gunpowder and blow up the salient. However, before this project
had progressed very far, the Southerners abandoned the position
and thus rendered the subterranean attack unnecessary.</p>
<p>While the attacks of McPherson and Thomas were being repulsed,
Schofield was gaining a clear success at the extreme right
of the Union line. On the 26th, one of his brigades crossed Olley’s
Creek north of Sandtown Road and, on the following day,
cleared their opponents from the area, securing a position several
miles to the south which placed the right of their line closer to the
Chattahoochee than was the left of Johnston’s army. From this
position the Northerners could strike at the Confederate line of
supply and perhaps cut Johnston off from all sources of help by
breaking the railroad.</p>
<p>Exact casualty figures for the battles of June 27 are not available.
However, the best estimates place Northern losses at about
3,000 men. The Southerners lost at least 750 killed, wounded, or
captured.</p>
<p>Sherman has been criticized for ordering the frontal attack on
Johnston’s lines, but it now seems that his decision was not
unwise. Had the assault succeeded, he would have won a great
victory. As it was, he did not continue the attacks when it was
clear that they would fail, and he had managed to secure a position
from which he could easily pry Johnston out of the Kennesaw
line.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_28">28</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig11"> <ANTIMG src="images/p13.jpg" alt="" width-obs="435" height-obs="795" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Lt. Col. William H. Martin jumped from the trenches waving a white handkerchief and shouting to the Northerners to come and
get the wounded men.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_29">29</div>
<h2 id="c7"><span class="small">ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE</span></h2>
<p>The success won by Schofield at Olley’s Creek indicated the
direction for the next Federal movement. Sherman quickly
decided to shift troops to his right, knowing that such a
move would force Johnston to choose between giving up the Kennesaw
line or being cut off from Atlanta. Accordingly, he began to
reinforce Schofield by moving McPherson from the left to the
right. By the afternoon of July 2, Federal troops were pushing
southward on Sandtown Road against only light opposition from
small Confederate detachments.</p>
<p>Johnston was aware of what was happening—in fact, he had
expected such a movement since the failure of the assault on the
27th. Believing that it would be unwise to stretch his lines further
and realizing that the troops opposing the Federal advance could
do no more than delay it, Johnston decided to abandon his Kennesaw
Mountain position and fall back to a previously prepared
line near Smyrna, 4 miles to the south. Accordingly, during the
night of July 2-3, the Confederates filed out of their trenches
around Marietta and marched southward.</p>
<p>When Sherman discovered that the Southerners were gone, he
pushed forward in pursuit, hoping to strike while the enemy was
retreating. In the late afternoon of the 3d, the Northerners
reached the new Confederate line. The 4th was spent in skirmishing,
but before a serious battle could develop, the Federal right
secured a strategic position from which it threatened to slice in
between Johnston’s army and Atlanta. Again, the threat to his
left forced Johnston to retreat. During the night of July 4-5, the
Southerners fell back to a heavily fortified position on the north
bank of the Chattahoochee.</p>
<p>On the 5th, the Federals pushed forward until they reached the
new Southern line. Skirmishing that day convinced Sherman that
the position was too strong to be carried by a headlong assault.
He dispatched a cavalry force to seize Roswell, an important little
manufacturing town about 16 miles upriver from Johnston’s fortifications,
and allowed his men a few days’ rest while he planned
the next move.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_30">30</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig12"> <ANTIMG src="images/p14.jpg" alt="" width-obs="514" height-obs="797" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER</span></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_31">31</div>
<p>After carefully studying the situation, the Federal commander
decided to attempt a crossing near the mouth of Soap Creek,
above Johnston’s right flank. On July 8, he moved Schofield’s
Army of the Ohio into position for the crossing. In a brilliant
movement, Schofield, utilizing pontoon boats and the ruins of a
submerged fish dam, got over the river and drove away the small
group of Southerners defending the area. Other troops were
rushed across, bridges were built, trenches were dug, and by
nightfall the Northerners held a secure bridgehead on the southern
bank. On the following day, the Federal cavalry got over the
river at Roswell. Sherman had successfully crossed the last major
barrier between Chattanooga and Atlanta and had carried the
fighting into the open country south of the Chattahoochee where
the terrain would favor him.</p>
<p>During the night of July 9-10, Johnston retreated across the
river and took up a position on the southern bank of Peachtree
Creek only a few miles from Atlanta. The Confederate commander
seems to have been optimistic at this time. Once again he
believed that he had reached a position from which he could not
be driven and he expected to fight the decisive battle of the
campaign along Peachtree Creek.</p>
<p>Sherman, meanwhile, had decided upon his next step. He would
swing north and east of Atlanta to cut Johnston off from Augusta
and possible reinforcements from Virginia. McPherson was to
strike eastward from Roswell to the Georgia Railroad at some
point near Stone Mountain. As this force advanced, the rest of
the Federals would move closer to the river. The line would thus
become a great swinging movement, with McPherson on the far
left, Schofield in the center as the pivot, and Thomas on the right
along Peachtree Creek. This movement began on the 17th. The
next day, McPherson reached the Georgia Railroad near Stone
Mountain.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_32">32</div>
<h2 id="c8"><span class="small">JOHNSTON REMOVED FROM COMMAND</span></h2>
<p>The Confederate government had been displeased by Johnston’s
conduct of the campaign. President Jefferson Davis
and other civilian officials had hoped that the Confederates
would be able to regain Tennessee or at least to draw Sherman
into a situation in which a severe defeat would be inflicted
upon him. Instead, after 10 weeks of campaigning, Johnston was
backed up against Atlanta and there was no assurance that he
would even try to hold that important center. These circumstances
led Davis to remove Johnston from command of the army
and to replace him with John B. Hood, who was promoted to the
temporary rank of full general.</p>
<p>Davis’ replacement of Johnston with Hood is one of the most
controversial acts of the war. Relations between the President
and Johnston had not been friendly since a dispute over the
general’s rank in 1861. Disagreements over strategy and tactics as
well as the personalities of the two men exacerbated matters in
1862 and 1863. During Johnston’s tenure as commander of the
Army of Tennessee, the situation became worse as communications
between the two broke down almost completely. Davis
promoted officers in the army without consulting Johnston, who
maneuvered in the field without informing the government of his
plans and operations in any meaningful detail.</p>
<p>Davis saw that Johnston had yielded much valuable territory
to the enemy. Important officials in the government began to urge
that the general be removed from command. On July 9, Davis
sent his military adviser, Gen. Braxton Bragg, to report on the
situation in Georgia. Bragg visited Johnston, learned nothing of
the general’s plans, and reported that it appeared the city would
be abandoned. Other evidence brought to the President’s attention—such
as Johnston’s suggestion that prisoners held in south
Georgia be sent to safer points—seemed to confirm Bragg’s assessment
that Atlanta would not be defended. On July 16, Davis
telegraphed Johnston: “I wish to hear from you as to present
situation and your plan of operations so specifically as will enable
me to anticipate events.” The general’s reply of the same date
read in part:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>As the enemy has double our numbers, we must be on the defensive.
My plan of operations must, therefore, depend upon that of the enemy.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<div class="pb" id="Page_33">33</div>
<p>It is mainly to watch for an opportunity to fight to advantage. We are
trying to put Atlanta in condition to be held for a day or two by the
Georgia militia, that army movements may be freer and wider.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>This vague reply did not satisfy Davis and on July 17 he issued
the order that removed Johnston from command. In great haste,
Johnston wrote out an order relinquishing his position and thanking
the soldiers for their courage and devotion. By the afternoon
of the 18th he had left Atlanta and the Army of Tennessee in the
none-too-steady hands of John Bell Hood.</p>
<p>Much debate has swirled around Davis’ decision. Johnston and
his partisans have argued that the general’s removal made inevitable
the loss of Atlanta, the reelection of Lincoln, and the defeat
of the Confederacy. They contend that had Johnston remained in
command, the city would have been held, or that if it were surrendered,
the army at least would not have been weakened and
would have continued as an effective unit.</p>
<p>Hood and Davis maintained that Johnston’s long retreat had
demoralized the army, that Johnston would not have held Atlanta,
and that the Confederacy’s only chance for success lay in
replacing Johnston with a bold commander who could strike
Sherman a blow that would send the Northerners reeling back to
Chattanooga.</p>
<p>Most historians have tended to accept Johnston’s position.
There can be no definite answer, of course, but it does seem that
Johnston would have evacuated the city rather than lose a large
portion of his army fighting for it. This would have saved the
army but, coming after the long retreat from Dalton, might have
so demoralized it that desertion and disgust would have ended its
career as an effective fighting force. If the retention of Atlanta
was essential to the life of the Confederacy, President Davis
seems justified in his decision to remove Johnston. It was the
Confederacy’s misfortune that no bold, intelligent, and lucky general
was available to take his place. But one thing was certain—with
Hood leading the Southerners, the pattern of the campaign
would change.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_34">34</div>
<h2 id="c9"><span class="small">IN THE RANKS</span></h2>
<p>Historians have long been in the habit of dealing with the
past as if it were nothing more than the story of a small
number of great men who moved about shaping the
world as they saw fit. In reality, leaders are not long successful
without followers—the great mass of the common people who do
the work, bear the burdens, and suffer the consequences of their
leaders’ policies. The Civil War offers a unique opportunity to
study the common people of America because during that conflict
large numbers of people were directly involved in the great events
of the times. For most of them, the war was the single most
important event of their lives. Consequently they wrote about it in
great detail in their letters and diaries and saved these documents
after the conflict ended. It is therefore possible to see the Civil
War armies as groups of humans, not masses of automata. The
men who followed Sherman, Johnston, and Hood in 1864 left
behind information that adds much to an understanding of the
campaign.</p>
<p>Records kept by the Federal Government show that the typical
Northern soldier was 5 feet 8¼ inches tall and weighed 143½
pounds. Doubtless the Southerners were of a similar stature. The
same records also indicate that before the war 48 percent of the
men had been farmers. Among the Confederates the percentage of
farmers was more than half. Relatively few immigrants served in
either western army—perhaps one-fifth to one-sixth of the men
were of foreign birth. More than half the units in Sherman’s
armies were from Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Iowa, Kentucky,
Missouri, and Wisconsin also furnished large contingents. Such
Eastern States as New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania were represented, but their contributions were
small. More than two-thirds of the units in the Southern army
were from Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia. Other
States with significant numbers of troops in the Confederate
ranks were Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Alabama, Kentucky,
Missouri, and Tennessee were represented by units on both sides.
Most of the men in the armies that struggled for Atlanta had
volunteered for military service in 1861 or 1862. By 1864 they
had become veterans, inured to the hardships of military life.
Nevertheless, they found the Atlanta Campaign a severe trial.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_35">35</div>
<p>Unlike many Civil War military operations in which fighting
occurred at infrequent intervals, the struggle for Atlanta was
virtually a continuous battle. Sometimes, as at Resaca, almost all
of the opposing forces were engaged; at other times, action was
limited to the desultory firing of skirmishers. But only on rare
occasions were the soldiers able to escape the sounds and dangers
of combat.</p>
<p>The weather—whether a freak cold wave in mid-June, the unusually
heavy rains of late May and June, or the normal heat of
July and August—affected every man and often hampered troop
movements as well. Frequently units on the march lost men who
could not stand the pace. The soldiers would drop by the roadside
until they had recovered their strength, then move on to overtake
their comrades. For example, the heat on July 12 was so bad that
only 50 of the men in an Illinois regiment could keep up on a
3-mile march. When the armies were in fortified positions, as they
were at Kennesaw Mountain, the men often stretched blankets or
brush across the trenches to protect themselves from the sun. On
rainy days, fence rails or rocks in the trenches served to keep
soldiers out of the water.</p>
<p>Clothing was also a problem. As a rule, Sherman’s men were
better supplied than their opponents, but the wool uniforms they
wore were unsuited to the hot Georgia summer. The Confederates
had almost no new clothing after the campaign began and their
uniforms deteriorated rapidly. A Texan summed up their plight in
early June when he wrote: “In this army one hole in the seat of
the breeches indicates a captain, two holes a lieutenant, and the
seat of the pants all out indicates that the individual is a private.”</p>
<p>Rarely did the men of either army have a chance to wash and
almost all of them were affected by body lice and other vermin. A
sense of humor helped them to survive these trials—soldiers who
were pinned down in a water-filled trench by enemy fire consoled
themselves with the thought that they were at least drowning the
lice. The Federals complained that the retreating Southerners
infested the country with lice that attacked the advancing Northerners.
Other pests included chiggers, ticks, snakes, scorpions,
flies, and ants.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_36">36</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig13"> <ANTIMG src="images/p15.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="552" /> <p class="pcap"><i>By 1864 most of the men in the armies that struggled for Atlanta had become veterans, inured to the hardships of military life.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_38">38</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig14"> <ANTIMG src="images/p16.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="682" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Soldiers in both armies had no scruples about supplementing their rations with whatever could be taken from surrounding
farms and homes.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_39">39</div>
<p>Soldiers in both armies suffered from a shortage of food and
had no scruples about supplementing their rations with whatever
could be taken from the surrounding farms and homes. Corn,
pork, chickens, geese, hams, potatoes, apples, and onions disappeared
as the armies moved through a neighborhood. Wild berries
and fish were also eaten. Nevertheless, there were many times
when food was in short supply. One Federal wrote, “most of the
time we are on the move and cannot get such as is fit for a man to
eat.”</p>
<p>The Atlanta Campaign, like many of the later Civil War campaigns,
saw the development of trench warfare on a large scale.
Protecting works were built from loose rocks, fence rails, tombstones,
or even the bodies of dead comrades. By the third or
fourth week of the campaign, both sides had mastered the art of
field fortification—a trench, with the dirt piled on the side toward
the enemy and surmounted by a headlog under which were small
openings for firing. Such works left “little but the eyes ...
exposed” to enemy fire. In front of the trenches the underbrush
would be cleared away and young trees cut so they fell toward the
foe. The trees were left partly attached to the stump so that they
could not be dragged aside. Telegraph wire was sometimes strung
between them to create further obstacles.</p>
<p>From behind their fortifications soldiers could pour out such a
volume of fire that there was no chance for a successful massed
attack—unless complete surprise could be achieved or overwhelming
numbers brought against a weak part of the enemy’s line.
Much of the fighting was therefore done by small patrols and
snipers, especially in heavily wooded country such as the area
around New Hope Church and Kennesaw Mountain.</p>
<p>The soldier who died in battle could expect no elaborate funeral.
Usually the armies were too busy to do more than bury the
dead as quickly as possible and they would probably be put in a
mass grave near the place where they had fallen. Later the bodies
might be exhumed and moved to a cemetery where they would be
listed as “unidentified” and reinterred in a numbered but nameless
grave.</p>
<p>The soldier who was wounded or who was disabled by disease
suffered greatly. As a rule, the Northerner who was sent to an
army hospital fared better than his opponent because the Federals
were better equipped and provisioned than the Confederates.
<span class="pb" id="Page_40">40</span>
Field hospitals treated men whose wounds were either very
slight or too serious to permit further movement. Others were
sent by wagon and rail to hospitals in the rear—Rome, Chattanooga,
and Knoxville for the Federals; Atlanta and the small
towns along the railroads south of that city for the Southerners.</p>
<p>Transportation in crowded hospital wagons over rutted roads
or in slow hospital trains was an indescribable horror. The hospitals
themselves were better but, by modern standards, uncomfortable
and dirty. For painful operations, Northern soldiers often
enjoyed the blessing of chloroform. Many Southerners, however,
especially those in the hospitals in smaller towns, frequently endured
major surgery without the benefit of any opiate except,
perhaps, whiskey. In such cases the hospitals echoed with the
screams of men undergoing amputations or such treatments as
that calling for the use of nitric acid to burn gangrene out of their
wounds.</p>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p17.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width-obs="500" height-obs="327" /></div>
<p>No precise figures as to the number of men who were killed,
wounded, or sick during the campaign are available. However, it
is known that for the war as a whole, disease killed about twice as
many men as did the weapons of the enemy. Sickness brought on
by exposure and unsanitary camps undoubtedly accounted for
<span class="pb" id="Page_41">41</span>
many lives among the soldiers in Georgia. Diseases that were
especially common were smallpox, scurvy, dysentery, diarrhea
(also known as “dierear” and the “Tennessee quick step”), and
various types of fevers.</p>
<p>Religion provided a great source of comfort for many soldiers.
Chaplains accompanied both armies but were too few to serve all
the troops. Some chaplains preferred to spend the campaign in
the rear where they would be safe, while others, of far more
influence with the men, braved hardships and dangers with the
units they served. At least three of the latter group were killed in
battle during the campaign—either while helping the wounded or
fighting in the ranks. When chaplains were not available the men
sometimes organized and conducted their own religious services.
On the other hand, many soldiers ignored religion altogether and
continued such “sinful” practices as cursing, drinking, and gambling.
Nevertheless, what one soldier called “the missionary influence
of the enemy’s cannon” and the constant presence of death
and suffering led many to seek comfort in religion.</p>
<p>Throughout the campaign, when the armies were in a relatively
stable situation, the men sometimes agreed not to shoot at one
another. Instead, they would meet between the lines to talk,
swim, drink, bathe, enjoy the sun, pick blackberries, exchange
newspapers, swap Northern coffee for Southern tobacco, play
cards, wrestle, eat, sing, rob the dead, and argue politics. Officers
on both sides tried to prohibit this fraternization, but the men in
the ranks had the good sense to ignore their orders. These informal
truces would usually be respected by all, and when they were
over, fighting would not resume until every man had gotten back
to his own trenches. Much of the tragedy of the war was reflected
in a letter written by a Wisconsin soldier on June 24:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We made a bargain with them that we would not fire on them if they
would not fire on us, and they were as good as their word. It seems too
bad that we have to fight men that we like. Now these Southern
soldiers seem just like our own boys, only they are on the other side.
They talk about their people at home, their mothers and fathers and
their sweethearts, just as we do among ourselves.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, regardless of the soldiers’ feelings about each other
during those times of truce, the war was being run by the generals
and the generals said it must go on.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_42">42</div>
<h2 id="c10"><span class="small">PEACHTREE CREEK</span></h2>
<p>John Bell Hood, the new commander of the Confederate
forces, found himself in a difficult position on the morning
of July 18, 1864. Hood was young—only 33—and relatively
inexperienced in handling large bodies of troops. After
graduation from West Point (in the same class with the Federal
generals McPherson and Schofield) he had served with the U.S.
Army until the spring of 1861, when he resigned and cast his lot
with the Confederacy. In the early years of the war Hood had
risen rapidly in rank—a rise more than justified by his outstanding
leadership at the brigade and division level.</p>
<p>Until the summer of 1863, Hood had been physically one of the
most magnificent men in the Confederate Army. A woman who
knew him in 1861 described him as “six feet two inches in height,
with a broad, full chest, light hair and beard, blue eyes, with a
peculiarly soft expression, commanding in appearance, dignified in
deportment, gentlemanly and courteous to all.” By the time he
took command of the Army of Tennessee, Hood’s appearance had
undergone some changes. His left arm dangled uselessly at his
side, smashed by a Federal bullet at Gettysburg in July 1863. His
right leg was gone, cut away at the hip following a wound received
at the Battle of Chickamauga in September 1863. Hood
suffered great pain from these wounds, and no doubt he should
have been retired from field command; but he was not the kind of
man who could stay away from the army during a war.</p>
<p>After recovering from his second wound, he was sent to the
Army of Tennessee as a corps commander and had served in that
capacity until Davis selected him to succeed Johnston. He may
have been taking a derivative of laudanum to ease his pain and
some students of the war believe that this affected his judgment.
Many soldiers in the army distrusted Hood’s ability. Some officers
resented his promotion over the heads of generals who had served
with the army since the beginning of the war. Hood himself believed
that the army had been demoralized by Johnston’s long
retreat and hence was unlikely to fight well.</p>
<p>Nor could the tactical situation have brought Hood any encouragement.
Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland was advancing
southward directly toward Atlanta, while the armies of McPherson
and Schofield were east of the city, advancing westward. Two
of the four railroads that connected Atlanta with the rest of the
Confederacy were in Federal hands. Unless Hood could keep the
remaining lines open, the city was doomed.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_43">43</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig15"> <ANTIMG src="images/p18.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="667" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">BATTLES AROUND ATLANTA</span></p> </div>
<dl class="undent pcap"><br/>Battle of Peachtree Creek JULY 20
<br/>Battle of Ezra Church, JULY 28
<br/>Battle of Atlanta JULY 22
<p>On July 19, the Army of the Cumberland crossed Peachtree
Creek, but as it advanced, it drifted toward the west. Thus by the
afternoon a gap had developed in the Northern line between
Thomas on the right and Schofield in the center. Hood decided to
concentrate the corps of Hardee and Stewart against Thomas.
The Confederate commander hoped to overwhelm the isolated
Army of the Cumberland before help could arrive from McPherson
<span class="pb" id="Page_44">44</span>
and Schofield. Hood relied upon his former corps, temporarily
commanded by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham, and the cavalry
to defend the area east of Atlanta. The attack on Thomas
was set for 1 p.m., July 20.</p>
<p>Early in the morning of the 20th, while the Southerners were
preparing to assail the right of the Federal line, the Northerners
east of Atlanta moved west along the Georgia Railroad toward
the city. Their progress was so rapid that Hood felt it necessary
to shift his army to the right in an effort to strengthen the forces
defending the eastern approaches to Atlanta. This movement led
to such confusion in the Confederate ranks that the attack
against Thomas was delayed for about 3 hours. When the Southerners
were finally ready to strike, Thomas’ men had had time to
establish and partly fortify a position on the south side of Peachtree
Creek.</p>
<p>What Hood had planned as a quick blow against an unprepared
Northern army thus developed into a headlong assault against a
partially fortified line. For several hours the Southerners threw
themselves against the Federals. Most of the attacks were halted
before they seriously threatened the Union position, but for a
short while it appeared that some of Hardee’s men would sweep
around the left of Thomas’ line and win a great victory. Hastily,
Thomas assembled artillery batteries and directed their fire
against the Southerners. Eventually the Confederates were driven
back.</p>
<p>While fighting raged along Peachtree Creek, McPherson continued
to push toward Atlanta from the east. By 6 p.m., Hood was
forced to call upon Hardee for troops to reinforce the Southern
lines east of the city. This order drew from Hardee the reserve
division that he was preparing to throw into the assault against
Thomas and forced him to abandon the attack. The first of
Hood’s efforts to cripple the Federal army had failed, although at
the time some Southerners saw it as a blow that slowed Federal
progress.</p>
<p>Northern casualties in the Battle of Peachtree Creek were reported
at 1,600. Estimates of Southern losses (mostly from Federal
sources) range from 2,500 to 10,000. It seems now that 4,700
is a reliable estimate of Confederate casualties.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_45">45</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig16"> <ANTIMG src="images/p19.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="309" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Gen. John B. Hood</i></p> </div>
<p>The battle later became a source of controversy between Hood
and Hardee. Hood, smarting under the criticism of Joseph E.
Johnston and others, blamed the failure to crush Thomas on
Hardee. The corps commander, Hood charged, had failed to
attack at the proper time and had not driven home the assault.
Hardee, who had outranked Hood when they were both lieutenant
generals and who may have been disgruntled at serving under
his former junior, replied that the delay was caused by Hood’s
decision to shift the line to the right and that the assault had not
been as vigorously executed as it normally would have been because
Hood’s late-afternoon order to send reinforcements to the
right had deprived the attackers of the unit that was to deliver
the final blow. Postwar commentators mostly favor Hardee and a
careful examination of the evidence supports this view.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_46">46</div>
<h2 id="c11"><span class="small">THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA</span></h2>
<p>After the Battle of Peachtree Creek, attention shifted to
the eastern side of the city. Hood determined to strike
McPherson who, on July 20 and 21, had moved past
Decatur and entrenched a line running north and south a few
miles east of Atlanta. The Confederate commander realized that
he might march troops around the left of McPherson’s position
and attack him from the flank and rear. He chose Hardee’s Corps
to be the flanking column and planned to have Cheatham’s men
attack the front of McPherson’s army from the west while Hardee
struck from the south and east. With luck, this sensible plan
could result in the defeat of a large part of Sherman’s forces.</p>
<p>Late on the 21st, Hardee’s men withdrew from their advanced
position north of Atlanta and by midnight they were marching
out of the city. They were to move southward, then turn and
swing eastward and northward. Meanwhile, the other Southerners
fell back to shorter lines where, it was hoped, they would be able
to hold off the Federals while Hardee outflanked them.</p>
<p>On the morning of July 22, Sherman found the Southerners
gone from his immediate front and concluded that Atlanta had
been abandoned. However, as his armies pushed forward, they
discovered that the defenders had only fallen back to a new
position. The Northern advance contracted the Federal lines and
the XVI Corps of McPherson’s army was crowded out of place.
McPherson ordered it to move to his extreme left. Thus at the
time Hardee was moving to that area, McPherson, by chance, was
sending in reinforcements.</p>
<p>Hardee’s march was long and hard. Poor roads, inept guides,
and the July heat combined to delay the Southerners. It was not
until noon that Hardee had his men in position, and at 1 p.m. he
sent them forward. The Confederates made their way through
heavy underbrush and emerged facing the Federal XVI Corps
which had halted in a perfect position to meet the charge which
broke upon them.</p>
<p>Poor coordination also weakened the force of the Confederate
offensive. Cheatham’s men, who assailed the XVII Corps, did not
join the assault until about 3:30, by which time Hardee’s attack
had lost much of its force. Nevertheless, the fighting was severe.
One Federal brigadier wrote of the attackers:</p>
<blockquote>
<div class="pb" id="Page_47">47</div>
<p>They burst forth from the woods in truly magnificent style in front of
my right.... Hardly had the enemy made his appearance in my front
when [the artillery] ... opened on them a deadly fire, which rather
staggered their line, yet on came the advancing rebels, and hotter grew
the fire of ... [our artillery]. At the same time the ... infantry ...
opened on them with cool and deadly aim. Still on came the charging
columns, more desperate than ever, those in front urged up by those
in rear.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The first charge was driven back, but the Southerners returned
to the attack again and again throughout the long afternoon.
Several times they swarmed over the Federal positions, capturing
men and cannon, but each time they were driven back. In one of
the early charges, McPherson was killed by advancing Confederate
skirmishers as he rode forward to rally his men. Finally,
about 7 p.m., the Southerners abandoned the attack and fell
back. Their losses have been estimated at about 8,000. Union
casualties were reported at 3,722.</p>
<p>For the second time Hood had lashed out at his opponent and
had been thrown back. Later he tried to shift the blame to Hardee
whom he accused of failing to be in the proper place at the
proper time. In post-war years, a bitter verbal battle raged over
the question. Most present-day authorities feel that Hardee did
all that could reasonably have been asked of him. His troops were
worn from the battle on Peachtree Creek, the bad roads slowed
his march, and the fateful positioning of the XVI Corps was a
matter over which he had no control.</p>
<p>In the summer of 1864, however, many Confederates saw the
battle as a splendid victory. One artilleryman wrote on July 23:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>We gained a great victory yesterday of which I suppose you know
[from newspapers] as much as I do. We left before much was accomplished
but hear that our corps captured 3,500 prisoners and 22 pieces
of artillery & the enemies killed & wounded amounted to twice our
own.</p>
</blockquote>
<div class="pb" id="Page_48">48</div>
<h2 id="c12"><span class="small">EZRA CHURCH</span></h2>
<p>For several days after the Battle of Atlanta, there was a lull
in military activities around the city. Both sides were reorganizing.
Sherman selected Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard
to command the army that McPherson had led. On the Confederate
side, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee replaced Cheatham as commander
of the corps that had originally been Hood’s.</p>
<p>By July 26, Sherman had decided upon his next maneuver. His
goal was the railroads south and west of Atlanta—the last links
between that city and the rest of the Confederacy—and to reach
them he would swing Howard’s Army of the Tennessee around
from his extreme left to his extreme right. The movement began
that afternoon and by nightfall on the 27th, Howard’s men were
west of Atlanta. Early the following day the advance was resumed.
The only effective opposition came from a small body of
Confederate cavalry.</p>
<p>Hood was aware of Sherman’s new maneuver and determined
to block it by sending the corps of Lee and Stewart west along
the road to the little settlement of Lickskillet. By noon the opposing
forces were in the area of a meetinghouse known as Ezra
Church, about 2½ miles west of Atlanta. The Confederates had
been ordered to attack and prevent the Northerners from crossing
the road, and Lee and Stewart sent their men forward in a series
of assaults against the XV Corps. The Federals had not had time
to entrench, but they had piled up barricades of logs and church
benches, and these afforded some protection.</p>
<p>“Our skirmishers, overpowered by numbers, were compelled to
fall back to the main line,” wrote a Union officer,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>followed at an interval of but a few paces by dense columns of the
enemy, which, covered as they were by the undergrowth, advanced
within forty or fifty paces of our lines, when a terrific and destructive
fire was opened upon them, and was continued steadily until their
advance was checked, at the distance of some twenty to thirty paces.
Their lines were cut down, disordered, and driven back some distance,
when they rallied and again came boldly forward to the charge, but
under the murderous fire of our rifles were no more able to disorder
or discompose our lines than before. They gained a little ground
several times, only to lose it inch by inch, after the most terrible
fighting on both sides.... After a very short interval, which did not
<span class="pb" id="Page_49">49</span>
amount to a cessation of the battle, new and largely augmented
columns of the enemy came pouring in upon us, with the same results,
however, as before, although their colors were planted within twenty
paces.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For 4 or 5 hours the assaults continued, but the Confederates
attacked piecemeal—separate units rushing forward—rather than
striking a unified blow, and all their desperate courage was not
enough to overcome this handicap. The Southern army is estimated
to have suffered about 5,000 casualties in this battle. Federal
losses were reported at 600.</p>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p20.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width-obs="500" height-obs="504" /></div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_50">50</div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p21.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width-obs="490" height-obs="800" /></div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_51">51</div>
<h2 id="c13"><span class="small">THE MONTH OF AUGUST</span></h2>
<p>Although he had inflicted heavy losses on the Southerners,
Sherman seems to have become convinced that he would
not be able to capture Atlanta by his customary tactics.
Hood had constructed a line of trenches that ran from Atlanta
southward to East Point, protecting the railroads. The Confederate
fortifications were too strong to be attacked and too long to
be encircled. Sherman brought up a battery of siege guns and
shelled the city. The Southern artillery in Atlanta replied and for
several weeks helpless citizens lived in their cellars and scurried
about amid bursting shells as the artillery duels started fires and
smashed buildings, killing soldiers and civilians indiscriminately.</p>
<p>The Federal commander also decided to try cavalry raids in the
hope that his horsemen could reach the railroads below Atlanta
and, by cutting them, force Hood to evacuate the city. Late in
July, two expeditions were launched. One under Brig. Gen.
George Stoneman was to swing to the east to McDonough, Lovejoy
Station, and Macon, tearing up the railroad and destroying
supplies as it went. These cavalrymen were then to strike southwest
to Americus where they hoped to free the 30,000 Northerners
held in the prisoner of war camp at Andersonville. The other
expedition, under Brig. Gen. Edward M. McCook, was to operate
to the west and join Stoneman in attacking the Confederate lines
of communication south of Atlanta.</p>
<p>From the start both raids were badly managed. Much of the
blame must rest upon Stoneman who chose to go directly to
Macon rather than follow orders. The scattered Federals were
faced by a well-handled Confederate force led by Wheeler. Except
for Stoneman’s column, the Northern horsemen were driven back
to Sherman’s lines after destroying some Confederate supplies.
Stoneman reached the vicinity of Macon where on July 31 he was
attacked by the Southerners and captured along with 500 of his
men.</p>
<p>Somehow during these busy weeks, Sherman found time to
write a letter to Miss Emily Hoffman of Baltimore, the fiancée of
the dead McPherson. “I owe you heartfelt sympathy,” he wrote,
adding, “I yield to none of Earth but yourself the right to excell
me in lamentations for our Dead Hero. Better the bride of
McPherson dead than the wife of the richest Merchant of Baltimore.”
<span class="pb" id="Page_52">52</span>
Sherman described the fallen leader of the Army of the
Tennessee who had been a close friend as well as a trusted subordinate
as “the impersonation of Knighthood” and added that
“while Life lasts I will delight in the Memory of that bright
particular star.”</p>
<p>On August 10, Hood, perhaps thinking that the defeat of
Stoneman and McCook had weakened Sherman’s cavalry, struck
out at his opponent’s line of supply. He sent cavalry commander
Wheeler with 4,000 men to destroy the railroad north of Marietta
and to disrupt Sherman’s communications with the North. Although
Wheeler was able to make some temporary breaks in the
line, he was unable to reduce substantially the flow of supplies to
Sherman’s armies. The Federal commander had built strong fortifications
at the most strategic points on the railroad and his
efficient repair crews quickly rebuilt those parts of the track that
Wheeler could reach and damage. Eventually, the Confederate
cavalry drifted into Tennessee and did not rejoin Hood until the
campaign was over. Many students of the war regard Wheeler’s
mission as a mistake because the absence of the cavalry deprived
Hood of the best means of keeping posted on Sherman’s activities
and thus proved fatal to the army at Atlanta.</p>
<p>Wheeler’s departure led Sherman to send out a third cavalry
expedition, commanded by Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick. The
Northerners reached the railroads below Atlanta and on August
18-20 succeeded in tearing up sections of the track. On the 20th
they were driven away. Kilpatrick reported to Sherman that the
railroad had been so thoroughly wrecked that it would take at
least 10 days to repair it. However, on the following day, the
Federals saw trains bringing supplies into the city from the south.
Clearly the Northern cavalry was not strong enough to destroy
Hood’s lines of supply. New plans would have to be tried if the
Unionists were to capture Atlanta.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, a curious kind of optimism was developing in the
Southern ranks. Many Confederates did not see the hard battles
of late July as defeats. Rather they viewed them as successful
efforts to halt the progress of flanking columns that had threatened
the city’s lines of supply. One officer wrote on August 4
about the battles of Atlanta and Ezra Church: “General Hood
watches his flanks closely and has twice whipped the flanking
<span class="pb" id="Page_53">53</span>
columns.” When Sherman made no new efforts to flank the city
and when the Northern cavalry raids were beaten off one after
another, many men came to believe that Atlanta had been saved.
In mid-August a Texan informed his homefolk that “affairs are
brightening here. People and army seem more confident of
success.” At about the same time, a Mississippian wrote that
“The enemy seems checked in his flanking operations on our left,
as he has made no progress in that direction for the last four or
five days.” On August 28, an Alabamian wrote his wife that “It
required hard fighting to check the enemy here after having pursued
us so far.”</p>
<p>At the very end of August there came exciting news for the
Southerners. Sherman had fallen back! The Northerners were
gone from in front of Atlanta! Many thought Wheeler’s cavalry
had cut off Sherman’s supplies and that this had forced the Federal
commander to lift the siege. Joyous Confederates swarmed
out of the city to romp over the abandoned Northern trenches.
“The scales have turned in favor of the South,” wrote Capt.
Thomas J. Key of Arkansas, “and the Abolitionists are moving to
the rear.”</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig17"> <ANTIMG src="images/p22.jpg" alt="" width-obs="700" height-obs="518" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">CAVALRY OPERATIONS<br/>JULY-AUGUST 1864</span></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_54">54</div>
<h2 id="c14"><span class="small">JONESBOROUGH</span></h2>
<p>Some Southerners suspected in 1864 what we now know—Sherman
had not retreated. Rather, he had concluded that
only his infantry could effectively break Hood’s lines of
supply and had resolved to move almost all of his force to the
southwest of the city. The movement began on August 25. One
corps was sent back to the Chattahoochee bridgehead to guard
the railroad that connected Sherman with the North. The remaining
Federal troops pulled out of their trenches and marched away
to the west and south. By noon on the 28th, Howard’s Army of
the Tennessee had reached Fairburn, a small station on the Atlanta
and West Point Railroad, 13 miles southwest of East Point.
Later that afternoon, Thomas’ troops occupied Red Oak, on the
railroad 5 miles to the northeast. The Northerners spent the rest
of the 28th and the 29th destroying the tracks. The rails were
torn up, heated, and twisted so that they were useless. Only one
railroad, the Macon and Western, running southeast from East
Point to Macon, now remained in Confederate hands. Sherman
soon moved to cut it.</p>
<p>By August 29, Hood had learned of the activities of the Federals
at Fairburn. It was clear that the railroad to Macon would be
Sherman’s next objective and the Southern commander acted to
defend that line. However, he badly misjudged the situation and
thought that only two corps of Sherman’s army were to the
southwest. Late on August 30, Hood ordered Hardee to take two
corps of the Southern army, move against the raiding column, and
drive it away. Both armies were soon closing in on Jonesborough,
14 miles below East Point on the Macon railroad. By that evening,
advance elements of the Union forces had crossed the Flint
River and entrenched a position 1 mile west of Jonesborough.
During the night, Hardee’s Southerners moved into the town by
rail; by morning they were deploying in front of the Federal line.</p>
<p>Hardee had his own corps (temporarily led by Maj. Gen. Patrick
R. Cleburne) and Lee’s. It took until mid-afternoon to complete
preparations for an attack. The Confederates advanced
about 3 p.m., their assault falling mostly on an entrenched salient
on the east bank of the Flint held by the Army of the Tennessee.
The attack was fierce but uncoordinated and failed to drive back
the Northerners. When the fighting ceased that night, the relative
<span class="pb" id="Page_55">55</span>
positions of the armies were unchanged.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Schofield’s Army of the Ohio had managed to
break the Macon railroad near Rough-and-Ready, a small station
between Jonesborough and East Point. This movement led Hood
to conclude that Sherman’s main force was attacking Atlanta
from the south. The Confederate commander, therefore, ordered
Lee’s Corps to leave Hardee at Jonesborough and move toward
Atlanta to help defend the city. Lee began this movement at 2
a.m. the next morning.</p>
<p>At dawn on September 1, Sherman with almost all of his troops
was south of Atlanta. The Federals were concentrating at Jonesborough
where they had encountered the bulk of the Southern
army on the preceding day and where it seemed a decisive battle
would be fought. The Confederates were widely separated. Hood,
with one corps, was in Atlanta; Hardee, with his corps, was at
Jonesborough; and Lee, with the remaining corps, was near East
Point.</p>
<p>At Jonesborough, Hardee had taken up a defensive position
north and west of the town. During the afternoon he was attacked
by the overwhelming force of Northerners concentrated
there. Although suffering many casualties, especially in prisoners,
Hardee’s Corps fought well and held its position until night offered
a chance to fall back to Lovejoy’s Station, 7 miles to the
south.</p>
<p>By this time Hood had realized what was happening and knew
that Atlanta could not be held any longer. During the night of
September 1-2, he evacuated the city. Supplies that could not be
carried away were burned. Hood’s forces moved far to the east of
the city to pass around Jonesborough and join Hardee at Lovejoy’s
Station. On September 2, Mayor James M. Calhoun surrendered
Atlanta to a party of Federal soldiers.</p>
<p>On the following day, Sherman sent a telegram to the authorities
in Washington announcing that “Atlanta is ours, and fairly
won.” He added that he would not pursue the Confederates, who
were then fortified at Lovejoy’s Station, but would return to Atlanta
so that his men could enjoy a brief respite from fighting.
“Since May 5,” he wrote, “we have been in one constant battle
or skirmish, and need rest.”</p>
<p>A few days later another Federal wrote from his camp near
<span class="pb" id="Page_56">56</span>
Atlanta: “Here we will rest until further orders.... The campaign
that commenced May 2 is now over, and we will rest here to
recruit and prepare for a new campaign.”</p>
<p>Some writers have been critical of Sherman’s decision not to
press after Hood’s army. They maintain that the enemy force and
not the city of Atlanta was the true objective of the Unionists. It
may have been that Sherman’s action was determined by the
question of supplies or it may have been that his men were too
exhausted for immediate operations south of the city. At any
rate, the capture of Atlanta delighted and heartened Northerners.
News of Sherman’s victory was greeted with ringing bells and
cannon fire all over the North.</p>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p23.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width-obs="500" height-obs="370" /></div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_57">57</div>
<h2 id="c15"><span class="small">EPILOGUE</span></h2>
<p>Sherman soon turned Atlanta into an armed camp. Houses
were torn down and the lumber used for fortifications or
soldiers’ huts. Civilians could not be fed by the army and
were ordered out of the city with the choice of going north or
south. In mid-September a truce was declared and the citizens
who chose to remain in the Confederacy were transported by the
Northerners to Rough-and-Ready, where they were handed over
to Hood’s men who conveyed them farther south.</p>
<p>After completion of this unpleasant task, Hood determined to
reverse Sherman’s strategy and to move with his whole army
around Atlanta to draw Sherman after him into Alabama or
Tennessee. In late September the Confederates crossed the Chattahoochee
and marched northward over many of the summer’s
battlefields. Sherman left a strong garrison in Atlanta and followed
Hood northward for several weeks. Unable to bring his
opponent to bay, Sherman detached a strong force to deal with
the Confederates and returned to Atlanta. Hood’s army was virtually
destroyed in several battles fought in Tennessee in November
and December. Sherman, meanwhile, reorganized his armies
and on November 15 burned Atlanta and marched out of the city
on his way to the sea.</p>
<p>The final importance of the Atlanta Campaign may lie more in
its psychological impact than in any military results. Essentially,
in early September, the Confederate military forces were in the
same position relative to the Northern armies that they had held
early in the spring. Psychologically, however, there had been a
great shift. The news that Atlanta had fallen meant that the
average Northerner had at last a tangible military victory that
made it possible for him to see the end of the war in the future.
There would be more months of marching, fighting, and dying,
but Sherman’s capture of Atlanta convinced many that the Confederacy
was doomed.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_58">58</div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p24.jpg" alt="{uncaptioned}" width-obs="500" height-obs="719" /></div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_59">59</div>
<h2 id="c16"><span class="small">SHERMAN IN ATLANTA: A Photographic Portfolio</span></h2>
<p>On September 3, 1864, President Abraham Lincoln telegraphed
the commanding officer of the Federal Military
Division of the Mississippi: “The national thanks are
rendered ... to Major-General W. T. Sherman and the officers
and soldiers of his command before Atlanta, for the distinguished
ability and perserverence displayed in the campaign in Georgia
which, under Divine favor, has resulted in the capture of Atlanta.
The marches, battles, sieges and other military operations that
have signalized the campaign, must render it famous in the
annals of war, and have entitled those who have participated
therein to the applause and thanks of the nation.”</p>
<p>The Union soldiers had, in Sherman’s words, “completed the
grand task which has been assigned us by our Government.”
Atlanta, chief rail hub of the Confederacy and one of the South’s
principal distributing, industrial, commercial, and cultural centers,
was in Federal hands at last. It was a choice prize.</p>
<p>The city was founded in 1837 as Terminus, so-named because
a rail line ended there. It was incorporated as Marthasville in
1845; two years later it was renamed Atlanta. Only a few dozen
people lived there in the 1840’s, but by 1861, when the Civil
War began, some 10,000 people called it home. By 1864, when
Sherman’s armies started south from Chattanooga, Atlanta’s
population was double that number. The city boasted factories,
foundries, stores, arsenals, government offices, and hospitals,
which, as the war progressed and drew closer, were hard pressed
to handle the mounting number of casualties needing treatment.
So strategic was Atlanta that Confederate President Jefferson
Davis proclaimed that “Its fall would open the way for the
Federal armies to the Gulf on one hand, and to Charleston on
the other, and close up those granaries from which Gen. Robert
E. Lee’s armies are supplied. It would give them control of our
network of railroads and thus paralyze our efforts.” Now, with
Federal soldiers in Atlanta, Davis’ fears would be realized.</p>
<p>Sherman’s troops occupied Atlanta for more than 2 months.
The photographs and captions that follow highlight aspects of
that occupation.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_60">60</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig18"> <ANTIMG src="images/p25.jpg" alt="" width-obs="524" height-obs="800" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>National Archives</i></span> <br/><i>Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, conqueror of Atlanta.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_61">61</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig19"> <ANTIMG src="images/p25a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="618" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> <br/><i>Confederate palisades and cheveaux-de-frise around the Potter house northwest of Atlanta. Near here, Mayor James M. Calhoun surrendered
the city to Sherman’s forces.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig20"> <ANTIMG src="images/p25c.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="411" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> <br/><i>Union soldiers lounge inside one of the abandoned Confederate field forts defending Atlanta.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_62">62</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig21"> <ANTIMG src="images/p26.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="183" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> <br/><i>Atlanta, October 1864: “solid and business-like, wide streets and many fine houses.”</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig22"> <ANTIMG src="images/p26a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="700" height-obs="700" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Atlanta Historical Society</i></span> <br/><i>Federal officers commandeered many of Atlanta’s houses for staff headquarters. Col. Henry A. Barnum and his
staff moved into General Hood’s former headquarters, described as the
“finest wooden building in the city.”</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_63">63</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig23"> <ANTIMG src="images/p26c.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="598" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> <br/><i>After Sherman turned Atlanta into an armed camp, wagon trains, like this one on Whitehall
Street, rumbled through the city day and night.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_64">64</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig24"> <ANTIMG src="images/p27.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="514" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Atlanta Historical Society</i></span> <br/><i>The 2d Massachusetts Infantry, the “best officered regiment in the Army,” set up camp in City Hall Square. When this photograph was taken, near
the end of the occupation, the soldiers’ tents had been replaced by more
substantial wooden huts built from demolished houses.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_66">66</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig25"> <ANTIMG src="images/p28.jpg" alt="" width-obs="545" height-obs="800" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> <br/><i>Atlanta residents, evicted from the city by General Sherman, await the departure of the baggage-laden train that will take them south beyond
Union lines.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_67">67</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig26"> <ANTIMG src="images/p28a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="485" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> <br/><i>Federal soldiers pry up the city’s railroad tracks before leaving on their march to the sea.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig27"> <ANTIMG src="images/p28c.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="501" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>Library of Congress</i></span> <br/><i>The railroad depot after it was blown up by Federal demolition squads.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_68">68</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig28"> <ANTIMG src="images/p29.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="514" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="jri"><i>National Archives</i></span> <br/><i>This desolate scene marks the site where retreating Confederate soldiers blew up their ordnance train early on the morning of September 1, 1864.
Sherman’s soldiers left similar scenes of destruction in their wake as they
marched across Georgia in the closing months of the war.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_70">70</div>
<h2 id="c17"><span class="small">FOR FURTHER READING</span></h2>
<p>The only published book-length study of the Atlanta Campaign
is Jacob D. Cox’s <i>Atlanta</i> (New York, 1882; new
edition, 1963). More detailed accounts may be found in
two doctoral dissertations: Richard M. McMurry, “The Atlanta
Campaign, December 23, 1863, to July 18, 1864,” and Errol MacGregor
Clauss, “The Atlanta Campaign, 18 July-2 September
1864.” Both were written at Emory University, the former in
1967 and the latter in 1965, and both are available on microfilm
from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Mich. In addition, the
<i>Georgia Historical Quarterly</i> and <i>Civil War Times Illustrated</i>
have published numerous articles dealing with specialized aspects
of the campaign.</p>
<p>Good books by participants include Paul M. Angle, ed., <i>Three
Years in the Army of the Cumberland: The Letters and Diary of
Major James A. Connolly</i> (Bloomington, 1959); John B. Hood,
<i>Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States
and Confederate Armies</i> (New Orleans, 1880; new edition,
Bloomington, 1959); Joseph E. Johnston, <i>Narrative of Military
Operations During the Late War Between the States</i> (New York,
1874; new edition, Bloomington, 1959); Albert D. Kirwan, ed.,
<i>Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade: The Journal of a Confederate
Soldier</i> (Lexington, Ky., 1956); Milo M. Quaife, ed., <i>From
the Cannon’s Mouth: The Civil War Letters of General Alpheus
S. Williams</i> (Detroit, 1959); John M. Schofield, <i>Forty-Six Years
in the Army</i> (New York, 1897); William T. Sherman, <i>Memoirs of
General William T. Sherman, by Himself</i> (2 vols., New York,
1875; new, 1-vol. edition, Bloomington, 1957); U.S. War Department,
comp., <i>War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies</i> (128 vols., Washington, D.C., 1880-1901),
Series 1, vol. 38; Sam R. Watkins, “Co. Aytch,” <i>Maury
Grays, First Tennessee Regiment; or, A Side Show of the Big
Show</i> (Chattanooga, 1900; new edition, Jackson, Tenn., 1952);
and Charles W. Wills, <i>Army Life of an Illinois Soldier ...</i> (Washington,
D.C., 1906).</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_71">71</div>
<h2 id="c18"><span class="small">CIVIL WAR SITES IN GEORGIA</span></h2>
<p>Listed below are several of the major Civil War sites in
Georgia. A good source on other areas is the booklet <i>Georgia
Civil War Historical Markers</i>, published by the Georgia
Historical Commission.</p>
<p>ANDERSONVILLE: This is now a national historic site. It
was the site of the notorious Civil War prison where, in the
summer of 1864, more than 30,000 captured Federals were held.
On U.S. 49 at Andersonville, near Americus.</p>
<p>ATLANTA: Goal of the 1864 campaign. Most of the area in
which the fighting occurred has been built over, but Grant Park
contains the trenches of Fort Walker, the Cyclorama of the Battle
of Atlanta, and a museum.</p>
<p>CHICKAMAUGA: On U.S. 278 near Rossville. A national military
park where the great battle of September 19-20, 1863, was
fought.</p>
<p>COLUMBUS: Site of the raised Confederate gunboat <i>Muscogee</i>
and a naval museum on Fourth Street, west of U.S. 27.</p>
<p>CRAWFORDSVILLE: On U.S. 278 west of Augusta. Liberty
Hall, the home of Confederate Vice President Alexander H. Stephens,
has been restored and is open to the public.</p>
<p>FORT PULASKI: A national monument on U.S. 80 east of Savannah.
Site of an engagement in 1862 when Northern forces
attacked and captured the fort.</p>
<p>IRWINVILLE: Off Ga. 107 in the south-central portion of the
State. Museum at the site where President Jefferson Davis was
captured by Federal forces in 1865.</p>
<p>KENNESAW MOUNTAIN: A national battlefield park on U.S.
41 north of Marietta. This park preserves much of the area where
fighting occurred in 1864. Museum, slide show, and hiking trails.</p>
<p>MILLEDGEVILLE: On U.S. 441 in east-central Georgia. Capital
of Georgia during the war. Occupied by the Federals during the
“March to the Sea.” Many old buildings remain.</p>
<p>SAVANNAH: Terminus of the “March to the Sea.” Fort McAllister,
east of the city on U.S. 17, was a Confederate defense post.
Factors Walk Museum at 222 Factors Walk houses many wartime
relics.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_72">72</div>
<hr class="dwide" />
<p>Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park is administered by the
National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. A superintendent,
whose address is Box 1167, Marietta, GA 30060, is in immediate charge.</p>
<p>As the Nation’s principal conservation agency, the Department of the
Interior has basic responsibilities for water, fish, wildlife, mineral, land,
park, and recreational resources. Indian and Territorial affairs are other
major concerns of America’s “Department of Natural Resources.” The
Department works to assure the wisest choice in managing all our resources
so each will make its full contribution to a better United States—now and
in the future.</p>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p30.jpg" alt="Department of the Interior • March 1, 1849" width-obs="163" height-obs="165" /></div>
<div class="verse">
<p class="t0">United States Department of the Interior</p>
<p class="t0">Thomas S. Kleppe, Secretary</p>
</div>
<div class="verse">
<p class="t0">National Park Service</p>
<p class="t0">George B. Hartzog, Jr., Director</p>
</div>
<p><span class="lr"><span class="smaller"><span class="ssn">★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 224-506</span></span></span></p>
<h2>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
<ul>
<li>Silently corrected a few typos.</li>
<li>Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook is public-domain in the country of publication.</li>
<li>In the text versions only, text in <i>italics</i> is delimited by _underscores_.</li>
</ul>
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