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<ANTIMG id="coverpage" src="images/cover.jpg" alt="Vicksburg National Military park, Mississippi" width-obs="500" height-obs="791" /></div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p02.jpg" alt="U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR · March 3, 1849" width-obs="289" height-obs="292" /></div>
<p class="center">UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
<br/>Stewart L. Udall, <i>Secretary</i></p>
<p class="center">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
<br/>Conrad L. Wirth, <i>Director</i></p>
<p class="tbcenter"><i>HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER TWENTY-ONE</i></p>
<p>This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the
historical and archeological areas in the National Park System
administered by the National Park Service of the United States
Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government
Printing Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of
Documents, Washington 25, D. C. Price 25 cents.</p>
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<h1><span class="large">VICKSBURG</span> <br/><span class="small">National Military Park, Mississippi</span></h1>
<p class="center">by William C. Everhart</p>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p02a.jpg" alt="Siege cannon." width-obs="400" height-obs="216" /></div>
<p class="center small">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES No. 21
<br/>Washington, D. C., 1954
<br/><span class="small">(Reprint 1961)</span></p>
</div>
<div class="box">
<p><i>The National Park System, of which Vicksburg National
Military Park is a unit, is dedicated to conserving the scenic,
scientific, and historic heritage of the
United States for the benefit and
inspiration of its people.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p03.jpg" alt="NATIONAL PARK SERVICE · DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR" width-obs="300" height-obs="379" /></div>
<h2 class="center"><i>Contents</i></h2>
<dt class="small">Page
<br/><SPAN href="#c1">Vicksburg and the Mississippi</SPAN> 1
<br/><SPAN href="#c2">The First Moves Against Vicksburg</SPAN> 3
<br/><SPAN href="#c3">Grant’s First Failure at Vicksburg</SPAN> 6
<br/><SPAN href="#c4">THE BAYOU EXPEDITIONS: GRANT MOVES AGAINST VICKSBURG—AND FAILS</SPAN> 8
<br/><SPAN href="#c5">The Geographical Problem of Vicksburg</SPAN> 8
<br/><SPAN href="#c6">Grant’s Canal</SPAN> 10
<br/><SPAN href="#c7">Duckport Canal</SPAN> 12
<br/><SPAN href="#c8">Lake Providence Expedition</SPAN> 12
<br/><SPAN href="#c9">The Yazoo Pass Expedition</SPAN> 14
<br/><SPAN href="#c10">The Steele’s Bayou Expedition</SPAN> 14
<br/><SPAN href="#c11">THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN: GRANT MOVES AGAINST VICKSBURG—AND SUCCEEDS</SPAN> 16
<br/><SPAN href="#c12">Porter Runs the Vicksburg Batteries</SPAN> 16
<br/><SPAN href="#c13">The River Crossing</SPAN> 19
<br/><SPAN href="#c14">The Battle of Port Gibson</SPAN> 21
<br/><SPAN href="#c15">The Strategy of the Vicksburg Campaign</SPAN> 21
<br/><SPAN href="#c16">The Battles of Raymond and Jackson</SPAN> 23
<br/><SPAN href="#c17">The Battle of Champion’s Hill</SPAN> 26
<br/><SPAN href="#c18">The Battle of Big Black River</SPAN> 30
<br/><SPAN href="#c19">The Campaign Ended</SPAN> 31
<br/><SPAN href="#c20">THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG</SPAN> 33
<br/><SPAN href="#c21">The Confederate Defense Line</SPAN> 33
<br/><SPAN href="#c22">The Assault of May 19</SPAN> 34
<br/><SPAN href="#c23">The Assault of May 22</SPAN> 35
<br/><SPAN href="#c24">Union Siege Operations</SPAN> 40
<br/><SPAN href="#c25">Confederate Trench Life</SPAN> 41
<br/><SPAN href="#c26">Civilian Life in Vicksburg During the Siege</SPAN> 45
<br/><SPAN href="#c27">Fraternization</SPAN> 45
<br/><SPAN href="#c28">Johnston’s Dilemma</SPAN> 47
<br/><SPAN href="#c29">The Surrender of Vicksburg</SPAN> 49
<br/><SPAN href="#c30">The Significance of the Fall of Vicksburg</SPAN> 52
<br/><SPAN href="#c31">GUIDE TO THE AREA</SPAN> 54
<br/><SPAN href="#c32">THE PARK</SPAN> 60
<br/><SPAN href="#c33">HOW TO REACH THE PARK</SPAN> 60
<br/><SPAN href="#c34">ADMINISTRATION</SPAN> 60
<br/><SPAN href="#c35">RELATED AREAS</SPAN> 60
<br/><SPAN href="#c36">VISITOR FACILITIES</SPAN> 60
<div class="fig"> id="fig1"> <ANTIMG src="images/p04.jpg" alt="" width-obs="700" height-obs="638" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Merchant steamers unloading supplies at Vicksburg after the surrender.</i> Courtesy Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_1">1</div>
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p04a.jpg" alt="Cannon overlooking the river." width-obs="500" height-obs="187" /></div>
<p class="tb"><i>Across the imperishable canvas of the American Civil
War are vividly recorded feats of arms and armies, and acts of
courage and steadfast devotion which have since become a treasured
heritage for all Americans. Among the military campaigns, few, if
any, present action over so vast an area, of such singular diversity, and
so consequential to the outcome of the war, as the great struggle for
control of the Mississippi River. Seagoing men-of-war and ironclad
gunboats engaged shore defenses and escorted troops along river and
bayou; cavalry raids struck far behind enemy lines as the armies of the
West marched and countermarched in a gigantic operation which
culminated in the campaign and siege of Vicksburg. Protected by
heavy artillery batteries on the riverfront and with land approaches to
the north and south guarded by densely wooded swamplands, Vicksburg
defied large-scale land and river expeditions for over a year.
Finally the tenacious Grant, in a campaign since accepted as a model
of bold strategy and skillful execution, forced the surrender of Vicksburg
on July 4, 1863, splitting the Confederacy in two and securing for
the North its great objective in the Western Theater.</i></p>
<h3 id="c1">VICKSBURG AND THE MISSISSIPPI.</h3>
<p>Control of the Mississippi River,
whose course meandered over 1,000 miles from Cairo, Ill., to the Gulf
of Mexico and divided the Confederacy into almost equal parts, was
of inestimable importance to the Union from the outbreak of hostilities.
The agricultural and industrial products of the Northwest, denied
their natural outlet to markets down the great commercial artery to
New Orleans, would be afforded uninterrupted passage. It would
provide a safe avenue for the transportation of troops and their supplies
through a tremendous area ill-provided with roads and railroads;
the numerous navigable streams tributary to the Mississippi would
offer ready routes of invasion into the heart of the South. Union control
would cut off and isolate the section of the Confederacy lying west of
<span class="pb" id="Page_2">2</span>
the river—Texas, Arkansas, and most of Louisiana—comprising almost
half of the land area of the Confederacy and an important source of
food, military supplies, and recruits for the Southern armies. Forcefully
emphasizing the strategic value of the Mississippi was the dispatch
of the General in Chief of the Union armies to Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant
on March 20, 1863, as Grant prepared to launch his Vicksburg
campaign:</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig2"> <ANTIMG src="images/p05.jpg" alt="" width-obs="216" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>“Johnny Reb.” A volunteer soldier of the Confederacy.</i> Courtesy Confederate Museum, Richmond.</p>
</div>
<blockquote>
<p>The great objective on your line now is the opening of the Mississippi
River, and everything else must tend to that purpose. The eyes and
hopes of the whole country are now directed to your army. In my
opinion, the opening of the Mississippi River will be to us of more
advantage than the capture of forty Richmonds.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>To protect this vital lifeline, the Confederacy had erected a series of
fortifications at readily defensible locations along the river from which
the Union advance could be checked. Pushing southward from Illinois
<span class="pb" id="Page_3">3</span>
by land and water, and northward from the Gulf of Mexico by river,
Union army and naval units attacked the Confederate strongpoints
from both ends of the line. They captured post by post and city by
city until, after the first year of the war, Vicksburg alone barred complete
Union possession of the Mississippi River. From the city ran the
only railroad west of the river between Memphis and New Orleans.
Through the city most of the supplies from the trans-Mississippi were
shipped to Confederate armies in the East. The city’s batteries on the
bluffs, commanding a 5-mile stretch of the river, effectively prevented
Union control of the Mississippi. Vicksburg was indeed the key,
declared Lincoln, and the war could not be brought to a successful
conclusion “until that key is in our pocket.”</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig3"> <ANTIMG src="images/p05a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="700" height-obs="661" /> <p class="pcap"><i>“Billy Yank.” A volunteer soldier of the Union.</i> Courtesy Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<h3 id="c2">THE FIRST MOVES AGAINST VICKSBURG.</h3>
<p>David Farragut, first admiral of
the United States Navy, early in May 1862, headed his Western Gulf
Squadron of oceangoing vessels up the Mississippi. In a spectacular
<span class="pb" id="Page_4">4</span>
engagement he passed the forts protecting New Orleans and captured
the South’s largest port city. Proceeding 400 miles up river, Farragut
received the surrenders of Baton Rouge, capital of Louisiana, and
Natchez, Miss., arriving before Vicksburg on May 18, just 1 year
before Grant’s army invested the city from the rear. At the same time,
Flag Officer C. H. Davis was moving down the Mississippi River from
the north, commanding a flotilla whose striking power was largely
provided by a ram fleet under Col. Charles Ellet, Jr., and the seven
“Pook Turtles”—ironclad gunboats, built on the Northern rivers,
which mounted 13 guns in an armored casemate resting on a flat-bottomed
hull.</p>
<p>After capturing Memphis in June 1862 and completely destroying the
Confederate fleet of converted river steamboats, Davis pushed southward
and on July 1 dropped anchor beside Farragut’s fleet just north
of Vicksburg. All of the Mississippi River was now in Union possession,
except for a section at and below Vicksburg.</p>
<p>The batteries of Vicksburg had been passed for the first time on
June 28. On that day Farragut blasted the city and its defenses with
broadsides from his ships and a devastating fire from Comdr. David
Dixon Porter’s mortar boats in an unsuccessful attempt to reduce
the city by naval attack. It was clearly evident from this experience
that a powerful land force would be required to capture fortress
Vicksburg. Only 3,000 troops under Brig. Gen. Thomas Williams
had accompanied the expedition, and they were put to work with
pick and shovel to dig a cut off which might permit river traffic to
bypass the Vicksburg batteries. As the fleets idled above Vicksburg,
the sweltering monotony was spectacularly interrupted by the short
but battle-filled career of the Confederate ironclad ram <i>Arkansas</i>,
which performed at Vicksburg one of the great feats of arms on
the Western waters.</p>
<p>The energy and skill of Lt. Isaac N. Brown, who commanded the
<i>Arkansas</i>, had enabled the ram to be readied for action despite almost
impossible handicaps in securing materials. Routing the Union vessels
sent to apprehend her, the venturesome man-of-war stood for the
two Federal fleets lying at anchor just above Vicksburg and, with
guns blazing, passed entirely through the massed flotillas to safety
under the Vicksburg batteries. Here the <i>Arkansas</i> withstood all attempts
to destroy her and presented a formidable threat to Farragut’s
wooden ships.</p>
<p>By the end of July, conditions indicated to Farragut that a withdrawal
from Vicksburg was necessary. In the hot, fetid atmosphere of
the river the disease rate had so increased that only 800 of Williams’
3,000 men were fit for duty. At the same time, the steadily falling
waters threatened to maroon his deep-draught vessels. Farragut, with
Williams’ troops aboard, moved down river to New Orleans, while
Davis steamed up river, leaving Vicksburg unopposed. The initial
expedition against Vicksburg had failed.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_5">5</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig4"> <ANTIMG src="images/p06.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="502" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss center">THE STRATEGIC SITUATION <br/><span class="small">JULY 1862</span></span></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_6">6</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig5"> <ANTIMG src="images/p07.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="504" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Scene of Sherman’s assault against the Bluffs at Chickasaw Bayou.</i> From <i>Battles and Leaders of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<p>With the Union withdrawal, communications between the sections
of the Confederacy east and west of the Mississippi, which had been
temporarily curtailed, were resumed. From Vicksburg to Port Hudson,
a distance of 250 miles by river, the Mississippi was now in Confederate
hands. Into the Mississippi, just above Port Hudson, emptied
the Red River which drained much of the trans-Mississippi South, and
down which great stores of food were being floated to supply the
armies of the Confederacy. It was imperative for the North to close off
this important supply route.</p>
<h3 id="c3">GRANT’S FIRST FAILURE AT VICKSBURG.</h3>
<p>In October 1862, Grant, who
had won the sobriquet of “Unconditional Surrender” at Fort Donelson
and had rallied his army from near defeat at bloody Shiloh, was
placed in command of the Department of the Tennessee with headquarters
at Memphis; his objective—to clear the Mississippi River.
The same month, Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton, a West Pointer, born
and raised in Pennsylvania, who had served with Grant in the Mexican
War, was placed in command of the Confederate troops defending
the Mississippi; his objective—to keep the Southern supply line
open and prevent loss of the river. Vicksburg would be the focus of
military operations for both commanders.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_7">7</div>
<p>The first full-scale expedition against Vicksburg was initiated in
December 1862, with Grant pushing southward through the State of
Mississippi to strike Vicksburg from the rear as Maj. Gen. William
Tecumseh Sherman, with an army of 32,000 men aboard 60 transports,
proceeded down river from Memphis. Grant anticipated that his advance
would pull Pemberton’s army away from Vicksburg, permitting
Sherman to make a lodgment on the bluffs immediately north of the
city against a greatly reduced garrison. On December 20, Maj. Gen.
Earl Van Dorn, with a striking force of 3,500 Confederate cavalry,
swung in behind the Union line of march, capturing and burning
$1,500,000 of military goods at Grant’s supply base in Holly Springs.
Unwilling to wage a campaign without a base of supply, Grant abandoned
his campaign and returned to Memphis.</p>
<p>Sherman made his assault on December 29 at Chickasaw Bayou, 5
miles north of Vicksburg. The land here was a low, swampy shelf
lying between the Yazoo River and the bluffs. The few dry causeways
over which the Federal infantry could advance were completely
covered by Confederate rifle and artillery fire from the bluffs 200 feet
above. The Union Army lost nearly 2,000 men against Confederate
casualties of less than 200. Tersely, Sherman reported his defeat: “I
reached Vicksburg at the time appointed, landed, assaulted and failed.”</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig6"> <ANTIMG src="images/p07a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="656" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss center"><span class="small">GRANT’S FIRST MOVE AGAINST</span> <br/>VICKSBURG <br/><span class="smaller"><i>DECEMBER 1862</i></span></span></p>
</div>
<p class="pcapc"><span class="ss"><span class="small">Grant’s advance was halted and
turned back when Van Dorn’s
cavalry raid destroyed the huge
Union supply base at Holly Springs.</span></span></p>
<p class="pcapc"><span class="ss"><span class="small">Sherman assaulted the bluffs at
Chickasaw Bayou, 5 miles north
of Vicksburg and was repulsed.</span></span></p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_8">8</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig7"> <ANTIMG src="images/p08.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="513" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The Confederate ironclad ram <span class="f">Arkansas</span> engaging the combined Union fleets at Vicksburg.</i> From <i>Battles and Leaders of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<h2 id="c4"><span class="small"><i>The Bayou Expeditions: Grant Moves Against Vicksburg—and Fails</i></span></h2>
<p>By the end of January, Grant had arrived at the Union encampment
at Milliken’s Bend, 30 miles north of Vicksburg, and assumed leadership
of the operations against Vicksburg. His army, numbering about
45,000, was divided into three corps under General Sherman, Maj.
Gen. John McClernand, and Maj. Gen. James Birdseye McPherson.
Cooperating with the army, and providing aid without which the
bayou expeditions would not have been possible, was the Western
Flotilla under Porter. This fleet consisted of 11 ironclads, 38 wooden
gunboats, rams, and sundry auxiliary craft mounting over 300 guns and
carrying a complement of 5,500. The war in the West now hinged
upon the effectiveness of this combined land and naval force. Under
Grant’s direction it maneuvered over hundreds of miles of river and
bayou seeking to outflank Vicksburg. The capture of the city would
result not from great battles but from a war of movement.</p>
<h3 id="c5">THE GEOGRAPHICAL PROBLEM OF VICKSBURG.</h3>
<p>The capture of Vicksburg
proved difficult partly because of the topography of the area, which so
favored defense of the city as to render the fortress almost impregnable
<span class="pb" id="Page_9">9</span>
to attack. To move against the city it was necessary to reach the bluffs
which extended north and south and on which Vicksburg had been
built. Behind the bluffs, to the east, lay dry ground on which an army
might maneuver; below the bluffs, on both sides of the river, flooded
swamplands prevented ground movements. With his army behind the
bluffs, either above or below, Grant might come to grips with Pemberton’s
Army of Vicksburg. Unless he reached the bluffs, capture of
the city would be impossible; it could not be assaulted from the river.</p>
<p>The line of bluffs which marks the eastern boundary of the Mississippi
Valley leaves the river at Memphis, curves in a great 250-mile arc
away from the river, and then swings back to reach the river again at
Vicksburg. Enclosed between the bluffs and the river is the “Delta”—a
strip of land averaging some 60 miles in width, which is now a
fertile, well-drained, cotton-growing region. In 1863, it was a swampy
bottom land containing numerous rivers and bayous, subject to incessant
floods. It was covered with thick forests and dense undergrowth,
a condition, which, according to Grant’s engineer officer, “renders
the country almost impassable in summer, and entirely so, except by
boats, in winter.” This impenetrable swampland, lying before the
bluffs, effectively guarded Vicksburg’s right flank. Unless the waterways
of the Delta might provide a passage to the bluffs, operations
against Vicksburg to the north were hopeless.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig8"> <ANTIMG src="images/p08a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="421" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant, commanding the Union Army of the Tennessee.</i> Courtesy National Archives.</p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig9"> <ANTIMG src="images/p08b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="452" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton, commanding the Confederate Army of Vicksburg.</i> Courtesy Flohr Studio, Vicksburg.</p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_10">10</div>
<p>South of Vicksburg the prospect for the Union Army was equally
dismal. After meeting the river at Vicksburg, the bluffs follow the river
course closely to the south and were accessible, therefore, to troops from
the Mississippi River. But the river batteries of the city prevented
passage of transports to the river below; for troops to get below the
city it was necessary to move through the Louisiana lowlands west
of the river. This region was like the Delta north of Vicksburg—flooded
bottom lands interspersed with bayous, rivers, and lakes. It would prove
equally obstinate to land movements.</p>
<p>To increase Grant’s difficulties, his campaign against Vicksburg was
begun during the wet season when streams were overflowing and
lowlands impassable. The winter of 1862-63 was a period of unusually
high water, the Mississippi cresting higher than its natural banks from
December until April. Had Grant reached Vicksburg during the dry
season, his problem would have been less formidable.</p>
<p>Until the bottoms were dry enough to permit land movements, the
Union commander felt himself compelled to keep the army active.
Even if success along the water routes seemed unlikely, he reasoned
that prolonged idleness would be injurious to the health and morale of
his troops. Grant had come to believe that military success was won by
the aggressive. To Grant’s critics, who demanded that he open the
Mississippi without delay or be replaced by someone who could,
Lincoln replied, “I can’t spare this man; he fights.”</p>
<p>As Pemberton prepared to defend Vicksburg he was beset by difficulties
rivaling those of his opponent, despite the topography which
was friendly to his defensive purpose. Vicksburg would be secure only
so long as the Confederate Army could prevent Grant from achieving
a foothold on the high ground above or below the city. Yet, to prevent
such a lodgment, it was necessary for Pemberton to defend a wide
front extending 200 miles above and below Vicksburg, at any point
along which Grant might strike. To cover this large area the Confederate
commander would have to disperse his limited garrison dangerously
and at the same time retain sufficient troops to protect the
city—his primary responsibility. Under such conditions it was essential
for Pemberton to receive information of Federal movements in order
to concentrate his troops rapidly to meet the advance. Yet Pemberton
was almost wholly lacking in cavalry and had no navy to interfere
with and report Union progress through the rivers and bayous. Both
Pemberton and Grant faced exacting problems in command during
the Vicksburg operations.</p>
<h3 id="c6">GRANT’S CANAL.</h3>
<p>Vicksburg’s location on the horseshoe bend of the river
had suggested a solution to the Vicksburg problem the previous summer.
By digging a canal across the peninsula below Vicksburg and
diverting the river through it, unarmored transports could bypass the
city batteries and deliver troops safely to the bluffs below. In January,
Sherman’s Corps, assisted by dredging machines, began excavation of
the mile-long canal. This project continued until March when a sudden
rise in the river flooded the peninsula, driving the troops to the levees,
and destroying much of their work.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_11">11</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig10"> <ANTIMG src="images/p09.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="451" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Pivot-gun and crew of the Union warship <span class="f">Wissahickon</span>, which fought the Vicksburg batteries.</i> From <i>Photographic History of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig11"> <ANTIMG src="images/p09a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="655" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss center">GRANT’S CANAL <br/><span class="smaller"><i>FEBRUARY-MARCH 1863</i></span></span></p> </div>
<p class="pcapc"><span class="ss"><span class="small">By digging a canal across the
mile-wide peninsula, Grant hoped
to by-pass the Vicksburg batteries,
move the army on transports below
the city, and attack from the south.</span></span></p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_12">12</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig12"> <ANTIMG src="images/p10.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="567" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Union soldiers at work on Grant’s canal opposite Vicksburg.</i> From a wartime sketch.</p> </div>
<h3 id="c7">DUCKPORT CANAL.</h3>
<p>A similar effort to turn Vicksburg’s left flank was
essayed by cutting a canal at Duckport, between Milliken’s Bend and
Vicksburg. By this avenue it was hoped vessels might leave the Mississippi
above Vicksburg, pass through a series of circuitous bayous and
emerge again on the Mississippi 20 miles below the city. The route
was laboriously opened for navigation and one small steamer safely
passed to the river below. Then the level of the river fell and blocked
the Duckport attempt.</p>
<h3 id="c8">LAKE PROVIDENCE EXPEDITION.</h3>
<p>While the canal work was in progress,
McPherson’s Corps was assigned the opening of the Lake Providence
route. The objective of this activity was the turning of Vicksburg’s left
flank by passing southward through the Louisiana waterways to reach
the bluffs below the city. A canal was cut to provide entrance from the
Mississippi into Lake Providence, 75 miles above Vicksburg. From
Lake Providence a route was surveyed through the labyrinth of
bayous, lakes, and rivers by which a fleet might emerge again on the
Mississippi 200 miles below the city and move on Vicksburg from the
south. While presenting great difficulties to navigation, the entire 400
miles would be safe from enemy action. By the end of March 1863,
McPherson’s men had almost cleared the route for navigation. The
dredging of shoals and the sawing off of trees far enough below the
water to permit passage of the transports proved the most severe obstacles.
Before this long and extremely difficult route could be completed,
however, other, more likely, plans were formulated, and the
Lake Providence expedition was recalled.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_13">13</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig13"> <ANTIMG src="images/p10a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="503" height-obs="799" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss center">THE BAYOU EXPEDITIONS <br/><span class="smaller"><i>FEBRUARY-APRIL 1863</i></span></span></p> </div>
<p class="pcapc"><span class="ss"><span class="small">Four unsuccessful attempts by Grant
to strike Vicksburg from the rear
by moving his army on transports
through the rivers and bayous to the
bluffs north or south of the city.</span></span></p>
<p class="pcapc"><span class="ss"><span class="small">Yazoo Pass Expedition blocked by the guns of Fort Pemberton.</span></span></p>
<p class="pcapc"><span class="ss"><span class="small">Lake Providence Route abandoned; unable to clear route for navigation.</span></span></p>
<p class="pcapc"><span class="ss"><span class="small">Steele’s Bayou Expedition cut off in Rolling Fork.</span></span></p>
<p class="pcapc"><span class="ss"><span class="small">Duckport Canal Expedition abandoned because of low water in the bayous.</span></span></p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_14">14</div>
<h3 id="c9">THE YAZOO PASS EXPEDITION.</h3>
<p>The Yazoo Pass project, which sought to
turn the right flank of Vicksburg by sending an expedition through
the Delta waterways to the bluffs north of the city, was for a time the
most promising of the bayou attempts. By exploding a mine in the
Yazoo Pass, 325 river miles north of Vicksburg, access from the
Mississippi into the rivers of the Delta was secured. With paddle wheels
reversed against the roaring current which surged through the
crevasse, and suffering extensive damage in collisions with trees and
floating debris, the gunboats and transports carrying a division of
infantry began the hazardous journey. Almost a month was required to
reach the calmer waters of the Coldwater River.</p>
<p>Notified of the threat, Pemberton dispatched Maj. Gen. W. W.
Loring’s Division to halt the Union advance. Fort Pemberton, overlooking
the Yalabusha River 90 miles north of Vicksburg, was
quickly constructed of earth and cotton bales. The land surrounding
the fort was completely flooded, permitting approach by water only.
On March 11, the Union gunboats began an artillery bombardment
and were promptly greeted by a heavy return fire as “Old Blizzards”
Loring gained his nickname by pacing the parapet and urging his
gunners to, “Give them blizzards, boys! Give them blizzards!” Grant
had planned to send 30,000 men through the Yazoo Pass; but Loring’s
gunners blasted back every attempt to pass the fort, forcing the fleet
to withdraw. The Yazoo Pass expedition was one of the great flanking
attempts of the war—the route from Milliken’s Bend to the rear of
Vicksburg through the pass was over 700 miles, yet it was only 30
miles direct from Milliken’s Bend to Vicksburg.</p>
<h3 id="c10">THE STEELE’S BAYOU EXPEDITION.</h3>
<p>The last and most extraordinary of
Grant’s unsuccessful attempts to reach Vicksburg was the Steele’s Bayou
expedition through 200 miles of narrow, twisting bayous north of
Vicksburg. Like the Yazoo Pass operation, it was an effort to turn the
city’s right flank. This shorter route had been originally scouted in
order to send aid to the Yazoo Pass expedition when that column
seemed in great danger of being cut off and captured. Further exploration
<span class="pb" id="Page_15">15</span>
suggested the route to the bluffs by way of Steele’s Bayou might
prove the best of all possible approaches to Vicksburg, and Porter
himself commanded the squadron of 11 vessels which entered Steele’s
Bayou from the Yazoo River on March 16.</p>
<p>The route was heavily obstructed by natural hazards, but Porter,
warned by apprehensive officers who feared that superstructures would
be carried away in crashing through the closely overhung waterways,
answered with the declaration, “All I need is an engine, guns, and a
hull to float them.” Progress was slow through winding streams barely
wide enough to admit passage of the gunboats. This time alert Confederates,
aided by treacherous obstructions in the mouth of the Rolling
Fork, nearly succeeded in shutting up and capturing the entire fleet
by felling huge trees across the bayou to block Porter’s retreat.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig14"> <ANTIMG src="images/p11.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="640" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Skirmishing in the heavily wooded and flooded bottom lands during the bayou expeditions.</i> From a wartime sketch.</p> </div>
<p>Sherman, following behind the fleet with infantry, received word
of Porter’s danger, and an eerie night march ensued. By the flaring
light of candles held in the muzzles of their rifles, the Federal soldiers
splashed through the canebrake hip deep in water and arrived in
time to drive off the Confederates who had moved in behind the
Union fleet. Three days were required to back the fleet to safety on the
Mississippi, which was reached late in March. Grant had now tested
<span class="pb" id="Page_16">16</span>
all possible approaches to Vicksburg as he attempted to swing wide
around its flanks to the north and south. Every effort had failed.
In April, the Union Army was no closer to Vicksburg than it had been
in December. The Southern bastion on the Mississippi had successfully
withstood Union land and naval attacks for almost a year.</p>
<h2 id="c11"><span class="small"><i>The Vicksburg Campaign: Grant Moves Against Vicksburg—and Succeeds</i></span></h2>
<p>In the eyes of many in the North, Grant’s Army had floundered in the
swamps for months with nothing to show for it except a steadily
mounting death list from disease. Criticism of the Union commander
mounted. “I don’t know what to make of Grant, he’s such a quiet little
fellow,” said Lincoln, thinking of the more flamboyant leaders who
had led his Eastern armies, “The only way I know he’s around is by
the way he makes things <i>git</i>.” Lincoln had grown increasingly fond
of Grant, whose army, while ineffective, had never been inactive. Now
he declared to Grant’s critics, “I think we’ll try him a little longer.”</p>
<p>Although Grant had made every effort to navigate the bayous and
reach Vicksburg, he was later to record that little hope had been entertained
that success would greet these ventures. While waiting for the
dry season which would permit land operations, however, he had determined
to exhaust every possibility and to retain the fighting edge
of his army by keeping it constantly on the move. As April arrived
and the roads began to emerge from the slowly receding waters, Grant
prepared to execute the movement which he had believed from the
first to be the logical approach against Vicksburg—marching down the
west bank of the Mississippi through Louisiana, crossing the river
south of the city, and laying siege to it from the rear.</p>
<h3 id="c12">PORTER RUNS THE VICKSBURG BATTERIES.</h3>
<p>Grant’s Vicksburg campaign
officially began on March 29, 1863, when he ordered McClernand’s
Corps to open a road for the army from Milliken’s Bend to the river
below the city. Considerable work had been done previously when it
was contemplated that a canal from Duckport to the river below Vicksburg
might offer passage to the fleet. Falling waters had finally defeated
this plan and, during April, McClernand’s engineers labored
to bridge streams, corduroy roads, and build flatboats to cross areas
still covered by flood waters. During that month also, elements of the
Army of the Tennessee accomplished the 70-mile march and assembled
at a small hamlet appropriately named, Hard Times, in view of
Grant’s unpleasant bayou experiences. Here they were across the river
from the Confederate stronghold of Grand Gulf, 25 miles below
Vicksburg.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_17">17</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig15"> <ANTIMG src="images/p12.jpg" alt="" width-obs="460" height-obs="599" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Adm. David Dixon Porter, commanding the Union naval operations on the inland waters.</i> Courtesy National Archives.</p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig16"> <ANTIMG src="images/p12a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="526" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Porter’s gunboats running the Vicksburg batteries on the night of April 16, 1863.</i> From a wartime sketch.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_18">18</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig17"> <ANTIMG src="images/p13.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="461" /> <p class="pcap"><i>This remarkable wartime photograph, taken by a Confederate Secret Service agent, shows Grierson’s cavalrymen near the end of their 600-mile raid behind the Confederate lines.</i> From <i>Photographic History of the Civil War</i>.</p>
</div>
<p>To ferry the Union Army across the Mississippi, it was necessary for
Porter’s fleet, in anchorage north of Vicksburg, to run the batteries and
rendezvous with Grant below. While naval craft singly and in groups
had, on occasion, passed these batteries successfully before, it was still
a formidable undertaking for which careful preparation was required.
As protection against shellfire, each vessel had its port side, which
would face the Vicksburg guns in passage, piled high with bales of
cotton, hay, and grain. Coal barges were lashed alongside as an
additional defense.</p>
<p>Shortly before midnight, April 16, Confederate pickets in skiffs at
the bend of the river above Vicksburg saw the muffled fleet bearing
down upon them and quickly gave the alarm. Tar barrels along the
bank were ignited and buildings in the small village of De Soto across
the river were set afire. The blinding light of a great flare helped illuminate
the river and outline the fleet for the Confederate gunners. Tier
upon tier of the river batteries thundered down on the Union vessels.
In return, these boats delivered their broadsides into the city as they
passed so close that the clatter of bricks from falling buildings could
be heard on board.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_19">19</div>
<p>Through this “magnificent, but terrible” spectacle—one of the most
fearful pageants of the war—steamed the fleet in single file. “Their
heavy shot walked right through us,” related Porter. Every one of the
12 boats was hit repeatedly. Many went out of control and revolved
slowly with the current. Despite the furious bombardment, only one
craft was sunk; within a few days damages were repaired and the
fleet joined the army at the village of Hard Times. Because of the
difficulty of supplying the army by wagon train over the wretched road
from Milliken’s Bend, 6 transports and 12 barges loaded with supplies
ran the batteries a few nights later with the loss of 1 transport and
6 barges.</p>
<h3 id="c13">THE RIVER CROSSING.</h3>
<p>Grant’s plan was to make an assault landing at
Grand Gulf, a fortified road junction on the bluffs at the mouth of
the Big Black River. On April 29, the Union gunboats pounded the
Grand Gulf fortifications for 6 hours, seeking to neutralize the defenses
and clear the landing for 10,000 Federal infantry aboard transports
just beyond range of the Confederate cannon. The naval attack
failed to reduce the Confederate works, and that night Grant marched
southward along the Louisiana shore to a landing opposite Bruinsburg.
There he was met by the fleet which then slipped downstream under
cover of darkness. By noon of the following day, April 30, Grant was
across the Mississippi, experiencing</p>
<blockquote>
<p>a degree of relief scarcely ever equaled since.... I was now in the
enemy’s country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg
between me and my base of supplies. But I was on dry ground on the
same side of the river with the enemy. All the campaigns, labors,
hardships, and exposures, from the month of December previous to
this time, that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment
of this one object.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Grant’s landing was unopposed, partly because of two diversionary
movements and partly because of Pemberton’s decision to hold his
army close to Vicksburg and fight a defensive campaign. Both diversions
were completely successful. On April 17, the day after Porter’s
running of the batteries had indicated Grant’s strategy of striking
from the south, Col. B. H. Grierson with 1,000 cavalrymen moved out
from southwestern Tennessee on one of the celebrated cavalry raids
of the war. They rode entirely through the State of Mississippi behind
Pemberton’s army to a junction with Union forces at Baton Rouge, La.
In 16 days Grierson covered 600 miles, interfering with Confederate
telegraph and railroad communications and forcing Pemberton to detach
a division of infantry to protect his supply and communication
lines. Sherman, whose corps had not yet made the march from Milliken’s
Bend, made an elaborate feint above Vicksburg. Loading his men
aboard every available gunboat, transport, and tug, he landed at
<span class="pb" id="Page_20">20</span>
Haynes’ Bluff, north of Vicksburg, leading Pemberton to expect the
real attack from that direction. Both moves helped screen Grant’s true
objective.</p>
<p>The events immediately following Grant’s landing revealed a basic
difference in tactical concepts between Pemberton, commanding the
Army of Vicksburg, and Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, his superior, who
was in charge of Confederate operations in the West. Johnston believed
that to defeat Grant it would be necessary for Pemberton to
unite his whole force in order to smash the Union Army, preferably
before Grant could consolidate his position on the east bank. Accordingly,
he wired Pemberton on May 2 “If Grant’s army crosses, unite
all your troops to beat him; success will give you back what was
abandoned to win it.”</p>
<p>It was Pemberton’s concept that holding Vicksburg was vital to the
Confederacy and that he must primarily protect the city and its approaches.
To have marched his army to meet Grant “would have
stripped Vicksburg and its essential flank defenses of their garrisons,
and the city itself might have fallen an easy prey into the eager hands
of the enemy.” This inability of Pemberton and Johnston to reach
agreement upon the tactics that might thwart Grant’s invasion seriously
affected subsequent Confederate operations and prevented effective
cooperation between the two commanders in the Vicksburg campaign.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig18"> <ANTIMG src="images/p14.jpg" alt="" width-obs="435" height-obs="550" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, commanding the Union XV Corps.</i> Courtesy National Archives.</p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig19"> <ANTIMG src="images/p14a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="410" height-obs="550" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, commanding Confederate military operations in the West.</i> Courtesy National Archives.</p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_21">21</div>
<h3 id="c14">THE BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON.</h3>
<p>McClernand’s Corps, immediately upon
debarking on April 30, headed for the bluffs 3 miles inland. By nightfall
the Federal soldiers had reached the high ground and pushed on
toward Port Gibson, 30 miles south of Vicksburg. From this point,
roads led to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg, and Jackson. Maj. Gen. John
S. Bowen moved his Grand Gulf command toward Port Gibson to
intercept the threat, and, at daylight on May 1, leading elements of
the Union advance clashed with Bowen’s troops, barring the two roads
which led to Port Gibson.</p>
<p>The battle of Port Gibson was a series of furious day-long engagements
over thickly wooded ridges cut by deep, precipitous gullies and
covered with dense undergrowth. While greatly outnumbering Bowen,
McClernand was prevented by the rugged terrain from bringing his
whole force into action. Slowly forced backward, Bowen conducted
an orderly retreat through the town, which he evacuated. The holding
action had cost Bowen 800 casualties from his command of 8,000; Union
losses were about the same from a force at hand of about 23,000. Pemberton
determined not to contest Grand Gulf lest he risk being cut
off from Vicksburg and withdrew across the Big Black River. Thus
he permitted Grant to occupy Grand Gulf and gave him a strong
foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi.</p>
<h3 id="c15">THE STRATEGY OF THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.</h3>
<p>Grant’s overall strategy,
up to the capture of Grand Gulf, had been first to secure a base on the
river below Vicksburg and then to cooperate with Maj. Gen. Nathaniel
P. Banks in capturing Port Hudson. After this he planned to move the
combined force against Vicksburg. Port Hudson, a strong point on
the Mississippi near Baton Rouge, was garrisoned by Confederate
troops after Farragut’s withdrawal the previous summer. At Grand
Gulf, Grant learned that Bank’s investment of Port Hudson would be
delayed for some time. To follow his original plan would force postponement
of the Vicksburg campaign for at least a month, giving
Pemberton invaluable time to organize his defense and receive reinforcements.
From this delay the Union Army could expect the addition
of no more than 12,000 men. Grant now came to one of the most
remarkable decisions of his military career.</p>
<p>Information had been received that a new Confederate force was
being raised at Jackson, 45 miles east of Vicksburg. Against the advice
of his senior officers, and contrary to orders from Washington, Grant
resolved to cut himself off from his base of supply on the river, march
quickly in between the two Confederate forces, and defeat each separately
before they could join against him. Meanwhile, he would
subsist his army from the land through which he marched. The plan
was well conceived, for in marching to the northeast toward Edwards
Station, on the railroad midway between Jackson and Vicksburg,
<span class="pb" id="Page_22">22</span>
Grant’s vulnerable left flank would be protected by the Big Black
River. Moreover, his real objective—Vicksburg or Jackson—would not
be revealed immediately and could be changed to meet events. Upon
reaching the railroad, he could also sever Pemberton’s communications
with Jackson and the East. It was Grant’s belief that, although the
Confederate forces would be greater than his own, this advantage
would be offset by their wide dispersal and by the speed and design
of his march.</p>
<p>But this calculated risk was accompanied by grave dangers, of which
Grant’s lieutenants were acutely aware. It meant placing the Union
Army deep in alien country behind the Confederate Army where the
line of retreat could be broken and where the alternative to victory
would not only be defeat but complete destruction. The situation was
summed up in Sherman’s protest, recorded by Grant, “that I was
putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad
to maneuver a year—or a long time—to get me.”</p>
<p>The action into which Pemberton was drawn by the Union threat
indicated the keenness of Grant’s planning. The Confederate general
believed that the farther Grant campaigned from the river the weaker
his position would become and the more exposed his rear and flanks.
Accordingly, Pemberton elected to remain on the defensive, keeping
his army as a protective shield between Vicksburg and the Union Army
and awaiting an opportunity to strike a decisive blow—a policy which
permitted Grant to march inland unopposed.</p>
<p>With the arrival of Sherman’s Corps from Milliken’s Bend, Grant’s
preparations were complete and, on May 7, the Union Army marched
out from Grand Gulf to the northeast. His widely separated columns
moved out on a broad front concealing their objective. When assembled,
Grant’s Army numbered about 45,000 during the campaign.
To oppose him, Pemberton had available about 50,000 troops, but these
were scattered widely to protect important points. On the day of Grant’s
departure from Grand Gulf, Pemberton’s defensive position was further
complicated by orders from President Jefferson Davis that both
Vicksburg and Port Hudson must be held at all cost. The Union Army,
however, was already between Vicksburg and Port Hudson and would
soon be between Vicksburg and Jackson.</p>
<p>In comparison with campaigns in the more thickly populated
Eastern Theater, where a more extensive system of roads and railroads
was utilized to provide the tremendous quantities of food and supplies
necessary to sustain an army, the campaign of Grant’s Western veterans
(“reg’lar great big hellsnorters, same breed as ourselves,” said a charitable
“Johnny Reb”) was a new type of warfare. The Union supply
train largely consisted of a curious collection of stylish carriages,
buggies, and lumbering farm wagons stacked high with ammunition
boxes and drawn by whatever mules or horses could be found. (Grant
<span class="pb" id="Page_23">23</span>
began his Wilderness campaign in Virginia the following year requiring
over 56,000 horses and mules for his 5,000 wagons and ambulances,
artillery caissons, and cavalry.) Lacking transportation, food supplies
were carried in the soldier’s knapsack. Beef, poultry, and pork
“requisitioned” from barn and smokehouse enabled the army which
had cut loose from its base to live for 3 weeks on 5 days’ rations.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig20"> <ANTIMG src="images/p15.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="598" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Troops on the march, going into bivouac at night.</i> From a wartime sketch.</p> </div>
<p>A noted historian described this campaign: “The campaign was
based on speed—speed, and light rations foraged off the country, and
no baggage, nothing at the front but men and guns and ammunition,
and no rear; no slackening of effort, no respite for the enemy until
Vicksburg itself was invested and fell.”</p>
<h3 id="c16">THE BATTLES OF RAYMOND AND JACKSON.</h3>
<p>When it became likely that
Grant might strike the railroad in the vicinity of Edwards Station,
Pemberton moved from Vicksburg toward that point with his main
force, leaving a strong reserve in this city. At the same time he ordered
the units collecting at Jackson to hit Grant’s flank and rear if the
opportunity presented itself. Maj. Gen. John A. Logan’s Division, in
advance of McPherson’s Union Corps, reached the vicinity of Raymond,
a crossroads village 15 miles from Jackson on May 12, and
was there engaged by a Confederate brigade under Brig. Gen. John
Gregg. A sharp clash lasting several hours followed, Gregg’s outmanned
infantry being driven back toward Jackson. Each side lost
about 500 men during the engagement. Confederate resistance at Raymond
indicated to Grant that Jackson might be held more strongly
than had been anticipated, and rumors reached the Union Commander
that strong reinforcements under Johnston were expected there. Grant
then determined to make sure of Jackson and, on May 13, wheeled his
entire army toward the east.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_24">24</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig21"> <ANTIMG src="images/p16.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="501" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss center">THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN <br/><span class="smaller"><i>MARCH 29-MAY 18, 1863</i> <br/>⇒ LINE OF GRANT’S MARCH
<br/>× BATTLES</span></span></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_25">25</div>
<p>Johnston arrived by rail in Jackson, on the night of the Raymond
engagement, in order to take field command of all troops defending
Vicksburg, and was notified that Grant’s Army was between Pemberton’s
forces and those in Jackson. About 12,000 troops were at Jackson,
against which the entire Union Army was reported to be moving.
Johnston telegraphed Richmond, “I am too late.”</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig22"> <ANTIMG src="images/p16a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="415" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Photograph of Vicksburg taken from across the Mississippi River by a Union surgeon during a bombardment.</i> From <i>Photographic History of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<p>In a pouring rain, Sherman and McPherson approached Jackson
on the morning of May 14. Johnston posted the brigades of General
Gregg and Brig. Gen. W. H. T. Walker on the approaches to the
city with instructions to hold just long enough for valuable stores to
be removed from Jackson northward to Canton where he hoped to
combine forces with Pemberton. Delaying their attack until the rain
<span class="pb" id="Page_26">26</span>
(which would spoil their powder) slackened, the Union infantry
charged the Confederate entrenchments, driving the defenders before
them and capturing the city along with 35 guns and much equipment.
Having intercepted a dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton ordering
a junction of all Confederate troops, Grant put his men on the road
toward Edwards Station at daylight the following morning. His plan
was to drive a wedge between the Confederate forces before Johnston,
circling to the north, could effect a junction with Pemberton. Sherman
remained in Jackson to destroy the railroad yards and stores.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig23"> <ANTIMG src="images/p17.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="524" /> <p class="pcap"><i>A Union assault during the battle of Champion’s Hill.</i> From a wartime sketch.</p> </div>
<h3 id="c17">THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION’S HILL.</h3>
<p>Events preceding the battle of Champion’s
Hill emphasized the opposing tactical views held by the two
Confederate commanders. Pemberton believed the retention of Vicksburg
so imperative that no move which might endanger the city
should be considered. It was Johnston’s view that Admiral Porter’s
successful passage of the batteries and Grant’s approach from the rear
had already doomed the city, and that it was consequently valuable
only for the military supplies and troops which it contained. Johnston
believed that the South’s only chance to prevent loss of the Mississippi
was for Pemberton and himself to join forces and fight the great battle
which might smash and destroy Grant’s Army.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_27">27</div>
<p>On the morning of May 14, Pemberton, at Edwards Station, received
the dispatch from Johnston (a copy of which Grant had already intercepted)
informing him of the position of Union troops at Clinton,
between the two Confederate forces, and ordering him “if practicable,
come up on his [Grant’s] rear at once.” Pemberton considered the
order “suicidal.” Convinced that Johnston’s recent arrival on the field
and separation from the main body did not give him sufficient information
to survey the situation accurately, Pemberton called a council
of war and placed the order before his commanders. Although a majority
of his council favored obedience to Johnston’s order, Pemberton
was unwilling to endorse a movement which might endanger Vicksburg.
It was decided to move instead against Grant’s supposed communications
which were believed essential to the Union Army’s existence
away from the river.</p>
<p>On May 15, Pemberton marched to the southeast with 17,000 men,
his route further separating him from Johnston to the north. Grant,
meanwhile, prepared to head westward, his line of march threatening
to pierce the gap between Johnston and Pemberton and beat both of
them in the race for Vicksburg. On the morning of the 16th, a second
order was received from Johnston ordering Pemberton to move to the
north and join Johnston. This order was obeyed, but as Pemberton’s
troops were countermarching they were struck by Union troops.</p>
<p>The battle of Champion’s Hill centered around a crescent-shaped
ridge of about 75 feet elevation near the Champion plantation home
and involved three parallel roads leading from Edwards Station to
Raymond. Each of Pemberton’s three divisions—led by General Bowen,
General Loring, and Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson—covered one of
these roads. The battle opened shortly before noon on the 16th when
Brig. Gen. A. P. Hovey’s Union Division, supported by Logan’s Division,
attacked along the north road which passed over the slope of
Champion’s Hill. From the crest of the hill, Stevenson’s Confederate
Division opened a heavy fire on the advancing Union lines which
steadily mounted the ridge, driving the Confederates back and capturing
11 guns. To meet this threat to the Confederate left flank,
Bowen’s Division was shifted to the north to prevent a breakthrough.
Re-forming his lines, Bowen counterattacked the ridge position. He
dislodged the Federal infantry, driving them from the slope, and recaptured
all but two of the lost guns.</p>
<p>Grant, in turn, was now compelled to reinforce his hard-pressed right,
and at 3:30 p. m. massed Union batteries concentrated fire on the ridge.
The Federal infantry followed with heavy and repeated attacks along
the entire line, and for the third time the hill changed hands. Pemberton
was unable to rally his troops against these attacks, and the divisions
of Bowen and Stevenson began to retreat toward Baker’s Creek.
Loring was detailed to hold the road open for the withdrawal of the
Confederate Army. Before Loring could rejoin the main body, after its
crossing of the stream, the Union Army secured the crossings. Loring
was thus cut off, and he was only able to join Johnston after a long
3-day march around the Union Army. Pemberton retreated toward
Vicksburg and that night took position at Big Black River, 12 miles
east of the city.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_28">28</div>
<div class="fig"> id="map1"> <ANTIMG src="images/map_lr.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="502" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss center">VICKSBURG <br/><span class="small">NATIONAL MILITARY PARK</span></span></p> <p class="center"><SPAN class="ab1" href="images/map_hr.jpg">High-resolution Map</SPAN></p>
</div>
<dl class="undent pcap"><dt class="center"><span class="large">LEGEND</span>
<br/>1 MUSEUM AND PARK HEADQUARTERS
<br/>2 JEFFERSON DAVIS STATUE
<br/>3 PEMBERTON STATUE
<br/>4 MISSISSIPPI MONUMENT
<br/>5 TILGHMAN STATUE
<br/>6 LOUISIANA MONUMENT AND GREAT REDOUBT
<br/>7 SURRENDER SITE
<br/>8 MICHIGAN MONUMENT
<br/>9 SHIRLEY HOUSE
<br/>10 ILLINOIS MONUMENT
<br/>11 THIRD LOUISIANA REDAN
<br/>12 GLASS BAYOU BRIDGE
<br/>13 ARKANSAS MONUMENT
<br/>14 MISSOURI MONUMENT
<br/>15 STOCKADE REDAN
<br/>16 OBSERVATION TOWER
<br/>17 FORT HILL
<br/>18 NATIONAL CEMETERY
<br/>19 UNION NAVY MEMORIAL
<br/>20 GRANT’S HEADQUARTERS AND
<dd class="t">RHODE ISLAND MONUMENT
<dd class="t">NEW YORK MONUMENT
<dd class="t">MASSACHUSETTS MONUMENT
<dd class="t">NEW HAMPSHIRE MONUMENT
<dd class="t">PENNSYLVANIA MONUMENT
<br/>21 WISCONSIN MONUMENT
<br/>22 MINNESOTA MONUMENT
<br/>23 IOWA MONUMENT
<br/>24 FORT GARROTT
<br/>25 ALABAMA MONUMENT
<br/>SHOWING
<br/>PARK TOUR
<br/>CONFEDERATE AVENUE
<br/>UNION AVENUE
<br/>SECONDARY PARK ROAD
<br/>RAIL ROAD
<div class="pb" id="Page_30">30</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig24"> <ANTIMG src="images/p19.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="440" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Wartime photograph of a Union supply station on the Big Black River in rear of Vicksburg.</i> Courtesy Library of Congress.</p> </div>
<p>The battle of Champion’s Hill (or Baker’s Creek) was the bloodiest
action of the Vicksburg campaign. The numbers actually engaged
were relatively equal, although a large Union reserve was close at hand.
Pemberton lost nearly 4,000 men, not counting the entire division of
Loring which was lost to his army. Grant listed casualties of 2,500,
with Hovey losing one-third of his entire division killed and wounded.</p>
<h3 id="c18">THE BATTLE OF BIG BLACK RIVER.</h3>
<p>Not knowing that Loring’s Division
had been cut off, Pemberton made a stand at the Big Black River in
order to hold the bridges open for Loring to join the main force. The
Confederate entrenchments spanned the river at a readily defensible
location where the stream made a horseshoe bend. Across the mile-wide
neck of the river the Confederates constructed a line of works,
and behind the earthworks, with their backs to the river, were placed
4,000 infantry of Bowen’s Division supported by artillery.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_31">31</div>
<p>Before dawn on the 17th the Union Army pushed on toward Vicksburg.
Grant, still hoping to win the race for Vicksburg, had dispatched
Sherman’s Corps to the north to pass the retreating Confederate Army
as Grant engaged it from the front. At an early hour the Federal
troops came in sight of the Confederate line, whereupon they opened
an artillery barrage and deployed to assault. Before the deployment
was complete, Brig. Gen. Eugene A. Carr’s Division charged “with
a shout” from the woods fronting the Confederate position. Realizing
the danger of their position, where they might be cut off from the
crossing to their rear, the Confederate troops broke and headed for the
bridges in disorder. After the withdrawal, the bridges were burned,
effectively halting Union pursuit. In the confusion, Grant captured
over 1,000 prisoners along with 18 artillery pieces.</p>
<p>While Pemberton’s Army retreated into the defenses of Vicksburg,
Grant’s engineers immediately began construction of bridges across
the Big Black River, using trees, cotton bales, and lumber from nearby
buildings as bridging materials. Sherman’s Corps, which had struck
the river 11 miles to the north attempting to outflank Pemberton and
prevent his retreat to Vicksburg, threw a pontoon bridge across the
river at that point. By light of pitch torches, the bridges were completed
during the night. On the following morning, May 18, troops crossed
en route to Vicksburg.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig25"> <ANTIMG src="images/p19a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="487" /> <p class="pcap"><i>A regiment drawn up in line of battle.</i> From a wartime sketch.</p> </div>
<h3 id="c19">THE CAMPAIGN ENDED.</h3>
<p>The Union Army, now within a few miles of
its long-sought objective, had, in the 18 days since it crossed the Mississippi,
completed one of the most noteworthy campaigns of the war.
Marching deep into enemy territory, the Army of the Tennessee had
successfully lived off the country while fighting and winning five
engagements and inflicting critical losses in men and equipment, had
prevented Johnston and Pemberton from joining forces, and had driven
the Army of Vicksburg into the defenses of the city.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_32">32</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig26"> <ANTIMG src="images/p20.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="484" /> <p class="pcap"><i>“Whistling Dick.” This Confederate cannon which guarded Vicksburg gained widespread fame among Union soldiers and sailors because of the peculiar whistle of its projectiles.</i> From <i>Photographic History of the Civil War</i>.</p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig27"> <ANTIMG src="images/p20a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="531" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The terrain of the siege of Vicksburg—looking from the Confederate line to the Union position on the far ridge.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_33">33</div>
<p>By noon of May 18, with Grant’s advance expected momentarily,
Pemberton believed the defenses of Vicksburg strong enough to stand
off the Union Army until Johnston received sufficient reinforcements
to raise the expected siege and prevent loss of the Mississippi River.
There, while inspecting his defenses, Pemberton received a dispatch
from Johnston advising the evacuation of Vicksburg which, Johnston
felt, was already doomed. Military necessity demanded that “instead
of losing both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops.
If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies and march
to the northeast.”</p>
<p>Unwilling to yield the city without a fight, Pemberton placed the
order before his senior officers. They were of unanimous opinion that
it would be “impossible to withdraw the army from this position with
such <i>morale</i> as to be of further service to the Confederacy.” As the
council of war reached its decision to remain and fight, Union guns
opened on the works. The siege of Vicksburg had begun.</p>
<h2 id="c20"><span class="small"><i>The Siege of Vicksburg</i></span></h2>
<h3 id="c21">THE CONFEDERATE DEFENSE LINE.</h3>
<p>From his assumption of command 7
months before, Pemberton had put his engineers to work constructing
a fortified line which would protect Vicksburg against an attack from
the rear. A strong line of works had been thrown up along the crest
of a ridge which was fronted by a deep ravine. The defense line began
on the river 2 miles above Vicksburg and curved for 9 miles along the
ridge to the river below, thus enclosing the city within its arc. So long
as this line could be held, the river batteries denied to the North control
of the Mississippi River.</p>
<p>At salient and commanding points along the line, artillery positions
and forts (lunettes, redans, and redoubts) had been constructed. The
earth walls of the forts were up to 20 feet thick. In front of these was
dug a deep, wide ditch so that assaulting troops which climbed the
steep ridge slope and reached the ditch would still have a high vertical
wall to climb in order to gain entrance into the fort. Between the strong
points, which were located every few hundred yards, was constructed
a line of rifle pits and entrenchments, for the most part protected by
parapets and ditches. Where spurs jutted out from the main ridge, advanced
batteries were constructed which provided a deadly crossfire
against attacking lines. The Confederates had mounted 128 artillery
<span class="pb" id="Page_34">34</span>
pieces in these works, of which 36 were heavy siege guns; the remainder,
field pieces.</p>
<p>Greatly strengthening the Confederate position was the irregular
topography which resulted from the peculiar characteristics of the
region’s loess soil. Possessing an unusual tenacity, except when eroded
by the action of running water, the loess had over the centuries been
cut into deep gullies and ravines with abrupt faces separated by narrow,
twisting ridges. This resulted in a broken and complicated terrain
which would seriously obstruct the Union movement. To permit a clear
field of fire and to hinder advancing troops, all the trees fronting the
Confederate line were cut down. Several hundred yards away from
the Confederate position and roughly parallel to it was a ridge system
not so continuous and more broken than that occupied by Pemberton’s
Army. Along this line, the Union Army took position and began its
siege operations.</p>
<p>On the scattered natural bridges of high ground, which spanned
the ravines and provided approaches to Vicksburg, were located the
six roads and one railroad leading into that city. Nine forts had been
constructed overlooking each of these routes into Vicksburg, their guns
completely commanding the approaches—Fort Hill on the river north
of the city, Stockade Redan, Third Louisiana Redan, Great Redoubt,
Second Texas Lunette, Railroad Redoubt, Fort Garrott (also known
as Square Fort), Salient Works, and South Fort on the river below
Vicksburg. (All but two of these works are well preserved today.)
The Confederate divisions, left to right, were commanded by Maj.
Gen. M. L. Smith, General Bowen, Maj. Gen. John H. Forney, and
General Stevenson. The Army of Vicksburg, at the beginning of the
siege, numbered about 31,000 men, of which Pemberton listed 18,500
effectives as available to man his defense line. Grant gave his strength,
shortly after the siege began, as 50,000 effectives; his army was steadily
enlarged during the siege by reinforcements from Memphis.</p>
<h3 id="c22">THE ASSAULT OF MAY 19.</h3>
<p>By midday of May 19, Grant had completed
his investment of the city. In the north, Sherman’s Corps was in position
opposite the Confederate left from the river (at the present location
of the national cemetery) to the Graveyard Road, at an average
distance of about 500 yards. McPherson’s Corps took position on
Sherman’s left from the Graveyard Road to near the Baldwin’s Ferry
Road; the front of McClernand’s Corps extended from the Baldwin’s
Ferry Road southward.</p>
<p>Considerable skirmishing had preceded the Union approach, as the
Confederate pickets fell slowly back inside the defenses, thus preventing
a close inspection of the Confederate fortifications. Grant determined,
however, to attack immediately, before Pemberton had time
to post his defenses strongly. The Union general ordered an assault
<span class="pb" id="Page_35">35</span>
at 2 p. m. on the 19th. Sherman’s troops, whose early arrival had
enabled them better to prepare for attack, moved under heavy fire
against the Confederate left. Although they succeeded in making a
close lodgment against the walls of the Stockade Redan, they failed
to breach the works and were repulsed. McPherson and McClernand,
not yet in good position for attack, were unable to do more than
advance several hundred yards closer to the siege line. Grant lost 1,000
men testing the Vicksburg defenses and discovered an unyielding army
manning the works. Confederate losses were slight.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig28"> <ANTIMG src="images/p21.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="473" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Confederate Railroad Redoubt. Plaques mark angle where fort wall was breached and entered by Union troops during the assault of May 22, 1863.</i></p> </div>
<h3 id="c23">THE ASSAULT OF MAY 22.</h3>
<p>While the probing operation of the 19th
had failed, Grant further considered the important results which a successful
assault would achieve. Such a move, however costly, would
save a long siege. In the end, fewer men might be lost, and a growing
threat to the Union rear—General Johnston raising troops near Jackson
for the relief of Vicksburg—could be eliminated by quickly capturing
Vicksburg and throwing the entire Union strength against Johnston.
In addition, the Federal troops, spirited by recent victories and impatient
to seize the prize for which they had campaigned so long, would
not work so zealously in the trenches with pick and shovel unless
<span class="pb" id="Page_36">36</span>
assault had failed. On the 21st, Grant issued orders for a general assault
against Vicksburg the following day.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig29"> <ANTIMG src="images/p22.jpg" alt="" width-obs="700" height-obs="611" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The heavy guns of this Union siege battery were borrowed from the Federal gunboats and used against the Confederate siege defenses.</i> From <i>Photographic History of the Civil War</i>.</p>
</div>
<p>The Union assault of May 22 was delivered against the center of
the Confederate siege line along a 3-mile front from Stockade Redan
to Fort Garrott. The felled trees and thick undergrowth, as well as the
precipitous faces of the ravines, restricted the scope of Union maneuver.
Only a portion of Grant’s full strength could be brought into action,
reserves being posted to exploit a breakthrough. Careful preparations
preceded the attack: field batteries were run forward and emplaced to
provide a covering fire for the infantry, and troops were advanced into
concealed positions—in places, within 200 yards of their objective.
Watches of all Union commanders were synchronized, the attack to
begin simultaneously at 10 a. m. in order to prevent Pemberton from
shifting his forces from one threatened point to another.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_37">37</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig30"> <ANTIMG src="images/p22a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="797" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss center"><span class="small">THE SIEGE OF</span> <br/>VICKSBURG <br/><span class="smaller"><i>MAY 18-JULY 4, 1863</i></span></span></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_38">38</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig31"> <ANTIMG src="images/p23.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="461" /> <p class="pcap"><i>This hospital ship provided medical care for the sick and wounded of Grant’s Army during the Vicksburg operations.</i> From <i>Photographic History of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<p>Of the six forts in the area of the grand assault, the Stockade Redan,
under attack by Maj. Gen. Frank Blair’s Division of Sherman’s Corps,
exemplified the day’s action in method and result. Blair’s men were
faced with two formidable obstacles: the fort could be reached only
by way of the Graveyard Road because of the deep ravines bordering
the road, and the road was completely covered by the guns of the fort.
In front of the fort was a deep ditch which protected it from attempts
to climb the wall and enter the works. The night before, Sherman had
decided that a bridge would be needed by his men to span the ditch.
Only one source of lumber could be found—a frame house in which
General Grant was sleeping. Informed of the need, Grant dressed and
watched the house quickly torn down for bridging materials.</p>
<p>At the stroke of 10, the artillery bombardment of the fort ceased
and the “Forlorn Hope”—a volunteer company of 150 men—raced
from their position over the Graveyard Road toward the Stockade
Redan, carrying the planks to bridge the ditch for the regiments to
follow. Until the Federal troops almost reached the Confederate line,
there was no sign of its defenders. Then the Southern soldiers “rose
from their reclining position behind the works, and gave them such a
terrible volley of musketry” that the road soon was nearly obstructed by
the bodies of the killed and wounded, “the very sticks and chips,
scattered over the ground jumping under the hot shower of Rebel
bullets.”</p>
<p>Although two color-bearers climbed the wall of the fort and planted
their flags near the crest, the remnants of regiments which reached
<span class="pb" id="Page_39">39</span>
the ditch were unable to storm the walls and enter the redan. Attempting
to prevent the fort garrison from firing down into the ditch, the
Federal infantry swept the top of the wall with rifle fire. The toll was
costly among the Confederate defenders, who fought back, using
artillery shells as hand grenades and rolling them down among the
Union troops in the ditch. After 4 hours of fighting, the attack was
stalemated at Stockade Redan.</p>
<p>Union flags were placed also on the walls of the Great Redoubt and
Second Texas Lunette, but it was at the Railroad Redoubt that a
momentary breach was made in the Confederate defenses. Here, McClernand’s
men reached the fort in force, and Sgt. Joseph E. Griffith
and several comrades of the 22nd Iowa crawled through a gap in the
wall, which had been blasted by Union artillery, and entered the outer
works. All were shot down but Griffith. He was able to back out
through the opening, bringing a dozen prisoners with him. When the
Union assault threatened to engulf the fort, there was a call for Confederate
volunteers to regain the lost ground. A volunteer company
from the Texas Legion counterattacked and drove the Union troops
from the outer defenses.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig32"> <ANTIMG src="images/p23a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="483" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Union Battery Hickenlooper during the siege, within 100 yards of the Confederate line.</i> From a wartime sketch.</p> </div>
<p>Encouraged by his partial success, McClernand asked Grant for reinforcements
and a renewal of the attack which, he felt, would enable
his men to break the Confederate line. Grant ordered Sherman and
McPherson to commit their reserves and create a diversion in McClernand’s
favor. The renewed assault was shattered by the resolute
Confederate defense. It served only to increase Union losses and to
<span class="pb" id="Page_40">40</span>
intensify an already bitter controversy over McClernand’s military
ability, which eventually resulted in his removal from command and
the appointment of Maj. Gen. Edward Ord to head the XIII Corps.
More than 3,000 Union soldiers lay dead or wounded in the ditches
and on the slopes of the ridge. It was the last assault against Vicksburg.</p>
<h3 id="c24">UNION SIEGE OPERATIONS.</h3>
<p>To bring the Union Army close against the
Confederate defense line, construction of protected approaches was
begun. As the siege progressed, “saps” or “approach trenches,” deep
enough to conceal troops, zigzagged their way toward the works protecting
Vicksburg. Ten major approaches were carried forward by
pick and shovel details, each with a network of parallels, bomb
proofs, and artillery emplacements. Over 60,000 feet of trenches and
89 artillery positions, mounting 220 guns, were completed. In the siege
of Vicksburg “Spades were trumps.”</p>
<p>A Federal infantryman was later to recall that</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Every man in the investing line became an army engineer day and
night. The soldiers worked at digging narrow, zigzag approaches to the
rebel works. Entrenchments, rifle pits, and dirt caves were made in
every conceivable direction. When entrenchments were safe and
finished, still others, yet farther in advance were made, as if by magic,
in a single night. Other zigzag underground saps and mines were made
for explosion under forts. Every day the regiments foot by foot, yard
by yard, approached nearer the strongly armed rebel works. The
soldiers got so they bored like gophers and beavers, with a spade in
one hand and a gun in the other.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>With an almost limitless ammunition supply, Federal sharpshooters
and artillerymen kept up a relentless fire, giving the Confederates
little opportunity to pick off the work parties which continued digging
operations during the day. Pemberton’s ammunition supply dwindled
each day. Considering the possible duration of the siege until an effective
relief army might be assembled, the Confederate commander considered
it “a matter of vital importance that every charge of ammunition
on hand should be hoarded with the most jealous care.” He therefore
issued strict orders that both rifle and cannon should be fired only
when absolutely necessary. This prevented the Confederates from
keeping up the steady, harassing fire needed to hold in check the
Union siege activities.</p>
<p>Trench life for Grant’s soldiers was not so rigorous or dangerous as
for the Vicksburg defenders. Food supplies were ample, although lack
of pure water was a problem for both armies and resulted in considerable
disease. The burning sun and frequent rains made life miserable
for both “Yank” and “Reb.” Particularly as a result of the low ammunition
stores of the Vicksburg army, Union losses during the siege, after
the assaults of May 19 and 22, were comparatively light.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_41">41</div>
<p>After the unsuccessful assault of May 22, only two attempts were
made to break through the Confederate defenses, neither of which
succeeded. Sherman, holding the Union right opposite the strong
Fort Hill position, determined to reduce the fort with naval aid, and
on May 27 the gunboat <i>Cincinnati</i>, protected by logs and bales of
hay, moved into position and engaged the several batteries of that
sector. Subjected to a deadly plunging fire which “went entirely
through our protection—hay, wood, and iron,” the <i>Cincinnati</i> went
down with her colors nailed to the stump of a mast.</p>
<p>The other attempt to pierce the defense line was by exploding a
mine under the Third Louisiana Redan. Logan’s approach trench had
reached the fort walls and from here a shaft was sunk under the fort
and a powder charge prepared for its demolition. The Confederate
garrison, hearing the miners’ picks at work beneath the fort, began
countermines in a grim race for survival. On June 25, as the entire
Union line opened fire to prevent shifting of reinforcements, a charge
of 2,200 pounds of powder was exploded beneath the Third Louisiana
Redan, creating a large crater into which elements of the 23rd
Indiana and 45th Illinois raced from the approach trench. Anticipating
this result, General Forney had prepared a second line of works
in the rear of the fort where survivors of the blast and supporting
regiments met the Union attack and drove it back. Still other mines
were also being prepared by Union engineers at the time of the
surrender.</p>
<h3 id="c25">CONFEDERATE TRENCH LIFE.</h3>
<p>Siege life for the Confederate soldier was a
hazardous ordeal; nearly 3,500 were killed or wounded. Because of
the limited number of effective troops available to Pemberton, almost
the entire Vicksburg Army had to be placed in the trenches; sufficient
numbers were not available to rotate frontline duty as was done by
the Federal Army. Never knowing when an attempt might be made
to assault the defense line, it was necessary for them to be on guard
at all times, enduring sun, rain, mud, poor and inadequate food, as
well as the bullets and shells of the Union Army for 47 days and nights.
The unending barrage of small arms and artillery fire, one Confederate
exclaimed, “can be compared to men clearing land—the report of
musketry is like the chopping of axes and that of the cannon like the
felling of trees.”</p>
<p>Rations were generally prepared by details of soldiers behind the
lines and carried to the troops at the breastworks. Coffee, the soldier’s
staple, was soon unobtainable and an ersatz beverage introduced,
the somewhat questionable ingredients of which included sweet potatoes,
blackberry leaves, and sassafras. To replace the exhausted flour
supply, a substitute was devised from ground peas and cornmeal.
When this was baked over a fire, one soldier complained, “it made a
<span class="pb" id="Page_42">42</span>
nauseous composition, as the corn-meal cooked in half the time the
peas-meal did, so this stuff was half raw.... It had the properties of
india-rubber and was worse than leather to digest.” Its effect on the
digestive systems of the Confederate soldiers was possibly the equivalent
of a secret Yankee weapon. A more famous, although not necessarily
a more palatable, item of the besieged soldiers’ diet was the mule
meat introduced late in the siege. General Pemberton heartily approved
of its appearance, observing that mule proved “not only nutritious,
but very palatable, in every way preferable to poor beef.”</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig33"> <ANTIMG src="images/p24.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="591" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Bombproofs of the 45th Illinois in Union siege line. Shirley House in background is only surviving wartime building in the park.</i> From <i>Photographic History of the Civil War</i>.</p>
</div>
<p>For protection against artillery fire, the Confederate troops dug
bombproofs in the reverse slope of their fortified ridge. From these
dugouts, bulwarked by heavy timbers, trenches connected with the
fortifications, affording the besieged some degree of relaxation in
reading or playing cards a few yards from the front line. To defend
against surprise night attacks, they were forced to sleep on their arms
in the trenches.</p>
<p>At night the unending bombardment from Porter’s fleet provided
the troops of both armies with an awesome pyrotechnic display.
Especially popular with the pickets were the giant 13-inch mortar
shells whose sputtering fuses described a tremendously high arc in
the blackness before disappearing into the city. It was a “wonderful
spectacle,” one soldier remembered, “to see the fuse from the shells—and
you could see them plainly—the comet or star-like streams of fire
and then hear them coming down into the doomed city. We used to
watch them while on picket at night.”</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_43">43</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig34"> <ANTIMG src="images/p24a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="577" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Fort Hill, on the Confederate left flank above Vicksburg, commanding the bend of the Mississippi.</i></p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig35"> <ANTIMG src="images/p24b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="566" /> <p class="pcap"><i>South Fort, on the Confederate right flank below Vicksburg, overlooking the Mississippi.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_44">44</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig36"> <ANTIMG src="images/p25.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="570" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Each of Porter’s mortar boats carried one of these giant 17,000-pound mortars which hurled 200-pound shells into Vicksburg throughout the campaign and siege.</i> Courtesy National Archives.</p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig37"> <ANTIMG src="images/p25a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="462" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The <span class="f">General Price</span>. This merchant steamer was converted into a ram by the Confederate Navy, captured by the Union Fleet at Memphis and used as a Federal gunboat against Vicksburg.</i> From <i>Photographic History of the Civil War</i>.</p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_45">45</div>
<p>Only when the Union trenches approached close to the defensive
works were determined efforts made to halt the Union threat. Then
the Union sap rollers (woven cane cylinders filled with earth or cotton
rolled in front of the open end of the trench to protect the work party)
became targets for destruction. Fuses were set on artillery shells which
were then rolled down against the sap rollers, or they were ignited by
Minié balls dipped in turpentine. Occasional night sallies succeeded
temporarily in driving off Union work parties and filling up trenches,
but no daylight forays were attempted by the Confederates.</p>
<h3 id="c26">CIVILIAN LIFE IN VICKSBURG DURING THE SIEGE.</h3>
<p>For the civilian population
of Vicksburg, the siege was a grim and harrowing experience.
Ordered to evacuate the city or prepare to face siege, many of the
townspeople preferred to remain and share the fate of the army. They
were joined by refugees accompanying the Confederate retreat into
the city. Vicksburg had been subjected to periodic naval bombardment
during the year of preliminary action and continuously during
the siege. For relief and protection against shellfire, many of the townspeople
occupied caves dug into the city’s plentiful hillsides.</p>
<p>To the civilians, as to the Confederate soldiers, there seemed only
three intervals during the day when the shelling ceased—8 a. m., noon,
and 8 p. m.—when the Union artillerymen ate their meals. However,
much of the accustomed social life of the town continued. Men and
women passed along the streets despite frequent shell explosions, and
the town’s newspaper continued to appear—finally printed on wallpaper.
Despite the artillery fire, few civilians were killed, although
many dwellings were destroyed or badly damaged. Over more and
more buildings, as the siege progressed, the yellow hospital flags
floated. Thousands of Confederate sick and wounded were brought
into the city, many being cared for by the women of Vicksburg. In the
latter stages of the siege the food stores of the city were badly depleted,
placing the people of Vicksburg on extremely short rations.</p>
<h3 id="c27">FRATERNIZATION.</h3>
<p>A unique feature of the American Civil War was
the inclination of the private soldier—Union and Confederate—to
fight with unrelenting ferocity during the engagements of the war and
yet to engage in friendly intercourse with each other once the battle
had ended, or even during lulls in the fighting. Swapping of Northern
coffee for Southern tobacco was a commonplace picket activity in all
<span class="pb" id="Page_46">46</span>
theaters of the war. In the long, weary siege of Vicksburg, the
monotony was often lightened by jeers and pleasantries exchanged between
lines. Many examples of soldier humor were recorded. The Confederates,
taking grim delight in their ability to withstand the onslaughts
of a steadily increasing Federal Army, would shout “When
are you coming in Vicksburg for a visit?” To which a grimy, sweating
Federal private would yell, “Not till you show better manners to
strangers.”</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig38"> <ANTIMG src="images/p26.jpg" alt="" width-obs="351" height-obs="599" /> <p class="pcap"><i>A Civil War drummer boy.</i> From a wartime sketch.</p> </div>
<p>To prevent surprise attacks, both armies posted pickets in advance
of their lines at night. With the lines so close in the latter stages of the
siege, pickets would often stand within a few feet of one another, or
even side by side. Discussions of good shots and bad officers, or vice
versa, helped to pass the long night watches. By common agreement,
out of respect for the exposed and unprotected position of the sentinels,
there was no firing at men on picket duty.</p>
<p>One Union veteran best remembered the siege of Vicksburg for
<span class="pb" id="Page_47">47</span>
the nightly verbal exchanges with the “Rebs” when “we used to talk
to each other after fighting all day.”</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the evening when everything had stopped for the day, some of
our men or some of the Johnnies would yell, “hello Johnnie” or “hello
Yank” “how did you enjoy the day?” The other would say “Fine;”
then some one would say, “Johnnie, how do you like mule meat?” and
they answer “Fine;” then “How do you like beef dried on the bone?”
to which they would reply “Not so well; it is too close to the bone
to be good.” Then some one would say, “Come over and we will
give you some ‘sow belly’ to fry it in.” They would reply, “We can’t
eat meat alone;” then the reply was, “We will give you some hardtack.”
Then they would reply, “The tack you sent over today was so hard
we could not chew it.” So you see how soon those on both sides forgot
their troubles when night came, but in the morning about daylight,
when the business of the day was about to open, we would say, “Watch
out Johnnie, and hunt your hole,” and things were on in earnest for
the day.</p>
</blockquote>
<div class="fig"> id="fig39"> <ANTIMG src="images/p26a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="411" height-obs="500" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. John S. Bowen, commanding the Confederate troops at the battle of Port Gibson.</i> Courtesy Confederate
Museum, Richmond.</p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig40"> <ANTIMG src="images/p26b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="460" height-obs="500" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand, commanding the Union XIII Corps.</i> Courtesy National Archives.</p>
</div>
<h3 id="c28">JOHNSTON’S DILEMMA.</h3>
<p>Pemberton’s foremost objective in prolonging
the siege had been to afford Johnston and the Confederate government
time to collect sufficient troops to raise the siege. But shortly after
Grant had invested the city, Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern
<span class="pb" id="Page_48">48</span>
Virginia began its invasion of the North, which ended on the field of
Gettysburg. No troops could be spared from that point. To have removed
troops from Lt. Gen. Braxton Bragg’s army in Tennessee would
have dangerously weakened that place in a desperate attempt to save
the Mississippi. Johnston wired Secretary of War James A. Seddon
“We cannot hold both.”</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig41"> <ANTIMG src="images/p27.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="555" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The Surrender Site. The monument was erected and inscribed by Union soldiers on spot where Grant and Pemberton met.</i></p> </div>
<p>During June, General Johnston had succeeded in increasing his
force to about 30,000, many of whom were green troops, but efforts
to secure adequate weapons, ammunition and wagons to equip the
regiments had been only partly successful. Preparing to encounter an
expected move by Johnston against his rear, Grant used reinforcements
arriving from Memphis to construct and man a strong outer defense
line facing Johnston’s line of advance. Grant then had two lines of
works, one to hold Pemberton in, the other to hold Johnston out. While
Seddon notified Johnston “Rely upon it, the eyes and hopes of the
whole Confederacy are upon you, with the full confidence that you will
act, and with the sentiment that it is better to fail nobly daring, than,
through prudence even, to be inactive,” Johnston notified his government
on June 15 “I consider saving Vicksburg hopeless.”</p>
<p>On July 1, Johnston moved his army of 4 infantry and 1 cavalry
divisions to the east bank of the Big Black River, seeking a vulnerable
place to attack Grant’s outer defenses. His reconnaissance during the
<span class="pb" id="Page_49">49</span>
next 3 days convinced him that no move against the Federal position
was practicable. Receiving word of the surrender on July 4, he withdrew
to Jackson.</p>
<h3 id="c29">THE SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.</h3>
<p>By July, the Army of Vicksburg had
held the line for 6 weeks, but its unyielding defense had been a costly
one. Pemberton reported 10,000 of his men so debilitated by wounds
and sickness as to be no longer able to man the works, and the list of
ineffectives swelled daily from the twin afflictions of insufficient
rations and the searching fire of Union sharpshooters. Each day the
constricting Union line pushed closer against the Vicksburg defenses,
and there were indications that Grant might soon launch another
great assault which, even if repulsed, must certainly result in a severe
toll of the garrison. (Grant had actually ordered a general assault for
July 6, 2 days after the surrender.)</p>
<p>General Pemberton, faced with dwindling stores and no help from
the outside, saw only two eventualities, “either to evacuate the city and
cut my way out or to capitulate upon the best attainable terms.” Contemplating
the former possibility, he asked his division commanders
on July 1 to report whether the physical condition of the troops would
favor such a hazardous stroke. His lieutenants were unanimous in their
replies that siege conditions had physically distressed so large a number
of the defending army that an attempt to cut through the Union line
would be disastrous. Pemberton’s only alternative, then, was surrender.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig42"> <ANTIMG src="images/p27a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="432" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The Union ironclad gunboat <span class="f">Cairo</span>, sunk by a Confederate “torpedo” (mine) near Vicksburg.</i> From <i>Photographic History of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_50">50</div>
<p class="pcap"><i>David and Goliath of the Union fleet, photographed at Vicksburg after the surrender:</i></p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig43"> <ANTIMG src="images/p28.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="581" /> <p class="pcap"><i>A patrol boat, the “tinclad” <span class="f">Silver Lake</span>.</i></p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig44"> <ANTIMG src="images/p28a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="506" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The powerful ironclad ram <span class="f">Choctaw</span>.</i> From <i>Photographic History of the Civil War</i>.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_51">51</div>
<p>Although not requested, Pemberton also received the verdict of his
army in a message from an unknown private, signed “Many Soldiers.”
Taking pride in the gallant conduct of his fellow soldiers “in repulsing
the enemy at every assault, and bearing with patient endurance all the
privations and hardships,” the writer requested his commanding general
if he would “Just think of one small biscuit and one or two mouthfuls
of bacon per day,” concluding with the irrefutable logic of an
enlisted man, “If you can’t feed us, you had better surrender us, horrible
as the idea is.”</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig45"> <ANTIMG src="images/p28b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="409" height-obs="500" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. M. L. Smith, commanding the Confederate left at Vicksburg.</i> Courtesy Library of Congress.</p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig46"> <ANTIMG src="images/p28c.jpg" alt="" width-obs="475" height-obs="500" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson, commanding the Union XVII Corps.</i> Courtesy Library of Congress.</p>
</div>
<p>On July 3, white truce flags appeared along the center of the
Confederate works. A few hours later, Grant and Pemberton met
beneath an oak tree, on a slope between the lines, to arrange for
the capitulation of Vicksburg and its army of 29,500. It had been 14
months since Farragut’s warships had first engaged the Vicksburg
batteries, 7 months since Grant’s first expedition against the city, and
47 days since the beginning of the siege. On the morning of July 4,
1863, while Northern cities celebrated Independence Day, Vicksburg
was formally surrendered. The Confederate troops marched out from
their defenses and stacked their rifles, cartridge boxes, and flags before
a hushed Union Army which witnessed the historic event without
cheering—a testimonial of their respect for the courageous defenders
of Vicksburg, whose line was never broken.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_52">52</div>
<p>Into the city which had defied him for so long, and which nearly
proved the graveyard rather than the springboard of his military career,
rode General Grant. At the courthouse, where the Stars and Bars had
floated in sight of the Union Army and Navy throughout the siege, he
watched the national colors raised on the flagstaff, and then proceeded
to the waterfront. With every vessel of the Navy sounding its whistle
in celebration, he went aboard Porter’s flagship to express gratitude
for the work of the fleet.</p>
<h3 id="c30">THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FALL OF VICKSBURG.</h3>
<p>Vicksburg, and the
simultaneous repulse of Lee’s invasion at the battle of Gettysburg,
marked the beginning of the end for the Confederacy. Previously, there
had been confidence that victory, although demanding desperate measures,
could yet be achieved. Afterward, there was only the hope that
the North might sicken of the frightful cost of continuing the war and
terminate hostilities. The great objective of the war in the West—the
opening of the Mississippi River and the severing of the Confederacy—had
been realized with the fall of Vicksburg. While in the East the
Union armies battled on in bloody stalemate before Richmond, the
armies of the West would now launch their columns deep into the
vitals of the Confederacy.</p>
<p>Grant emerged from the Vicksburg campaign with a hard-won
reputation as a master strategist, which prompted President Lincoln
to place him in supreme command of all the armies of the United
States. From this position he was destined to direct the final campaigns
of the Civil War and to receive Lee’s surrender at Appomattox.
As for Pemberton, the fall of Vicksburg subjected him to painful criticism
from those who held that a more resourceful defense might have
saved the city, or his army, or both. Essentially, both commanders had
disobeyed orders in like manner—Grant in striking behind Vicksburg
alone rather than waiting to combine forces with Banks; Pemberton
in deciding to protect Vicksburg at all cost rather than joining Johnston
and risking loss of the city. But Grant’s gamble had succeeded and
Pemberton’s had failed; and in war, as a leading Confederate commander
had soberly remarked, the people measure a general’s merit
by his success. “I thought and still think that you did right to risk an
army for the purpose of keeping command of even a section of the
Mississippi River,” President Davis wrote to General Pemberton after
the fall of Vicksburg. “Had you succeeded none would have blamed,
had you not made the attempt few if any would have defended your
course.”</p>
<p>In the Confederate capital, Gen. Josiah Gorgas, one of the most able
of Southern leaders, confided to his diary the implications of the
calamitous change in fortune to the South attending the twin disasters
of Gettysburg and Vicksburg:</p>
<blockquote>
<div class="pb" id="Page_53">53</div>
<p>Events have succeeded one another with disastrous rapidity. One
brief month ago we were apparently at the point of success. Lee was
in Pennsylvania threatening Harrisburgh, and even Philadelphia.
Vicksburgh seemed to laugh all Grant’s efforts to scorn.... All looked
bright. Now the picture is just as somber as it was bright then. Lee failed
at Gettysburgh.... Vicksburgh and Port Hudson capitulated, surrendering
thirty-five thousand men and forty-five thousand arms. It
seems incredible that human power could effect such a change in so
brief a space. Yesterday we rode on the pinnacle of success—today
absolute ruin seems to be our portion. The Confederacy totters to its
destruction.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In Washington, a grateful President sat at his desk seeking words
to express appreciation to Grant “for the almost inestimable service you
have done the country.” Explaining the fear he had entertained that
the Union Army might be destroyed during its daring thrust in the
rear of Vicksburg, which he believed at the time to be “a mistake,”
Lincoln wrote to Grant, “I wish now to make the personal acknowledgement
that you were right and I was wrong.”</p>
<p>On July 9, the Confederate commander at Port Hudson, upon
learning of the fall of Vicksburg, surrendered his garrison of 6,000
men. One week later the merchant steamboat <i>Imperial</i> tied up at the
wharf at New Orleans, completing the 1,000-mile passage from St.
Louis undisturbed by hostile guns. After 2 years of land and naval
warfare, the Mississippi River was open, the grip of the South had been
broken, and merchant and military traffic had now a safe avenue to
the gulf. In the words of Lincoln, “The Father of Waters again goes
unvexed to the sea.”</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig47"> <ANTIMG src="images/p29.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="456" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The Union Army passing the courthouse as it took possession of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863.</i> From a wartime sketch.</p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_54">54</div>
<h2 id="c31"><span class="small"><i>Guide to the Area</i></span></h2>
<p>Vicksburg National Military Park is shaped like a great crescent, enclosing
the city of Vicksburg within a 9-mile arc which curves from
the old bed of the Mississippi River north of the city to the river south
of Vicksburg (from U. S. 61 north of Vicksburg, across U. S. 80 east
of the city, to U. S. 61 south of Vicksburg). The two main avenues in
Vicksburg National Military Park, Union Avenue and Confederate
Avenue—constructed along the siege lines established by the two
armies—are parallel. The black markers, on iron standards, indicate
the position of the fortified lines and the units which occupied that sector.
The remains of artillery batteries, forts (and the ditches in front),
and trenches are clearly visible, although, during the 36-year interval
between the siege and the establishment of the park, the fortifications
and trenches have suffered marked alteration from wind and weather.
All the cannon barrels are originals, used during the Civil War; the
carriages are replacements. This self-guiding tour begins at the
museum, going north on Confederate Avenue. It provides a brief
inspection of Union Avenue, proceeds to the national cemetery, a distance
of 6 miles, and returns south by way of Union Avenue. The
numbered stops of this tour correspond to the numbers on the tour
map found on pages <SPAN href="#Page_28">28</SPAN>-29.</p>
<h3 id="c32">1. MUSEUM AND PARK HEADQUARTERS.</h3>
<p>Located at the center of Confederate
Avenue, at its junction with U. S. 80. Here are exhibits illustrating
and explaining the campaign and siege of Vicksburg and the
outstanding features of Vicksburg National Military Park. A recorded
lecture synchronized with lights on a large relief map explains fully
the story of the Vicksburg operations.</p>
<h3 id="c33">2. JEFFERSON DAVIS STATUE.</h3>
<p>(in front of museum) Davis was a West
Point graduate, Mexican War colonel, Mississippi cotton planter,
United States Senator, Secretary of War, and, finally, President of the
Confederacy.</p>
<p>As you begin the tour, notice the natural strength of the Confederate
position on the crest of the ridge. The ground drops away to your
right and, several hundred yards across the ravine, rises to a similar
and parallel ridge. From this, the Union Army launched its siege
operations against the Confederate line. Before the siege began, all the
trees between the lines had been cut down by the Confederate
engineers to insure a clear field of fire.</p>
<h3 id="c34">3. PEMBERTON STATUE.</h3>
<p>Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton, a native Pennsylvanian,
elected to fight for the South and commanded the Confederate
Army of Vicksburg. When a command in keeping with his rank of
<span class="pb" id="Page_55">55</span>
three-star general was unavailable after Vicksburg, he voluntarily
resigned his commission and served as a lieutenant colonel of artillery
for the remainder of the war—a testimonial of his loyalty to the South.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig48"> <ANTIMG src="images/p30.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="356" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Museum and administration building of Vicksburg National Military Park.</i></p> </div>
<h3 id="c35">4. MISSISSIPPI MONUMENT.</h3>
<p>A State memorial to her 4,600 soldiers in
the siege, the bas-relief and sculptures around the base of the shaft
depict battle scenes. The 9-inch Dahlgren gun at the rear of the monument
was one of the largest used at Vicksburg.</p>
<h3 id="c36">5. TILGHMAN STATUE.</h3>
<p>This is a monument to Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman
who was killed at the battle of Champion’s Hill, 18 miles east of
Vicksburg, as he manned an artillery piece in an attempt to hold off a
Union charge. A broken gun carriage lies under his horse’s forefeet.</p>
<h3 id="c37">6. LOUISIANA MONUMENT AND GREAT REDOUBT.</h3>
<p>The largest fort on the
Confederate line, its well-preserved walls extend on both sides of the
Louisiana memorial. On top is the Eternal Torch. The low marble
markers on the slope, below the avenue in front of the fort, mark the
farthest advance of Union regiments in the unsuccessful assault of
May 22. On the ridge, 200 yards away, is the Union line.</p>
<h3 id="c38">7. SURRENDER SITE.</h3>
<p>Grant and Pemberton met under an oak tree,
midway between the lines, for surrender negotiations. The tree immediately
vanished to provide souvenirs of the historic event; notches on
this monument erected by Union soldiers after the surrender are the
work of latter-day souvenir hunters.</p>
<p>The tour now follows Union Avenue, which parallels Confederate
Avenue, for a short distance before returning to the Confederate line.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_56">56</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig49"> <ANTIMG src="images/p31.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="529" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The Illinois Memorial.</i></p> </div>
<h3 id="c39">8. MICHIGAN MONUMENT.</h3>
<p>Symbolic figure of Michigan bringing
laurels to her soldiers of the siege. Beyond the monument, left of the
avenue, notice the wall which protected the Union artillery.</p>
<h3 id="c40">9. SHIRLEY HOUSE.</h3>
<p>A siege landmark, and termed the “White House”
by the soldiers, it is the lone surviving wartime structure in the park.</p>
<h3 id="c41">10. ILLINOIS MONUMENT.</h3>
<p>Modeled after the Pantheon in Rome, this
Memorial Temple, the largest monument on the field, is dedicated to
the 36,312 Illinois men whose names are inscribed on the bronze
plaques within. The Illinois Commission specified that no device indicative
of war should appear on the memorial.</p>
<h3 id="c42">11. THIRD LOUISIANA REDAN.</h3>
<p>This Confederate fort, marked by the
three artillery pieces at right of the avenue, was reached by “Logan’s
Approach,” a Union advance trench. Federal engineers constructed a
mine underneath the redan and exploded 2,200 pounds of powder,
which blasted a tremendous crater into which Union infantry raced,
only to be driven back after severe fighting.</p>
<h3 id="c43">12. GLASS BAYOU BRIDGE.</h3>
<p>The precipitous slopes of the ridges and
deeply cut ravines protected the city, making Vicksburg a natural
fortress. The 75-foot drop from the bridge well illustrates the difficult
terrain over which the Union Army moved.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_57">57</div>
<h3 id="c44">13. ARKANSAS MONUMENT.</h3>
<p>Site of the Arkansas memorial. The
twin pylons are representative of North and South, which were split by
the sword of war and reunited by the cross of faith in a restored Union.
Depicted on the left are Arkansas soldiers repelling a Union assault;
on the right, the Confederate ram <i>Arkansas</i>.</p>
<h3 id="c45">14. MISSOURI MONUMENT.</h3>
<p>A border State, Missouri was divided in
sympathy during the Civil War. Her soldiers enlisted in the armies of
both the North and the South. By the fortunes of war, in this sector of
the siege line, Missouri soldiers of the Union and Confederate armies
faced and fought each other. The monument honors both. The plaque
on the left depicts Missouri Federals attacking this position; on the
right, Missouri Confederates defending it. Between the panels, the
prow of the Ship of State symbolizes the divided Union; the figure
above is the Republic, emerging from the war with renewed strength.</p>
<h3 id="c46">15. STOCKADE REDAN.</h3>
<p>For a close view of siege warfare, walk up
into the fort, to the artillery piece at the right of the avenue. From
the ridge 150 yards away, Union cannon, which are trained on the
fort, blasted the Confederate defenders continuously. During the
assault of May 22, Grant’s infantry reached the wall of the fort. The
two black markers in front of the cannon and just below it indicate
where colorbearers planted their flags, almost at the top of the wall,
before the assault was broken and driven back.</p>
<h3 id="c47">16. OBSERVATION TOWER.</h3>
<p>Erected by the Vicksburg National Military
Park Commission, in 1909, to provide a panoramic view of the park
and the city of Vicksburg.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig50"> <ANTIMG src="images/p31a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="426" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Terraces in Vicksburg National Cemetery.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_58">58</div>
<h3 id="c48">17. FORT HILL.</h3>
<p>Anchoring the Confederate left flank on the Mississippi
River, its guns commanded the Union right as well as the river. The
flags of England, France, Spain, the United States, and the Confederate
States have flown over this historic site, where the bluffs meet the
river, during the centuries-old struggle for control of the Mississippi.
Fort Nogales (Spanish) was built here in 1791, and Fort McHenry,
1798, was the first American settlement at Vicksburg. The water below
the fort is not the Mississippi River—it changed its course in
1876—but the Yazoo Diversion Canal, bringing the Yazoo water into
the old bed of the Mississippi.</p>
<h3 id="c49">18. VICKSBURG NATIONAL CEMETERY.</h3>
<p>Established in 1866 to reinter the
remains of nearly 17,000 Union soldiers who had been given temporary
burial in scattered locations during the war. The identity of almost
13,000 of the soldiers is unknown. The national cemetery also contains
the remains of veterans of the Mexican and Spanish-American
Wars, World Wars I and II, and Korea.</p>
<p>From the lower cemetery drive, you may leave the park and emerge
2 miles north of downtown Vicksburg on U. S. 61. If time permits,
we recommend your completing the tour of the park by following the
“Park Tour” arrows from the cemetery, south on Union Avenue, in
order that you may view the Union lines and monuments and the
southern portion of the park.</p>
<h3 id="c50">19. UNION NAVY MEMORIAL.</h3>
<p>The 202-foot shaft is a tribute to the
achievements of the Union Navy in the Vicksburg operations. Statues
of four fleet commanders, Admirals Farragut and Porter and Flag
Officers Davis and Andrew H. Foote, surround the base.</p>
<h3 id="c51">20. GRANT’S HEADQUARTERS.</h3>
<p>An equestrian statute of General Grant
marks his headquarters location. Impressive monuments, here, of five
northeastern States—<span class="small">PENNSYLVANIA</span>, <span class="small">NEW HAMPSHIRE</span>, <span class="small">MASSACHUSETTS</span>,
<span class="small">NEW YORK</span>, and <span class="small">RHODE ISLAND</span>—indicate their troops were on the
exterior line of defense against Johnston’s army.</p>
<h3 id="c52">21. WISCONSIN MONUMENT.</h3>
<p>“Old Abe,” the famous Wisconsin war
eagle and mascot of the 8th Wisconsin, was carried alongside the regimental
colors, on the march and in battle, through 3 years of war. A
6-foot bronze replica atop the State monument now honors his war
service. Names of all Wisconsin soldiers at Vicksburg are on plaques
around the base.</p>
<h3 id="c53">22. MINNESOTA MONUMENT.</h3>
<p>At the base of the 100-foot shaft, a symbolic
figure of Peace holds a shield and a sword, signifying that the
soldiers of both armies have placed their weapons in her keeping,
and the Union is at peace.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_59">59</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig51"> <ANTIMG src="images/p32.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="468" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The Alabama Memorial.</i></p> </div>
<h3 id="c54">23. IOWA MONUMENT.</h3>
<p>In front, a mounted colorbearer with unfurled
flag awaits the order to advance. The six bronze bas-relief panels portray
scenes of the Vicksburg operations in which Iowa soldiers participated—the
bombardment of Grand Gulf, the battles of Port Gibson,
Jackson, Champion’s Hill, and Big Black River, and the assault on
Vicksburg of May 22, 1863.</p>
<h3 id="c55">24. FORT GARROTT.</h3>
<p>Also called Square Fort, its walls are well preserved.
The two lines of markers in front of the fort indicate the site
of “Hovey’s Approach”—a Union trench dug almost against the walls
of the Confederate fort.</p>
<h3 id="c56">25. ALABAMA MONUMENT.</h3>
<p>Around the flag—which represents the
spirit of Alabama—the group of figures symbolizes the courage and
devotion of both the soldiers and women of Alabama during the war.
The monument was dedicated in 1951.</p>
<p class="tb">This completes the park tour. By continuing northward on Confederate
Avenue for one-half mile, you will reach U. S. 80 at Memorial
Arch. Turning left, through the arch, you will be in the city of Vicksburg.
Colored route markers will guide you over U. S. 61 north and
south and U. S. 80 west through the city. You may also reach U. S. 61
south and U. S. 80 west by turning south at the Alabama Monument
and following Confederate Avenue through the southernmost portion
of Vicksburg National Military Park to U. S. 61, below the city of
Vicksburg.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_60">60</div>
<h2 id="c57"><span class="small"><i>The Park</i></span></h2>
<p>Vicksburg National Military Park was established in 1899 to preserve
the site of the siege of Vicksburg and was placed under the jurisdiction
of the War Department. In 1933, it was transferred to the National
Park Service of the United States Department of the Interior. The
park consists generally of the Confederate and Union siege lines, now
Confederate and Union Avenues, and the area between. The park’s
30 miles of avenues and about 1,330 acres of federally owned land contain
128 artillery pieces and 1,600 monuments, markers, and tablets,
as well as 17 State memorials.</p>
<h2 id="c58"><span class="small"><i>How To Reach the Park</i></span></h2>
<p>The park forms a semicircle around the city of Vicksburg, Miss., which
is located at the intersection of U. S. 80 and 61, midway between
Memphis and New Orleans.</p>
<h2 id="c59"><span class="small"><i>Administration</i></span></h2>
<p>Vicksburg National Military Park is administered by the National
Park Service of the United States Department of the Interior. Communications
should be addressed to the Superintendent, Vicksburg
National Military Park, Box 349, Vicksburg, Miss.</p>
<h2 id="c60"><span class="small"><i>Related Areas</i></span></h2>
<p>Other Civil War battlefields administered by the National Park Service,
and important to the military operations in the West, are: Shiloh,
Stones River, and Fort Donelson National Military Parks, Tenn., and
Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, Ga.-Tenn.</p>
<h2 id="c61"><span class="small"><i>Visitor Facilities</i></span></h2>
<p>The Union and Confederate siege-lines are well marked and readily
visible from Union and Confederate Avenues. Information and free
literature, as well as the service of park historians, are available in the
museum which contains exhibits explaining and illustrating the Vicksburg
operations. An electrical relief map synchronized with a recorded
lecture affords a full explanation of the campaign and siege to each
visitor. Educational groups may receive a guided tour of the park.</p>
<p class="tbcenter"><span class="smaller"><span class="ss">U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 O-586734</span></span></p>
<h3 id="c62"><span class="center"><span class="small">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE</span> <br/>HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES</span></h3>
<p class="center small">(Price lists of National Park Service publications may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C.)</p>
<dl class="undent"><br/>Antietam
<br/>Bandelier
<br/>Chalmette
<br/>Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battlefields
<br/>Custer Battlefield
<br/>Custis-Lee Mansion, the Robert E. Lee Memorial
<br/>Fort Laramie
<br/>Fort McHenry
<br/>Fort Necessity
<br/>Fort Pulaski
<br/>Fort Raleigh
<br/>Fort Sumter
<br/>George Washington Birthplace
<br/>Gettysburg
<br/>Guilford Courthouse
<br/>Hopewell Village
<br/>Independence
<br/>Jamestown, Virginia
<br/>Kings Mountain
<br/>The Lincoln Museum and the House Where Lincoln Died
<br/>Manassas (Bull Run)
<br/>Montezuma Castle
<br/>Morristown, a Military Capital of the Revolution
<br/>Ocmulgee
<br/>Petersburg Battlefields
<br/>Saratoga
<br/>Scotts Bluff
<br/>Shiloh
<br/>Statue of Liberty
<br/>Vanderbilt Mansion
<br/>Vicksburg
<br/>Yorktown
<div class="fig">> <ANTIMG src="images/p33.jpg" alt="Memorial column" width-obs="500" height-obs="775" /></div>
<h2>Transcriber’s Notes</h2>
<ul>
<li>Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook is public-domain in the country of publication.</li>
<li>Corrected a few palpable typos.</li>
<li>In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by _underscores_.</li>
</ul>
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