<SPAN name="startofbook"></SPAN>
<div class="box">
<p class="jr1"><span class="smaller">NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORY SERIES</span></p>
<h1><span class="small">CAMPAIGN FOR</span> <br/>PETERSBURG</h1>
<p class="jr1">RICHARD WAYNE LYKES</p>
<p class="jr1"><span class="smaller">National Park Service
<br/>U.S. Department of the Interior
<br/>Washington, D.C. 1970</span></p>
</div>
<div class="verse">
<p class="t0">For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,</p>
<p class="t0">U.S. Government Printing Office</p>
<p class="t0">Washington, D.C. 20402—Price $1</p>
</div>
<h2 class="center">CONTENTS</h2>
<br/><SPAN href="#c1">PROLOGUE</SPAN> 2
<br/><SPAN href="#c2">UNION STRATEGY 1864</SPAN> 5
<br/><SPAN href="#c3">STRATEGIC PETERSBURG</SPAN> 7
<br/><SPAN href="#c4">BATTLE OF PETERSBURG</SPAN> 10
<br/><SPAN href="#c5">FIRST UNION ATTEMPT TO ENCIRCLE PETERSBURG</SPAN> 17
<br/><SPAN href="#c6">BATTLE OF THE CRATER</SPAN> 24
<br/><SPAN href="#c7">FIGHT FOR THE WELDON RAILROAD</SPAN> 36
<br/><SPAN href="#c8">UNION ENCIRCLEMENT CONTINUES</SPAN> 42
<br/><SPAN href="#c9">LEE’S LAST GAMBLE</SPAN> 58
<br/><SPAN href="#c10">FIVE FORKS: BEGINNING OF THE END</SPAN> 64
<br/><SPAN href="#c11">FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND</SPAN> 68
<div class="pb" id="Page_1">1</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig1"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg01.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="773" /> <p class="pcap"><i>In the final year of the Civil War in the East, the fighting focused upon
Petersburg, an important
transportation center for
Richmond and Lee’s army.
For 10 bloody months of
combat, both from behind
prepared positions and
along the main routes of
supply, Lee’s ragged
Confederates held the city
(shown here from north of
the Appomattox River)
against Grant’s numerically
superior Federals. On
April 2-3, 1865, Lee was
forced to abandon both
Petersburg and Richmond.
One week later, he
surrendered the Army of
Northern Virginia at
Appomattox Court House,
dooming the South’s bid
for independent existence.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_2">2</div>
<h2 id="c1"><span class="small">PROLOGUE</span></h2>
<p>By June 1864, when the siege of Petersburg began,
the Civil War had lain heavily on both the North and
the South for more than 3 years. Most of the fighting in
the East during this period had taken place on the rolling
Virginia countryside between the opposing capitals
of Washington and Richmond, only 110 miles apart,
and all of it had failed to end the war and bring peace to
the land. Various generals had been placed in command
of the Union’s mighty Army of the Potomac and had
faced Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.
So far not one had succeeded in destroying Lee’s army
or in capturing Richmond.</p>
<p>Perhaps Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan had come the
closest to success when, in the late spring and early
summer of 1862, his Northern troops had threatened
the Confederate capital, only to be repulsed on its outskirts.
The other Northern commanders who followed
McClellan—Pope, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade—were
less successful. Lee had met and turned aside their drives.</p>
<p>After 36 months of bitter conflict the war in the East
seemed, to many observers, to be far from a final settlement.
The failure of Union forces to deliver a decisive
blow against the Army of Northern Virginia was a
source of growing concern in Washington. The Confederacy,
for its part, was no more successful in settling the
issue. Attempted invasions of the Northern States by
Lee were turned back at Antietam in September 1862
and at Gettysburg in July 1863.</p>
<p>Farther west the picture was brighter for Northern
hopes. In the same month as the Battle of Gettysburg,
the Confederate stronghold of Vicksburg, Miss., fell into
Union hands. A few days later, Port Hudson, La., the
last remaining stronghold of the Confederacy on the
banks of the Mississippi River, surrendered. Later in
1863, the Union capture of Chattanooga, Tenn., threw
open the gateway to Georgia.</p>
<p>Strategically, despite the stalemate in Virginia, the beginning
of 1864 found the Northern armies in a stronger
position than the Confederate military forces. Not only
was there a distinct possibility that the Southern States
east of the Mississippi could be split into two parts, but
the greater resources at the command of the Lincoln administration
were beginning to count more heavily with
each passing day. All that seemed to be needed to end
the war was an able Union commander who could
marshal the mighty resources of his country for a last
tremendous blow at the South.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_3">3</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig2"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg02.jpg" alt="" width-obs="469" height-obs="800" /> <p class="pcap"><i>From the Rapidan River to the James, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant (above), commanding
the armies of the United
States, found all his efforts
to capture Richmond and
destroy the Confederacy
blocked by Gen. Robert E.
Lee (below) and his Army of
Northern Virginia. Finally,
Grant turned his attention
to Petersburg.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg02a.jpg" alt="Gen. Robert E. Lee." width-obs="600" height-obs="495" /></div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_4">4</div>
<div class="fig"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg03.jpg" alt="Campaign Map." width-obs="600" height-obs="608" /></div>
<br/>Union Movements
<br/>Confederate Movements
<br/>Major Battles and Engagements
<br/>WILDERNESS<span class="hst"> MAY 5-7, 1864</span>
<br/>SPOTSYLVANIA<span class="hst"> MAY 8-19, 1864</span>
<br/>COLD HARBOR<span class="hst"> JUNE 3-13, 1864</span>
<br/>PETERSBURG CAMPAIGN<span class="hst"> JUNE 1864-APRIL 1865</span>
<br/>FIVE FORKS<span class="hst"> APRIL 1, 1865</span>
<br/>SAYLER’S CREEK<span class="hst"> APRIL 6, 1865</span>
<p>Such a man was found in Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant,
the victor at Vicksburg and Missionary Ridge, who was
brought east and, on March 9, 1864, commissioned
lieutenant general to be responsible for all the Union
armies. Unlike his predecessor, Henry W. Halleck, Grant
decided not to remain in Washington but chose instead
to accompany the Army of the Potomac, where he would
provide general direction to the military operations but
leave the execution of them to that army’s commander,
Maj. Gen. George G. Meade.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_5">5</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig3"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg03a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="428" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. George G. Meade commanded the Army of the Potomac during the
1864-65 Virginia campaign.
With General Grant actively
directing most of the
military operations, Meade
was in the awkward position
of serving much like a
corps commander in his
own army. He nevertheless
functioned well in this
difficult situation.</i></p>
</div>
<h2 id="c2"><span class="small">UNION STRATEGY 1864</span></h2>
<p>To accomplish the conquest of the Confederacy, the
Northern plan called for a huge two-pronged attack.
Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, in command of the
southern prong, was assigned the task of destroying Gen.
Joseph E. Johnston’s Confederate Army of Tennessee,
capturing Atlanta, marching to the sea, and then turning
north to effect a junction with Grant.</p>
<p>It was the upper arm of the movement which was directly
concerned with Richmond and Petersburg. This
was composed of two armies: the Army of the Potomac
and the Army of the James. It was the task of these
armies to capture Richmond, crush the Army of Northern
Virginia, and march south toward Sherman.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_6">6</div>
<p>The story of the Army of the James in the early phase
of the offensive can be briefly told. Maj. Gen. Benjamin
F. Butler was ordered to advance upon Richmond from
the southeast and threaten communications between the
Confederate capital and the Southern States. With some
40,000 Union troops, the advance was begun. City
Point, located at the junction of the James and Appomattox
Rivers and soon to be the supply center for the
attack on Petersburg, was captured on May 4, 1864.
Within 2 weeks, however, a numerically inferior
Confederate force shut up the Army of the James, “as if
it had been in a bottle strongly corked,” in Bermuda
Hundred, a loop formed by the winding James and Appomattox
Rivers. Here Butler waited, while north of
him the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern
Virginia engaged in a series of bloody battles.</p>
<p>The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5-7, 1864, began
what proved to be the start of the final campaign against
the Army of Northern Virginia. Here Meade’s Army of
the Potomac, numbering approximately 118,000 troops,
fought the Confederate defenders of Richmond. Lee had
about 62,000 men with him, while an additional 30,000
under Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard held the Richmond-Petersburg
area. The battle resulted in a fearful loss of
men on both sides, although the armies remained intact.
This was followed by a series of fierce engagements
around Spotsylvania Court House from May 8 to 21.</p>
<p>Failing to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia in
these battles, Grant moved the Army of the Potomac to
the east of Richmond. It was his hope that he would
outflank the Confederate defenders by persistent night
marches. Lee was not to be so easily outguessed, however.
After minor battles at the North Anna River
(May 23) and Totopotomoy Creek (May 29), Grant
arrived at Cold Harbor, about 8 miles northeast of Richmond,
but Lee’s army still stood between him and that
city. On June 3, 2 days after he arrived at Cold Harbor,
Grant ordered a direct frontal assault against the
Confederate lines. He was repulsed with heavy losses—about
7,000 men. “I have always regretted that the last
assault at Cold Harbor was ever made,” Grant would
write many years later.
<span class="pb" id="Page_7">7</span>
By the end of the first month of Grant’s campaign, both
sides had suffered heavy casualties, but the North’s ability
to refill its depleted ranks was greater than the
South’s. Lee’s offensive strength had been sapped. From
the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House until the end of
the war, except for counterattacks and the lunge at Fort
Stedman during the siege of Petersburg, the Army of
Northern Virginia was a defensive weapon only.</p>
<p>After Cold Harbor, Grant decided to turn quickly to the
south of Richmond and isolate the city and the defending
troops by attacking Petersburg and cutting the railroads
that supplied them. Lee knew he could not allow
this to happen. “We must destroy this army of Grant’s
before he gets to James River,” he told one of his generals.
“If he gets there, it will become a siege, and then it
will be a mere question of time.”</p>
<h2 id="c3"><span class="small">STRATEGIC PETERSBURG</span></h2>
<p>According to the United States census of 1860, Petersburg
was a city of 18,266 people. It was situated on the
southern bank of the Appomattox River about 8
miles from City Point, where the Appomattox joins the
James, and 23 miles south of Richmond. As the war
progressed and the territory to the north and east was
shut off, Richmond became increasingly dependent on
Petersburg for supplies. Through it passed a constant
stream of war materials and necessities of life from the
South to sustain the straining war effort. In short, Petersburg
was a road and rail center of vital importance
to the Confederacy, and its capture would almost certainly
lead to the abandonment of Richmond.</p>
<p>The transportation vehicles of the 1860’s did not require
the wide, straight highways of the present. However,
several good roads came into the city from the east,
south, and west where they joined with the Richmond
Turnpike. Along these roads passed supply wagons,
couriers, and, on occasion, troops on their way to repel
the foe. Several were built of logs laid across the road to
form a hard surface. Because of this they were called
“plank roads.” Two of the most important arteries of
traffic into Petersburg were the Jerusalem Plank Road,
connecting Petersburg with Jerusalem (now Courtland),
Va., and the Boydton Plank Road which led south
through Dinwiddie Court House. Among others of importance
were the City Point, Prince George Court
House, Baxter, Halifax, Jordon Point, Squirrel Level,
and Cox Roads.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_8">8</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig4"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg04.jpg" alt="" width-obs="596" height-obs="547" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">Railroads and important roads serving Petersburg in 1864. The dashed line indicates the original Confederate Defense line built in 1862-63.</span></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig5"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg04a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="595" height-obs="412" /> <p class="pcap"><span class="ss">Map showing the network of railroads and the strategic location of Petersburg to Richmond. The shaded area is the
approximate line of Union control in
early 1864. The three arrows indicate
the major drives planned by the Union
army for 1864. (Railroads serving Rich.
and Petersburg are in heavy lines.)</span></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_9">9</div>
<p>It was the railroads more than the highways, however,
which gave to Petersburg a significance out of all proportion
to its size. Tracks radiated from the city in all
directions. The Richmond and Petersburg Railroad left
the city to the north; the Southside Railroad ran west to
Lynchburg; the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad led
south to North Carolina; the Norfolk and Petersburg
Railroad passed through a ravine east of the city before
turning southeast toward Norfolk; and the Petersburg
and City Point Railroad struck out for the hamlet of
City Point, situated at the junction of the James and
Appomattox Rivers about 8 miles away.</p>
<p>Because of its proximity, Petersburg became a part of
the transportation system of the Confederate capital,
serving as a major point of transfer to the larger metropolis
for products and materials from the vast regions to
the south and southwest. By June 1864, all but one
railroad from the south and west into Richmond—the
Richmond and Danville Railroad—passed through
Petersburg. As other lines of supply were cut off or
threatened, the dependence of Richmond upon Petersburg
increased and made the security of that city a
matter of vital concern.</p>
<p>In the spring of 1862, McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign
had threatened Richmond from the east and southeast,
making that city’s defenders acutely aware of the need
for a system of fortifications around Petersburg. In August
a defense line was begun, and work continued until
its completion about a year later. Capt. Charles H. Dimmock,
a Northerner by birth, was in charge of it under
the direction of the Engineer Bureau, Confederate States
Army, and the line so constructed became unofficially
known as the “Dimmock Line.”</p>
<p>When finished, the chain of breastworks and artillery
emplacements around Petersburg was 10 miles long, beginning
and ending on the Appomattox River and protecting
all but the northern approaches to the city. The
<span class="pb" id="Page_10">10</span>
55 artillery batteries were consecutively numbered from
east to west. Although natural terrain features were utilized
whenever possible, some glaring weaknesses existed,
such as the deep ravine between Batteries 7 and 8,
which could provide a means of penetration by an attacking
force. The very length and size of the fortifications
proved to be a disadvantage. It meant that a larger
number of troops would be necessary to defend the line
than General Beauregard, charged with this heavy responsibility,
had present for duty. Col. Alfred Roman,
an aide-de-camp to Beauregard, estimated that the long
“Dimmock Line” would require more than 10 times as
many men to defend it as were available.</p>
<p>On several occasions raids were made on the railroads
south and west of Petersburg. The most serious of these
occurred on June 9, 1864, when 3,000 infantry and
1,300 cavalry appeared in force along the eastern and
southeastern sector of the Dimmock Line. The infantry
contented itself with a menacing demonstration, but
the cavalry attacked up the Jerusalem Plank Road. After
breaking through the defenses, the horse soldiers were
checked by regular Southern army units assisted by a
hastily summoned home guard of old men and youths.
The damage done by such raids was quickly patched up,
but they were a constant nuisance to the city’s transportation
lines. To shut off permanently the supplies that
streamed along the railroads, the Union forces would
have to take permanent physical possession of them.</p>
<h2 id="c4"><span class="small">BATTLE OF PETERSBURG</span></h2>
<p>After the Battle of Cold Harbor on June 3, Grant had
abandoned, for a time at least, his plan to capture Richmond
by direct assault. With characteristic zeal he had
ordered Meade to move the Army of the Potomac
across the James River and to invest the more southerly
city. On June 14, Grant and Butler conferred at Bermuda
Hundred. At that time, orders were given for the
attack on Petersburg.</p>
<p>The first of the Northern forces to arrive on the scene of
battle was the XVIII Corps of the Army of the James,
which had fought at Cold Harbor. Early in the morning
of June 15, these troops, commanded by Maj. Gen. W.
<span class="pb" id="Page_11">11</span>
F. “Baldy” Smith, crossed from Bermuda Hundred to
the south side of the Appomattox by means of a pontoon
bridge at Broadway Landing. Eighteen thousand Union
soldiers were on their way to face less than 4,000 under
Beauregard. Throughout the day they approached the
city and assembled for the attack.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig6"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg05.jpg" alt="" width-obs="393" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard, Confederate commander at Petersburg during the early
days of the campaign,
defended the “Dimmock
Line” against the Federal
assaults of June 15-18, 1864.
When Lee arrived to direct
operations, Beauregard’s
troops were merged with the
Army of Northern Virginia.</i></p>
</div>
<p>There was skirmishing throughout the afternoon as the
Federals drove in the Confederate pickets, and shortly
after 7 p.m. on June 15 the XVIII Corps launched a
fierce attack on the Dimmock Line. Among the first
points to fall was Battery 5, one of the strongest of the
Confederate positions. Within a few hours Beauregard
<span class="pb" id="Page_12">12</span>
had lost not only Battery 5 but all the line for more than
a mile south. The defenders withdrew and threw up a
hasty entrenchment behind Harrison’s Creek, well to the
rear of the captured section of the line. While the
Confederate retreat was taking place, the Union II
Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock,
arrived to reinforce the Federal columns.</p>
<p>The appearance on the field of the II Corps was an
ominous sign for the Confederates. While the initial attacks
were taking place on June 15, the Army of the
Potomac had been busily engaged in crossing the James
River farther to the east. The number of Union troops
south of the river was increasing hourly, until by midnight
of June 16 at least 70,000 had crossed.</p>
<p>Darkness ended the fighting on June 15, but early the
next day the attacks were renewed. More of the defense
line, south of the portion captured the previous day,
now gave way. In response to repeated entreaties from
Beauregard throughout June 15 and 16, Lee ordered
more divisions to the support of Petersburg, necessitating
the draining of precious reserves from the Richmond
lines. By dawn of that second day, Beauregard could
muster about 14,000 men to face the enemy. Thus, the
center of attention rapidly shifted from Richmond to
Petersburg, which had so recently seemed of but secondary
importance.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_13">13</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig7"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg06.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="456" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Broadway Landing on the Appomattox River where Maj. Gen. W. F. “Baldy”
Smith’s XVIII Corps of the
Army of the James crossed
on June 15, 1864. It was
later used as an ordnance
depot by the Union Army.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig8"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg06a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="377" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Pontoon bridge at Broadway Landing constructed by Federal soldiers in 1864.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig9"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg06g.jpg" alt="" width-obs="1000" height-obs="283" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Confederate Battery 5, shown here under Federal occupation 6 days after its
capture, was one of the first
points on Petersburg’s outer
defense lines to fall to the
XVIII Corps during the
June 15 attack.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_14">14</div>
<p>The third day of battle was practically a repetition of
that of the preceding day. Again the Northern forces
attacked the Confederate troops, concentrating their efforts
to the south of the positions captured earlier.
Again the Confederates were forced to draw back. A
decisive breakthrough of the opposing line was now anticipated
by the assaulting forces. About 12:30 a.m.,
June 18, Beauregard ordered his troops to begin a withdrawal
to new positions about a mile closer to the city.
Throughout the early morning hours of that day Beauregard
had his men busily engaged in the construction
of this defense line. Colonel Roman later recalled that
“without a moment’s rest the digging of the trenches was
begun, with such utensils as had been hastily collected
<span class="pb" id="Page_15">15</span>
at Petersburg, many of the men using their bayonets,
their knives, and even their tin cans, to assist in the
rapid execution of the work.”</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig10"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg07.jpg" alt="" width-obs="1000" height-obs="737" /> <p class="pcap"><i>A section of the Confederate defense lines around Petersburg. Note the use of
wickerware (gabions),
sharpened stakes (fraises),
and branches (abatis) to
protect the position.</i></p>
</div>
<p>A general assault by the Union forces was ordered for 4
a.m. on June 18. When the attack began it was soon
discovered that the ranks of the enemy had not been
broken nor had the city fallen into Northern hands. The
area where the left flank of the Dimmock Line anchored
on the Appomattox was empty, except for a thin line of
skirmishers who were gradually forced back. The
Northern troops came on, crossing the Norfolk and Petersburg
Railroad west of where the defenders had constructed
their new line and continuing on until they were
<span class="pb" id="Page_16">16</span>
brought face to face with the muzzles of Confederate
guns. Meanwhile, elements of Lee’s command continued
pouring in to aid their comrades, and Lee came down
from his temporary headquarters near Chester, Va., to
personally direct the defense operations.</p>
<p>Throughout that June Saturday, brisk action occurred
on the new Petersburg front. The major Union drive,
involving elements of five corps, came about 4 p.m.
Artillery hammered the Confederates. Infantry charged,
only to be hurled back. During the course of one of
these futile drives, the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery reportedly
suffered the most severe losses of any regiment in a
single engagement of the entire war. This unit, 850
strong, charged from the concealment of the Prince
George Court House Road north of where Fort Stedman
was soon to stand. Met by a heavy crossfire, it
withdrew in less than one-half hour, with 632 casualties.</p>
<p>As on the previous days, fighting ended with the coming
of darkness. Grant’s attempt to capture Petersburg had
failed, with a loss of 10,000 men; but his efforts could
not be considered entirely wasted. Two of the railroads
leading into the city had been cut, and several roads
were in Union hands. Behind the Northern troops was
City Point, which Grant speedily converted into a huge
supply base.</p>
<p>The major result of the opening 4 days of combat, however,
was the failure of the Federal forces to break the
Confederate defense line. First Beauregard, and then
Lee, had held against heavy odds. They had been
pushed back closer to their base—but they had held.
Possibly if Smith had advanced his XVIII Corps farther
into the defenses on the opening night, or if Hancock’s
II Corps had arrived earlier, Petersburg would have
fallen on June 15 or 16. But these had not happened,
and now 47,000 to 51,000 Confederates would settle
down to defend the city against 111,000 to 113,000
Union besiegers.</p>
<p>The defenses of Richmond now ran from White Oak
Swamp, east of that city, south to Jerusalem Plank Road,
26 miles away. The fate of the Army of Northern Virginia—of
the Confederate capital itself—would depend
upon the outcome of the drive against Petersburg.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_17">17</div>
<h2 id="c5"><span class="small">FIRST UNION ATTEMPT TO ENCIRCLE PETERSBURG</span></h2>
<p>The Union Army, having failed in its initial attack on
Petersburg, was now committed to doing something further
to effect its capture. From June 19 to July 9, the
Union forces were engaged in three kinds of activity.
First, elements of the army were set to work consolidating
the positions captured in the 4-day battle and constructing
the devices needed for siege operations. Second,
jabbing cavalry thrusts were made at the important
supply routes into Petersburg. And third, they reconnoitered
the Confederate defenses to determine a plan
which would force Lee out of his lines.</p>
<p>A threatening movement toward the Weldon Railroad
was promptly undertaken by the Northern troops. Three
days after the failure to capture the city, two corps (the
II and VI) began to push to the southwest of Grant’s
flank on the Jerusalem Plank Road. The following day,
June 22, Confederate divisions led by Generals Cadmus
M. Wilcox and William Mahone advanced from the defense
line south of Petersburg and rolled by the Federals,
capturing 1,700 prisoners, four cannons, and eight
stands of colors.</p>
<div class="fig"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg08.jpg" alt="Map." width-obs="800" height-obs="479" /></div>
<br/><span class="ss">Union Troops Advance on Petersburg</span>
<br/><span class="ss">JUNE 15-18, 1864. Portion of Original Confederate Line Captured and New Line Built Nearer City</span>
<br/><span class="ss">JUNE 22-24, 1864. Union Attempt to Capture the Weldon R.R. Turned Back</span>
<div class="pb" id="Page_18">18</div>
<p>The next morning saw the resumption of the advance
toward the Weldon Railroad. A Union patrol succeeded
in reaching the tracks on the 23d and promptly started
the work of destruction. Alarmed by the threat to this
important supply line, the Confederates launched a
sharp attack that forced the withdrawal of the Union
forces from the vicinity of the railroad. However, the
Union lines confronting Petersburg had been extended
across the Jerusalem Plank Road, thus cutting off its use
to the city.</p>
<p>In itself, the Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road on June
22-24 was not too important militarily. The North could
quickly replace the loss of 2,300 men. The Weldon Railroad,
although its days were numbered, was still able to
deliver supplies to Petersburg. But as an indication of
Grant’s tactics, it pointed the course of the campaign
ahead. It marked the first of several attempts to encircle
Petersburg, and the others to follow would not all be as
disappointing to Northern hopes. In these repeated
drives to the west lay the essence of the basic plan to
capture Petersburg.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_19">19</div>
<p>On July 9, the plan of operations decided upon by the
Union high command was revealed in an order from
Meade’s headquarters giving detailed instructions for
the building of fortifications and the development of
siege tactics. It thus became apparent that the Union
plan was to reduce Petersburg by a process of attrition—a
process that was to last for 9 months.</p>
<p>There were still those in the attacking forces, however,
who felt that, with a little imagination, the city could be
taken by direct assault. While most of the troops were
digging siege lines, another smaller group had already
begun work on a unique plan which would, if successful,
make further encirclement unnecessary.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig11"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg09.jpg" alt="" width-obs="1000" height-obs="597" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The Federal cavalry saw little battle action during the siege, but it did its share in destroying Lee’s lines of communication. Combat artist Alfred R. Waud of Harper’s
Weekly made this sketch of Brig. Gen. James H.
Wilson’s troopers tearing up part of the Weldon
Railroad, south of Petersburg, during their June 1864 raid.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_20">20</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig12"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg10.jpg" alt="" width-obs="1000" height-obs="987" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The “Dictator,” also called “The Petersburg Express,” was a 17,000-pound, 13-inch Federal seacoast mortar mounted on a reinforced railroad car. During the early part of the siege, this huge weapon fired 200-pound
explosive shells into Petersburg, 2½ miles away, from a curved section of the
Petersburg and City Point Railroad. On July 30, 1864, it
was part of the artillery support for Union troops during
the Battle of the Crater.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_22">22</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig13"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg11.jpg" alt="" width-obs="1000" height-obs="607" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The men who commanded the “Dictator”—Col. H. L. Abbot (the man on the left
in front) and officers of the 1st
Connecticut Heavy Artillery.
Next to Abbot is Maj. Gen.
Henry J. Hunt, in charge
of all artillery operations
on the Petersburg front.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig14"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg11a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="603" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The “Dictator” in permanent position near Union Battery IV, formerly Confederate
Battery 5.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_23">23</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig15"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg11b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="1192" /> <p class="pcap"><i>A 13-inch seacoast mortar on display at Petersburg National Battlefield today,
on the site where the
“Dictator” stood during
most of the siege.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_24">24</div>
<h2 id="c6"><span class="small">BATTLE OF THE CRATER</span></h2>
<p>At several places east of the city the opposing lines were
extremely close together. One of these locations was in
front of Pegram’s (sometimes called Elliott’s) Salient, a
Confederate strong point near old Blandford Church.
Here the Confederate position on Cemetery Hill and the
Union picket line were less than 400 feet apart. Because
of the proximity of the Union line, Pegram’s Salient was
well fortified. Behind earthen embankments was a battery
of four guns, and two veteran South Carolina infantry
regiments were stationed on either side. Behind these
were other defensive works; before them the ground
sloped gently downward toward the Union advance line.</p>
<p>This forward Union line was built on the crest of a
ravine which had been crossed on June 18. Through this
ravine, and between the sentry line and the main line,
lay the roadbed of the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad.
The front in this sector was manned by Maj. Gen.
Ambrose E. Burnside’s IX Corps. Among the many
units which composed this corps was the 48th Regiment,
Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteer Infantry. A large proportion
of this regiment was made up of onetime coal
miners, and it apparently occurred to one or more of
them that Pegram’s Salient would provide an excellent
place to use their civilian knowhow. Lt. Col. Henry
Pleasants, the commanding officer of the 48th and a
mining engineer by profession, overheard one of the
enlisted men mutter, “We could blow that damned fort
out of existence if we could run a mine shaft under it.”
From this and similar remarks came the germ of the idea
for a Union mine.</p>
<p>The 48th Regiment proposed to dig a long gallery from
the bottom of the ravine behind their picket line to a
point beneath the Confederate battery at Pegram’s Salient,
blow up the position by powder placed in the end of
the tunnel, and then send a strong body of troops through
the gap created in the enemy’s line by the explosion.
They saw as the reward for their effort the capitulation
of Petersburg and, perhaps, the end of the war.</p>
<p>After obtaining the permission of Burnside and Grant,
Pleasants and his men commenced digging their mine
shaft on June 25. The lack of proper equipment made it
necessary to improvise tools and apparatus with which
<span class="pb" id="Page_25">25</span>
to excavate. Mining picks were created by straightening
army picks. Cracker boxes were converted into hand-barrows
in which the dirt was removed from the end of
the tunnel. A sawmill changed a bridge into timber necessary
for shoring up the mine. Pleasants estimated
the tunnel’s direction and depth by means of a theodolite
sent him from Washington. The instrument, although
outmoded, served its purpose well: the mine shaft hit
exactly beneath the salient at which it was aimed.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig16"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg12.jpg" alt="" width-obs="435" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Lt. Col. Henry Pleasants, onetime mining engineer and the commanding officer of the
48th Pennsylvania Regiment
which dug the tunnel
under the Confederate line.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_26">26</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig17"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg13.jpg" alt="" width-obs="1000" height-obs="561" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Cross-section view of the Federal tunnel under the Confederate line. Colonel Pleasants later recalled that “General Burnside told me that General Meade and
Major Duane, chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac,
said the thing could not be done—that it was all clap-trap
and nonsense; that such a length of mine had never
been excavated in military operations, and could not be;
that I would either get the men smothered, for want of
air, or crushed by the falling of the earth; or the
enemy would find it out and it would amount to nothing.”</i></p>
</div>
<br/><span class="ss">Air tube</span>
<br/><span class="ss">Air-tight door</span>
<br/><span class="ss">Fireplace</span>
<br/><span class="ss">Chimney</span>
<br/><span class="ss">FEDERAL LINE Established June 18, 1864</span>
<br/><span class="ss">Tunnel sloped up to avoid heavy clay</span>
<br/><span class="ss">Air tube</span>
<br/><span class="ss">JUNE 25, 1864, Tunnel started</span>
<br/><span class="ss">510-8/10 feet</span>
<br/><span class="ss">JULY 27, 1864, 8,000 lbs. of powder placed here</span>
<br/><span class="ss">CONFEDERATE LINE</span>
<br/><span class="ss">JULY 30, 1864, Pegram’s Battery destroyed by explosion</span>
<div class="pb" id="Page_28">28</div>
<p>One of the most remarkable features of the gallery was
the method devised to supply the diggers at the end with
fresh air. The longer the tunnel grew, the more serious
the problem of ventilation became. It had been considered
impossible to dig a tunnel for any considerable
distance without spacing shafts at regular intervals in
order to replace the polluted air with a fresh supply.
This problem had been solved by the application of the
simple physical principle that warm air rises. Behind the
Union picket line and to the right of the mine gallery,
although connected with it, the miners dug a ventilating
chimney. Between the chimney and the mine entrance
they erected an airtight canvas door. Through that door
and along the floor of the gallery they laid a square
wooden pipe. A fire was then built at the bottom of the
ventilating shaft. As the fire warmed the air it went up
the chimney. The draft thus created drew the bad air
from the end of the tunnel where the men were digging.
As this went out, fresh air was drawn in through the
wooden pipe to replace it.</p>
<p>Work on the tunnel continued steadily from June 25,
and by July 17 the diggers were nearly 511 feet from
the entrance and directly beneath the battery in Pegram’s
Salient. The Confederates had learned of the mine by
this time and had dug several countermines behind their
own lines in an effort to locate the Union gallery. Two
were very close, being dug on either side of where the
Pennsylvanians were at work. Although digging in the
countermines continued throughout July, Confederate
fears seemed to lessen during the same period. There
were many reasons for this, one being the failure of
their tunnels to strike any Union construction. Another
major reason, undoubtedly, was a belief held by many
that it was impossible to ventilate a shaft of any length
over 400 feet without constructing air shafts along it,
and so far no air shafts could be seen between the
Union and Confederate lines.</p>
<p>The next step in the Union plan was to burrow out into
lateral galleries at the end of the long shaft. Accordingly,
on July 18, work was begun on these branches
which extended to the right and left, paralleling the
Confederate fortifications above. When completed, these
added another 75 feet to the total length of the tunnel
which now reached 586 feet into the earth. It was about
20 feet from the floor of the tunnel to the enemy works
above. The average internal dimensions of the shaft
were 5 feet high, with a base 4½ feet wide tapering to 2
feet at the top.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_29">29</div>
<p>Digging was finally completed on July 23. Four days
later the task of charging the mine with black powder
was accomplished. Three hundred and twenty kegs of
powder weighing about 25 pounds each were arranged
in the two lateral galleries in eight magazines. The total
charge was 8,000 pounds. The powder was sandbagged
to direct the force of the explosion upward and the fuses
were spliced together to form a 98-foot line.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, preparations for the large-scale attack
which was to follow the explosion of the mine had been
carried out. Burnside wanted his IX Corps to lead the
attack, spearheaded by a fresh, 4,300-man Negro division,
and pressed his wishes on Meade. Both Meade and
Grant approved the request, but refused to allow the
black troops to lead the assault for fear that, if the
attack failed, the Union commanders could be accused
of wanting to get rid of the only Negro troops then with
the Army of the Potomac. Burnside did not learn of this
decision until the day before the assault, July 29, and he
was forced to change his plans at the last moment.
Three white divisions would make the initial charge,
with the black division in reserve. Burnside had the
commanding generals of these three divisions draw
straws to see which would lead. Brig. Gen. James F.
Ledlie of the 1st Division won the draw.</p>
<p>Despite these 11th-hour changes, a plan of battle had
been evolved. During the night of July 29-30, the bulk
of the IX Corps was assembled in the ravine behind the
mine entrance and in the two approach trenches leading
to the picket line. Troops from other Union corps were
marshalled as reinforcements. Artillerymen, manning
110 guns and 54 mortars, were alerted to begin shelling
the Confederate line. To assist the attack, Grant sent a
cavalry and infantry force north of the James to threaten
the Richmond defenses and destroy whatever they could
of the Virginia Central Railroad. The object was to draw
as many of Lee’s soldiers away from Petersburg as possible.
And it worked. When the assault came, only
18,000 Confederates were left to guard the city.</p>
<p>At 3:15 a.m., July 30, Pleasants lit the powder fuse
and mounted the parapet to see the results of his regiment’s
<span class="pb" id="Page_30">30</span>
work. The explosion was expected at 3:30 a.m.
Time passed slowly and the men, huddled behind the
lines, grew more apprehensive. By 4:15 there could be
no doubt that something had gone wrong. Two volunteers
from the 48th Regiment (Lt. Jacob Douty and Sgt.
Harry Reese) crawled into the tunnel and found that
the fuse had burned out at a splice. They relighted it
and scrambled to safety. Finally, at 4:40 a.m., the earth
trembled, and with one great roar, men, equipment, and
debris were hurled high into the air. At least 278
Confederate troops were killed or wounded in the tremendous
blast, and two of the four guns in the battery
were destroyed beyond repair. The crater torn by the
powder was at least 170 feet long, 60 to 80 feet wide,
and 30 feet deep.</p>
<p>The awesome spectacle of the mine explosion caused a
delay in the Union charge following the explosion. Removal
of obstructions between the lines caused further
delay. Soon, however, an advance was made to the crater,
where many of the attacking force paused to seek
shelter on its steep slopes or to look at the havoc caused
by the mine. The hard-pressed Confederates rallied
quickly and soon were pouring shells and minié balls
into their opponents. Union reinforcements poured into
the breach; but, instead of going forward, they either
joined their comrades in the crater or branched out to
the immediate right and left along the lines. By 8:30
that morning a large part of the IX Corps had been
poured into the captured enemy salient. More than
15,000 troops now milled in and about the crater.</p>
<p>By prompt action and determined effort the Confederates
had prevented a breakthrough. The attention of
three batteries was soon directed on the bluecoats at the
crater. Artillery hammered with shot and shell the huddled
groups of increasingly demoralized men. In addition,
mortars brought to within 50 yards of the crater
dropped shells on the soldiers with deadly effect.</p>
<p>Successful as these devices were in halting the Union
advance, Lee was aware that an infantry charge would
be necessary to dislodge the enemy. By 6 a.m. an order
had gone out to Brig. Gen. William Mahone to move two
brigades of his division from the lines south of Petersburg
<span class="pb" id="Page_31">31</span>
to the defense of the threatened position; Mahone
had anticipated the order and already had his troops in
motion. Then Lee joined Beauregard in observing the
battle from the Gee house, 500 yards to the rear of the
scene of action.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig18"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg14.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="663" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Colonel Pleasants’ sketch of the Crater.</i></p> </div>
<br/><i>Outline of Crater.</i>
<br/><i>Course of Confederate Works.</i>
<br/><i>S & E</i>
<br/><i>Magazines.</i>
<p>In spite of the Confederate resistance, part of the Northern
black division and other regiments had, by 8 a.m.,
advanced a short distance beyond their companions at
the crater. Shortly thereafter, Mahone’s lead Confederate
brigade arrived on the scene. The men filed into a
ravine about 200 yards northwest of the crater and
between it and Petersburg. No sooner had they entered
this protected position than, perceiving the danger to
their lines, they charged across the open field into the
mass of Federal soldiers. Although outnumbered, they
<span class="pb" id="Page_32">32</span>
forced the Northerners to flee back to the comparative
shelter of the crater. Then they swept on to regain a
portion of the line north of the Union-held position.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig19"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg15.jpg" alt="" width-obs="1000" height-obs="643" /> <p class="pcap"><i>To many soldiers, the explosion of the mine and the bitter Battle of the Crater that followed were the most memorable events of the siege. Artist A. R. Waud
sketched the explosion from the Union lines.</i></p>
</div>
<p>By 10:30 another of Mahone’s brigades had reached the
point of danger, and it charged the Union troops holding
the crater, only to be repulsed. Meanwhile, the lot of
the Northern soldiers was rapidly becoming unbearable.
Confederate artillery continued to beat upon them. The
closely packed troops (dead, dying, and living indiscriminately
mixed) lacked shade from the blazing sun, food,
water and, above all, competent leadership. Meade had
ordered their withdrawal more than an hour before the
second Confederate charge, but Burnside delayed the
transmission of the order till after midday. Many men
had chosen to run the gantlet of fire back to their own
lines, but others remained clinging to the protective
sides of the crater.</p>
<p>The last scene in the battle occurred shortly after 1 p.m.
<span class="pb" id="Page_33">33</span>
Mahone had called up a third brigade, and an attack
spearheaded by the fresh unit succeeded in gaining the
slopes of the crater. Some of the Union men, overcome
with exhaustion and realizing the helplessness of their
situation, surrendered; but others continued to fight. At
one point where resistance centered, the Confederates
put their hats on ramrods and lifted them over the rim
of the crater. The caps were promptly torn to shreds by
a volley of minié balls. Before their foe could reload,
Mahone’s forces jumped into the crater where a desperate
struggle with bayonets, rifle butts, and fists ensued.</p>
<p>Soon it was all over. The Union army had lost more
than 4,000 men killed, wounded, or captured, as against
about 1,500 for the Confederates. Again, as on June
15-18, a frontal assault had failed to take the Confederate
stronghold, even though Union numerical strength
greatly exceeded that of the Confederates. At the
battle’s close Grant had more than 83,000 men south
of the Appomattox River; Lee had about 22,000.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_34">34</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig20"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg16.jpg" alt="" width-obs="898" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>What 8,000 pounds of powder could do—the crater as it appeared in 1865.
The Union soldier seated at
the end of the tunnel gives
an idea of the crater’s size.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_36">36</div>
<h2 id="c7"><span class="small">FIGHT FOR THE WELDON RAILROAD</span></h2>
<p>Grant, if he reviewed the fruits of his campaign shortly
after July 30, could not have felt much comfort. Three
hammering blows delivered against Petersburg had
failed. Moreover, two important railroads still connected
the city with the South. Lee, despite his numerically
inferior numbers, was still able to maintain a long line
of defenses around Petersburg and Richmond. Farther
south, the Union outlook was brighter. Ten days before
the Battle of the Crater, final operations against Atlanta
had been begun by Sherman. On September 2 it was to
fall, and the march to the sea followed in 10 weeks.</p>
<p>Yet it was equally certain that Grant had accomplished
an important objective. By committing Lee’s weakened
but still potent Army of Northern Virginia to a defensive
position in the area adjacent to Richmond, he was
immobilizing the South’s most powerful striking force.
Moreover, the Union failure at the crater decided the
future direction of the campaign to capture Petersburg.
All Grant’s energy now turned to extending his siege
lines around the city and cutting Lee’s supply lines in
an attempt to force him out of his defenses.</p>
<p>The first step taken in this direction after July 30 was a
strong effort to capture the Weldon Railroad, which the
Confederates had so nearly lost in June. On August 16,
Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, Union V Corps commander,
received orders to attack, occupy, and hold the
Weldon Railroad 3 miles below the city.</p>
<p>The seizure of the objective was quickly accomplished
on August 18, the opening day of battle. More than a
mile of track near Globe Tavern, an old colonial inn,
was soon in Union hands. Then Warren marched most of
his troops northward toward the city. They were in unfamiliar
and heavily wooded terrain where they were
assailed by two Confederate brigades led by Maj. Gen.
Henry Heth. The Union troops were forced to fall back
a short distance and entrench. Here the V Corps was
reinforced by the IX Corps.</p>
<p>On the afternoon of the 19th, five brigades of Lt. Gen.
A. P. Hill’s Corps struck the Union infantry. Three of
the brigades under Mahone managed to slip in behind
their opponents by taking advantage of the concealment
offered by the heavy growth of trees. They inflicted
<span class="pb" id="Page_37">37</span>
serious losses and captured 2,500 prisoners. By nightfall,
Warren had been forced back one-half mile nearer
his new headquarters at Globe Tavern.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig21"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg17.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="678" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Globe Tavern, near the Weldon Railroad. During the Battle for the Weldon
Railroad, August 18-21,
1864, this building was
headquarters for Maj. Gen.
Gouverneur K. Warren’s
V Corps.</i></p>
</div>
<p>August 20 was marked by comparative inactivity, although
there was some skirmishing in the morning.
Throughout the following day A. P. Hill, who had received
reinforcements, threw his men at the Union
positions around the tavern. The attacks were in vain,
for the new Union lines held. General Lee arrived with
more infantry brigades during the afternoon, but after
discussing the situation with his generals, he determined
not to renew the attack. By the end of the day Lee
realized that the upper portion of the Weldon Railroad
had been lost and that any attempt to regain it would be
a needless sacrifice of manpower.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_38">38</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig22"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg18.jpg" alt="" width-obs="1000" height-obs="385" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Petersburg’s hungry defenders were delighted when Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton’s Confederate horsemen rustled more than 2,000 cattle from the Union
army in September 1864. Alfred Waud sketched the
raid for</i> <b>Harper’s Weekly.</b></p>
</div>
<p>One sentence from a dispatch sent by Lee to the
Confederate Secretary of War on August 22 shows the
seriousness of the loss of the railroad: “Our supply of
corn is exhausted today, and I am informed that the
small reserve in Richmond is consumed.” For a time the
Confederate government was able to utilize the Weldon
Railroad as far as Stony Creek, 20 miles below Petersburg,
where supplies were transferred to wagons and
hauled around the left of the Northern army to Petersburg
and Richmond. In December the railroad line was
destroyed below Stony Creek and henceforth the beleaguered
cities had only two direct rail communications
with the South—the Richmond and Danville Railroad
out of Richmond and the Southside from Petersburg.</p>
<p>On August 25, 2 days after the fighting at Globe Tavern
had ended, the Confederates scored a minor victory
with a surprise attack. Their blow was aimed at Hancock’s
II Corps busily engaged in destroying railroad
tracks at Reams Station, nearly 5 miles below Globe
<span class="pb" id="Page_39">39</span>
Tavern. The II Corps, containing large numbers of inexperienced
recruits, was badly beaten and more than
1,700 were taken prisoner. The Southern victory was
shortlived, for the destruction of their rail communications
was continued. The best that Lee could hope for in
the future would be to stem the Federal advance.</p>
<p>In mid-September, Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton, cavalry
commander of the Army of Northern Virginia since J.
E. B. Stuart’s death in May, led a remarkable raid of
4,000 mounted troops around the rear of the Union
army, now numbering 80,000. He succeeded in returning
to Petersburg on September 17 with about 2,400
head of cattle and more than 300 prisoners, while suffering
losses of only 61 men in two engagements with the
enemy. Although this raised the morale of the Confederates,
it did not change the course of the campaign. The
iron band being forged outside their city was a reality,
and Grant, a tenacious man, had not loosened his grip.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_40">40</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig23"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg19.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="590" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Federal soldiers in the trenches before Petersburg. By 1864, most of the men
of the Armies of the Potomac
and the James were veteran
combat soldiers, but the
strain of siege warfare
eventually affected even the
most hardened of them.
“It was hell itself,” one
soldier recalled, “and it is
wondrous to me that so many
of us survived the event.”</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_41">41</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig24"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg19b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="492" height-obs="254" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Constructing gabions for the attack on Petersburg. When filled with earth, these
cylindrical, basket-like
objects offered strong
protection against enemy fire.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig25"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg19d.jpg" alt="" width-obs="494" height-obs="244" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Federal pickets in front of Union Fort Sedgwick, opposite Confederate Fort
Mahone. Note how the
gabions are being used.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig26"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg19e.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="224" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Rifled siege guns in Union Battery IV. Fire from this battery helped to seal off the Confederate breakthrough at Fort Stedman in March 1865.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig27"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg19g.jpg" alt="" width-obs="1000" height-obs="394" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Capt. James H. Cooper’s Battery, 1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, V Corps. While the men were standing to their guns to have this picture taken, a Confederate
battery, thinking the Federals were preparing to fire,
opened up on them. The famous Civil War photographer Mathew B.
Brady is standing with hands in pocket beside the trail of the second gun.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_42">42</div>
<h2 id="c8"><span class="small">UNION ENCIRCLEMENT CONTINUES</span></h2>
<p>The relentless westerly advance of the besieging force
was soon resumed after the capture of the Weldon Railroad
in August. Constant skirmishing occurred between
the lines until, in late September, Grant struck again.</p>
<p>The Battle of Peebles’ Farm, September 29 to October
1, was really the second section of a two-part struggle.
The first took place closer to Richmond and was
directed at Fort Harrison, a strongly fortified point on
the outer defense line of the Confederate capital. Fort
Harrison was approximately midway between Richmond
and Petersburg. On the morning of September
29, Union troops advanced and captured the fort and
held it the next day against a counterattack by the
former occupants. At the same time, Meade was moving
toward a further encirclement of Petersburg with more
than 20,000 troops. The direction of his attack was
northwest toward Confederate earthworks along the
Squirrel Level Road. The ultimate goal was the capture
of the Southside Railroad.</p>
<p>Fighting began on the 29th as the Federal vanguard
approached the Confederates in the vicinity of Peebles’
farm. The engagement increased in fury on the 30th and
continued into the next day. When the smoke of battle
had blown away on October 2, Meade had extended the
Union left flank 3 miles farther west and had secured
the ground on which Fort Fisher would soon be built.
(This fort was to be the Union’s biggest and was one of
the largest earthen forts in Civil War history.) He was,
however, stopped short of the coveted Southside Railroad.
Against the gain in territory the Union army had
suffered a loss of more than 1,300 prisoners to the
Confederacy and more than 650 killed and wounded.
The Southerners found that their lines, while unbroken,
were again extended. Each extension meant a thinner
Confederate defense line.</p>
<p>For a period of about 3 weeks after the Battle of
Peebles’ Farm, the shovel and pick again replaced the
rifle-musket as the principal tools for soldiers on both
sides. Forts were built, breastworks dug, and gabions
constructed. Then, on October 27, the Union troops
moved again. This time they turned toward the Boydton
Plank Road and a stream known as Hatcher’s Run, 12
<span class="pb" id="Page_43">43</span>
miles southwest of Petersburg. Again Grant’s objective
was Lee’s vital supply line—the Southside Railroad.</p>
<div class="fig"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg20.jpg" alt="Map." width-obs="800" height-obs="480" /></div>
<br/><span class="ss">JULY 30, 1864. The Crater. Union Attempt to Capture Petersburg by Surprise Failed.</span>
<br/><span class="ss">SEPT. 29-OCT. 1, 1864. Battle of Peebles’ Farm. Union Lines Pushed West of the Weldon R.R.</span>
<br/><span class="ss">AUGUST 18-21, 1864. Union Troops Capture the Weldon R.R.</span>
<p>The general plan of operations was nearly the same as
that used at Peebles’ farm. Butler’s Army of the James
was ordered to threaten attack in front of Richmond.
Meanwhile, at the left of the Union line, nearly 43,000
infantry and cavalry of the Army of the Potomac started
for the Boydton Plank Road. The columns made rapid
progress, driving the enemy outposts ahead of them and
advancing until they neared Burgess’ Mill where the
Boydton Plank Road crossed Hatcher’s Run.</p>
<p>Near Burgess’ Mill, heavy Confederate opposition was
met and a spirited engagement took place. The failure of
Union Generals Hancock of the II Corps and Warren of
the V Corps to coordinate the efforts of their respective
columns, coupled with a slashing thrust by Heth’s infantry
and dogged resistance by Hampton’s cavalry and
<span class="pb" id="Page_44">44</span>
horse-artillery, resulted in a speedy Northern withdrawal.
The Boydton Plank Road, for a time at least,
remained in Southern hands, and Grant’s encircling
movement to cut Lee’s railroad was checked.</p>
<p>The approach of winter made any large-scale effort by
either side less probable, although daily skirmishes and
tightening of the siege lines continued. The slackening of
hostile action was used to good advantage by Union and
Confederate alike, as it had been in the previous respites
between battles, in the strengthening of the battlelines
and efforts to develop some rudimentary comforts in the
cheerless camps. Throughout the last 2 months of 1864
and the 1st month of the new year there were no strong
efforts by either side before Petersburg; picket duty,
sniping, and patrolling prevailed. The only action out of
the trenches was the Hicksford Raid in December when
a strong Union force destroyed the Weldon Railroad as
far as Hicksford, about 40 miles south of Petersburg.
Lee now had a 35-mile front, with the left resting on the
Williamsburg Road east of Richmond and the right on
Hatcher’s Run southwest of Petersburg. To hold this
long line he had in December an effective troop strength
of only 66,533. Facing these undernourished and ragged
soldiers were, according to official Union returns of the
same month, 110,364 well-fed and equipped Federals.</p>
<p>The picture throughout the rest of the South was no
more reassuring to Confederate sympathizers. In the
Shenandoah Valley, northwest of Richmond, Maj. Gen.
Philip H. Sheridan’s army had finally crushed Lt. Gen.
Jubal A. Early’s Southern forces at Cedar Creek on
October 19 and was destroying the scattered resistance
that remained. Far to the southwest, Sherman had captured
Atlanta, Ga., in September, and Savannah had
surrendered on December 21. As the new year dawned,
his army was prepared to march north toward Grant.
To complete the gloomy Southern prospects, Fort
Fisher, guardian bastion of Wilmington, N.C., the last
of the Confederacy’s Atlantic coast ports to remain
open, was under fatal bombardment by mid-January.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_45">45</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig28"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg21.jpg" alt="" width-obs="361" height-obs="800" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Not everyone was shooting all the time. Often only handpicked sharpshooters traded shots from the trenches and tried to pick off each other’s artillerymen.
An artist caught these men of the Federal XVIII Corps
at their daily, deadly business.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_46">46</div>
<p>In late January, President Jefferson Davis, hoping that
peace might be made with the Union, agreed to send
commissioners to meet with President Lincoln. The
Peace Commissioners, on January 31, 1865, crossed
over to the Union lines at Petersburg. Soldiers of both
armies, suspecting their mission, cheered as the commissioners
slowly walked over the scarred earth of the crater
battlefield. At Hampton Roads they met Lincoln, but
the “Peace Conference” ended in failure; Davis’ insistence
on Southern independence as a condition for peace
brought about the impasse. The war continued.</p>
<p>The Battle of Hatcher’s Run on February 5-7, 1865,
was the result of a further drive by the Federals in their
attempt to encircle Petersburg. Two Union corps (the
II and V), reinforced by a cavalry division and elements
of the VI Corps, advanced across Hatcher’s Run.
Their immediate objective was the Boydton Plank Road.</p>
<p>As had happened before, the Confederates quickly
moved out to engage the Union columns. On the afternoon
of the 5th, and again the next day, the Southerners
counterattacked. While many Confederate units displayed
their customary élan, others did not. There were
several reasons for this: the inferior numbers of the
Southern army, the extremely bad weather which made
a Union attack appear unlikely, the ravages of cold on
badly equipped and poorly uniformed men, and, most
important, the breakdown of the food supply system.</p>
<p>The only Federal units to reach the Boydton Plank
Road belonged to the cavalry, but in view of the
Confederate response and the discovery that General
Lee was not utilizing this road to supply his army, they
were recalled. Consequently, no effort was made to
hold the Boydton Plank Road, but the Federals did
occupy and fortify the newly extended line to Hatcher’s
Run at a point 3 miles below Burgess’ Mill. Thus, again
the Union lines had been pushed to the west, and, as
before, Lee was forced to lengthen his defenses. The
Petersburg-Richmond front, with its recent extension,
now stretched over 37 miles, and the army holding it
had dwindled through casualties and desertion to
slightly more than 56,000 on March 1, 1865.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_47">47</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig29"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg22.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="677" /> <p class="pcap"><i>One of the most impressive oddities of the siege was Poplar Grove Church, built about
February 1865 by the 50th
New York Engineers to while
away their leisure hours.
It could seat 225 men and
was used for recreational
and religious purposes until
the regiment moved away to
take part in the pursuit of Lee.
The building was dismantled
in 1868. Today, Poplar Grove
Cemetery is on the site.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_48">48</div>
<p>The Battle of Hatcher’s Run was another fight in the
constant movement of the Union Army to the west after
June 18, 1864. In its relentless extension around Petersburg,
which continued day by day with the addition of a
few more feet or yards of picket line and rifle-pits, there
had occurred five important thrusts aimed by the Northern
leaders at encircling the city. They included two
attacks on the Weldon Railroad, in June and August
1864; Peebles’ Farm, in September and October; Boydton
Plank Road, in October; and, finally, the move to
Hatcher’s Run in February 1865. They met with varying
degrees of success, but still the Union noose was
not drawn tightly enough.</p>
<p>The enlisted men of both armies, however, remained
largely unaware of the strategy of their commanders.
Their daily existence during the campaign took on a
marked flavor, different in many respects from the more
dashing engagements which preceded it. Too often war
is a combination of bloodshed and boredom, and Petersburg,
unlike most other military operations of the Civil
War, had more than its share of the latter. The Petersburg
episode—assault and resistance—dragged on to
become the longest unbroken campaign against a single
American city in the history of the United States. The
romantic and heroic exploits were relatively few, and
between them came long stretches of uninspiring and
backbreaking routine.</p>
<p>The men of both sides had much in common, despite
the bitterness with which they fought. In battle they
were enemies, but in camp they were on the same common
level. Stripped of the emotional tension and exhilaration
of combat they all appear as bored, war-weary,
homesick men. The greater part of their time was primarily
utilized by digging and constructing fortifications,
performing sentry and picket duty, and striving
to speed up the long succession of days. They lived in
rude improvised shelters, often made of mud and log
walls with tent roofs. Chimneys were made of mud and
barrels. There was some friendly interchange of words
and gifts between the lines, but enmity was more rampant
than brotherly regard. Off duty, the amusements
and pastimes of the soldiers were simple and few—limited
in most cases to their ability to improvise them. The
most striking difference between the armies as the Petersburg
campaign lengthened was that, while the
Northerners suffered most from boredom, the Confederates
were plagued by the demoralizing effects of hunger.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_49">49</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig30"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg23.jpg" alt="" width-obs="358" height-obs="801" /> <p class="pcap"><i>In late 1864, with food and supplies dwindling, desertion in the Confederate
ranks became a major
problem. This Southern
cavalryman, completely
discouraged and in rags, was
one of those who crossed
the lines to surrender.
By early 1865, more than
2,000 Confederates had
followed his example. One
Union officer concluded that
“if we stay here, the
Johnnies will all come over
before the 4th of July.”</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_50">50</div>
<p class="pcap"><i>During the Civil War, a
handful of “special artists”
followed the Federal armies
to supply glimpses of soldier
life to news- and picture-hungry
readers of such popular
publications as the</i> <b>New York
Illustrated News, Harper’s
Weekly,</b> <i>and</i> <b>Frank Leslie’s
Illustrated Newspaper.</b> <i>Artists
Edwin Forbes and the Waud
brothers, Alfred and William,
caught these scenes during
the siege of Petersburg.</i></p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig31"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg24.jpg" alt="" width-obs="1000" height-obs="528" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Pickets trading between the lines. At quiet moments, opposing pickets sometimes
met between the lines to trade
coffee, tobacco, newspapers,
and trinkets.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig32"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg24a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="273" /> <p class="pcap"><i>The wagon camp at night. Necessary but thankless was the task of the teamsters,
those thousands of soldiers
and civilians who drove the
supply wagons from the
railroads and ships to the
front line. Theirs may have
been a relatively safe job,
but a bone-wearying one.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig33"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg24b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="286" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Pennsylvania soldiers voting, 1864. Volunteers considered themselves citizens
first, soldiers second. These
men, and thousands like
them, took time out from
their deadly work to vote in
the Presidential election,
doubtless, as the campaign
song ran, “For Lincoln and
Liberty, too.”</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_51">51</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig34"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg24e.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="615" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Bivouac in the rifle-pits. Life in the infantry line was anything but pleasant:
steaming, stinking mud in
summer, frozen muck in
winter. These soldiers
of the V Corps built
wood-and-canvas “shebangs”
over their trenches as
protection against the elements.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_52">52</div>
<div class="fig"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg25.jpg" alt="Map." width-obs="1000" height-obs="559" /></div>
<br/><span class="ss">OCTOBER 27, 1864. Battle of Boydton Plank Road. Union Drive Toward the Southside R.R. Turned Back</span>
<br/><span class="ss">FEBRUARY 5-7, 1865. Union Troops Extend Line to Hatcher’s Run</span>
<br/><span class="ss">MARCH 25, 1865. Fort Stedman. Confederate Offensive Fails</span>
<br/><span class="ss">APRIL 1, 1865. Battle of Five Forks. Union Victory Opens Way to Southside R.R.</span>
<br/><span class="ss">APRIL 2, 1865. Union Forces Break Through Outer Defenses of City and Reach Appomattox River</span>
<br/><span class="ss">NIGHT OF APRIL 2-3, 1865. Confederates Evacuate Petersburg and Retreat West.</span>
<br/><span class="ss">Union Troops Enter City Morning of April 3</span>
<br/><span class="ss">Union Army Sets Out in Immediate Pursuit of The Confederates on April 3</span>
<br/><span class="ss">FORT GREGG</span>
<br/><span class="ss">FORT MAHONE</span>
<br/><span class="ss">FORT SEDGWICK</span>
<br/><span class="ss">FORT FISHER</span>
<p>The Petersburg campaign was grim business. Amusements
could lighten the heart for only a brief time at
best. Ever present were the mud and disease which followed
every Civil War camp. Both opposing forces felt
the chill of winter and the penetrating rain. The discouragement
<span class="pb" id="Page_53">53</span>
of the homesick, who never knew when, or if,
they would return to their homes, was a hardship not
peculiar to any rank. However, when spring came to
warm the air, there was a difference between the two
opposing armies. It was more than a numerical superiority.
Then the Union soldiers felt confidence, while the
Southern veterans, ill-clothed, ill-fed, and nearly surrounded,
knew only despair.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_54">54</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig35"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg26.jpg" alt="" width-obs="1000" height-obs="494" /> <p class="pcap"><i>From June 1864 until April 1865, City Point was the “busiest place in Dixie.” While Lee’s outnumbered Confederates fought and starved behind their slowly
crumbling defenses at Petersburg, here, just 8 miles
away, Grant built up one of the largest supply depots
of the Civil War which, during the 10 months of its
existence, kept his army the best-fed, best-clothed, and
best-munitioned in the field.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_56">56</div>
<p class="pcap"><i>1-4. Scenes at City Point, Va., showing some of the
supplies and munitions destined for Grant’s army.
An Episcopal bishop from Atlanta, visiting Grant at
City Point, was awed by the abundance of military stores
that he saw—“not merely profusion, but extravagance;
wagons, tents, artillery, ad libitum. Soldiers provided
with everything.”</i></p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig36"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg27.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="278" /> <p class="pcap"><i>1</i></p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig37"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg27a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="182" /> <p class="pcap"><i>2</i></p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig38"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg27b.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="303" /> <p class="pcap"><i>3</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_57">57</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig39"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg27e.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="413" /> <p class="pcap"><i>4</i></p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig40"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg27g.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="769" /> <p class="pcap"><i>On August 9, 1864, a Confederate spy slipped a time bomb on board one of
the ammunition barges
tied up at City Point. The
bomb’s explosion, sketched
by A. R. Waud, killed or
wounded 200 people and
demolished more than 600
feet of warehouses and about
180 feet of wharf. Grant
himself was shaken up by
the blast, and one of his staff
members was wounded.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_58">58</div>
<h2 id="c9"><span class="small">LEE’S LAST GAMBLE</span></h2>
<p>By mid-March 1865 the climax of the campaign, and of
the war, was close at hand. Lee’s forces in both Richmond
and Petersburg had dwindled to about 55,000.
Grant, on the other hand, had available, or within easy
march, at least 150,000. Moreover, Sheridan, having
destroyed the remnants of Early’s forces at Waynesboro,
Va., on March 2, had cleared the Shenandoah
Valley of Confederates and was now free to rejoin
Grant before Petersburg.</p>
<p>Everywhere Lee turned, the military situation was black.
Union forces under Sherman, driving the Confederates
before them, had turned north from Savannah and were
now hammering Johnston’s forces in North Carolina.
With President Jefferson Davis’ consent, Lee sent a letter
to General Grant on March 2 suggesting an interview.
In the early morning hours of the second day following
the dispatch of the letter, Lee and Maj. Gen. John B.
Gordon discussed the three possible solutions to the
problem which perplexed them: (1) Try to negotiate
satisfactory peace terms. (This had already been acted
upon in Lee’s note to Grant.) (2) Retreat from Richmond
and Petersburg and unite with Johnston for a final
stand. (3) Attack Grant in order to facilitate retreat.</p>
<p>There followed a series of interviews with Confederate
government officials in Richmond. Each of the plans
was analyzed. The first was quickly dropped when Grant
made it clear that he was not empowered to negotiate.
Nor was the second proposal, that of retreat, deemed
advisable by President Davis who wished to strike one
more blow before surrendering his capital. This left only
the third alternative—to attack.</p>
<p>Before settling on a definite course of action, however,
Lee ordered General Gordon to make a reconnaissance
of the Federal lines around Petersburg to see if they
could be broken anywhere. Gordon soon reported that
the best place for an attack was at Fort Stedman, a
Union work located near the City Point and Petersburg
Railroad and only 150 yards to the east of a strongly
fortified Confederate position named Colquitt’s Salient.
Lee agreed with Gordon’s assessment and, on the night of
March 23, told Gordon to make preparations for an
attack on the fort.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_59">59</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig41"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg28.jpg" alt="" width-obs="563" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>In Petersburg, sometime in the autumn of 1864, Lee was photographed on his horse Traveller for the first time. Although determined to fight on until all hope was gone,
already Lee knew the war was going badly and that his
tired, hungry, dirty, and cold soldiers could not hold
out for long against Grant’s growing might.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_60">60</div>
<p>About one-half of the besieged army would be used to
charge the Union line in the vicinity of Fort Stedman. It
was hoped that this would cause Grant to shorten his
front by withdrawing his left flank to protect his endangered
right. Then Lee could detach a portion of the
Confederate army to send to the aid of Johnston as,
with shorter lines, he would not need as many men in
Petersburg. Should the attack fail, he would attempt to
retreat with all his forces for a final stand with Johnston.
This would be the last desperate gamble of the Army of
Northern Virginia.</p>
<p>The details for the attack were worked out by Gordon.
During the night preceding the assault, the obstructions
before the Confederate lines were to be removed and
the Union pickets overcome as quietly as possible. A
group of 50 men were to remove the chevaux-de-frise
and abatis protecting Fort Stedman; then three companies
of 100 men each were to charge and capture the
fort. When Stedman was safely in Confederate hands,
these men were to pretend they were Union troops and,
forming into three columns, were to rush to the rear to
capture other positions.</p>
<p>The next step was to send a division of infantry to gain
possession of the siege lines north and south of the
fallen bastion. When the breach had been sufficiently
widened, Southern cavalry were to rush through and
destroy telegraphic communication with Grant’s headquarters
at City Point. They were also ordered to cut
the military railroad. Additional reserves were to follow
the cavalry.</p>
<p>The attack was scheduled for the morning of March 25.
The 50 axmen and the 300 soldiers who were to make
up the advance columns were given strips of white cloth
to wear across their chests to tell friend from foe. The
officers in charge were given the names of Union officers
known to be in the vicinity and were told to shout their
assumed names if challenged. Beginning about 3 a.m.,
Confederates professing to be deserters crossed to the
Union pickets offering to surrender. Their purpose:
to be near at hand to overwhelm the unsuspecting
pickets when the attack began.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_61">61</div>
<p>At 4 a.m. Gordon gave the signal, and the Confederates
sprang forward. At first the attack went as planned.
Blue-clad pickets were silenced so effectively that not a
shot was fired. Union obstructions were quickly hewn
down by the axmen, and the small vanguard of 300
swept through Battery No. X which stood immediately
north of Fort Stedman. They then rushed into the fort;
the occupants were completely surprised and many surrendered
without a fight. Battery XI to the south of Fort
Stedman was also soon in Confederate hands. Union
resistance in this early stage was ineffective, although
Battery XI was recaptured for a short time.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig42"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg29.jpg" alt="" width-obs="557" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon planned and led the March 25 attack on Fort Stedman, one of the most advanced works on the Union line.</i></p>
</div>
<p>More Confederates pressed into the torn line. While
three columns set out in the general direction of City
Point and along the Prince George Court House Road
behind Stedman, other infantry units moved north and
south along the Federal emplacements. To the north,
they captured the fortifications as far as Battery IX
where they were stopped by the Union defenders; to the
south, they progressed as far as the ramparts of Fort
Haskell. A desperate struggle ensued, but here, too, the
<span class="pb" id="Page_62">62</span>
Northerners refused to yield. Despite these checks, the
Confederates were now in possession of almost 1 mile of
the Union line.</p>
<p>In the center of the Confederate attack, the three small
columns quickly advanced as far as Harrison’s Creek—a
small stream which winds its way north to the Appomattox
River 650 yards behind Fort Stedman. One of
the columns succeeded in crossing the stream and continuing
toward a small Union artillery post on the site of
what had been Confederate Battery 8 (renamed Fort
Friend by the Federals), but canister from the post
forced the column back to the creek. Confusion took
hold of the Confederates who were unable to locate the
positions they had been ordered to capture behind the
Union line. Artillery fire from Northern guns on a ridge
to the east held them on the banks of Harrison’s Creek.
By 6 a.m. their forward momentum had been checked.</p>
<div class="fig"> id="fig43"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg30.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="437" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Advancing from Colquitt’s Salient (above), Gordon’s men captured Fort Stedman (below) but were driven out by a murderous crossfire from Federal artillery. In the assault, some 4,000
Confederates were killed, wounded, or captured.</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg30a.jpg" alt="Fort Stedman." width-obs="600" height-obs="508" /></div>
<p>Union infantry then charged from the ridge to attack the
Southerners. The forces joined battle along Harrison’s
Creek and the Confederates were soon forced back to
Fort Stedman. For a brief time they held their newly
captured positions. At 7:30 a.m. Brig. Gen. John F.
Hartranft advanced on them with a division of Northern
<span class="pb" id="Page_63">63</span>
troops. Heavy small-arms and artillery fire on Gordon’s
men threatened them with annihilation unless they retired
to their own lines. About 8 a.m., Gordon received
an order from Lee to withdraw his men. The order was
quickly dispatched across the open fields to the soldiers
in the captured Union works. By now, however, the line
of retreat was raked by a vicious crossfire and many
Confederates preferred surrender to withdrawal. About
the same time Gordon was starting back, Hartranft ordered
his division of Pennsylvania troops to recapture
Fort Stedman. Within a few moments the Union line
was completely restored and the forlorn Southern hope
of a successful disruption of Northern communications,
followed by secret withdrawal from the city, was lost.
Equally bad, if not worse, to the Confederates was the
loss of more than 4,000 killed, wounded, and captured
as compared to the Union casualties of less than 1,500.</p>
<p>Of the three Confederate plans of action before the
Battle of Fort Stedman, now only the second—retreat—was
possible. The situation demanded immediate
action, for, even as Gordon had been preparing on
March 24 to launch his attack, Grant had been engaged
in planning more difficulties for the harassed
defenders of Petersburg.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_64">64</div>
<h2 id="c10"><span class="small">FIVE FORKS: BEGINNING OF THE END</span></h2>
<p>The coming of better weather heralded the opportunity
for the final blows against the city. Grant, who was now
passing some of the most anxious moments of his life,
planned that this effort should be concentrated on the
extreme right of the long Confederate line which protected
Richmond and Petersburg. This meant that hostilities
would soon commence somewhere west of Hatcher’s
Run, perhaps in the neighborhood of Dinwiddie
Court House or a road junction called Five Forks which
lay 17 miles southwest of Petersburg. On March 24,
Grant ordered the II and IX Corps and three divisions
of the Army of the James to the extreme left of the
Union lines facing Lee. This resulted in a strong concentration
northeast of Hatcher’s Run. Two days later Sheridan
arrived at City Point, fresh from his victorious
campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, and was ordered to
join his troops to those concentrated on the left. Finally,
it began to appear that the Army of Northern Virginia
was to be encircled.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Lee was waiting only until he collected supplies
and rations to last his men for a week and until the
roads were passable before leaving to join Johnston. He
hoped to leave on or about April 10. The information
he received about the rapid accumulation of Union
forces opposite his lightly held right was very disturbing,
for, if it was true, the Federals not only threatened to cut
off his retreat to the west and south, but they also posed
a serious danger to the Southside Railroad—the last
remaining communication link between Petersburg and
the South, which continued to deliver a trickle of supplies
to the city.</p>
<p>On March 29 the Union troops moved out. Sheridan’s
cavalry crossed the Rowanty Creek and occupied Dinwiddie
Court House, while the II and V Corps crossed
Hatcher’s Run. In moving into position on the left of the
II Corps, Warren’s V Corps soldiers encountered heavy
resistance north of Gravelly Run. While Sheridan was
marshaling his troops around Dinwiddie, Lee issued orders
on March 29 which sent Maj. Gens. George E.
Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee to the Confederate right near
Five Forks, far beyond Petersburg.</p>
<p>Sheridan was prepared to move against the Confederates
<span class="pb" id="Page_65">65</span>
with his cavalry on March 30, but heavy rains
lasting from the evening of March 29 until the morning
of the 31st made a large-scale movement impracticable
over the muddy roads. On the last day of the month,
part of Sheridan’s forces which has pushed northwest
toward Five Forks was attacked by Southern forces
which succeeded in driving them back to Dinwiddie
Court House, where Sheridan had a fresh division.
Pickett then found his men badly outnumbered and
withdrew them to Five Forks without pressing the
advantage he had gained. This incident, called the Battle
of Dinwiddie Court House, was a minor Confederate
victory, although Sheridan’s men were neither demoralized
nor disorganized by the attack, and Robert E. Lee
could find small comfort in the situation.</p>
<div class="fig"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg31.jpg" alt="Map, Five Forks." width-obs="800" height-obs="439" /></div>
<p>Meanwhile, there had been a savage clash on White
Oak Road between Warren’s V Corps and Maj. Gen.
Bushrod Johnson’s Confederate division. The Confederates
at first swept all before them, but in the end numbers
<span class="pb" id="Page_66">66</span>
told and they were compelled to withdraw behind
their breastworks.</p>
<p>The Confederates had been able to concentrate on their
extreme right in the vicinity of Five Forks only about
10,000 cold and hungry soldiers to meet the expected
Union drive to turn their right flank. Massed
against this force commanded by Pickett were about
10,000 Northern cavalry and 12,000 infantry. The
desperate urgency of General Lee’s fears was indicated
in the dispatch he sent to Pickett early on April 1, the
day of the struggle for Five Forks: “<i>Hold Five Forks at
all hazards.</i> Protect road to Ford’s Depot and prevent
Union forces from striking the south-side railroad. Regret
exceedingly your forced withdrawal, and your inability
to hold the advantage you had gained.”</p>
<p>Throughout April 1, Pickett’s troops worked unceasingly,
erecting barricades of logs and earth around Five
Forks. About 4 p.m., with only 2 hours of daylight
remaining, Sheridan’s cavalry and Warren’s infantry attacked.
While the cavalry occupied the attention of the
Confederate defenders along White Oak Road, divisions
of infantrymen from the V Corps moved to the
left of Pickett’s troops and, after crossing the White Oak
Road which connected Five Forks with Petersburg, hit
them on the weakly held left flank. Lacking sufficient
artillery support, infantry reserves, and the presence of
their commander, the Southerners were quickly overcome.
Realizing that their position was no longer tenable,
portions of the Confederate troops tried to retreat
to Petersburg, but the avenue of escape had been cut by
the Union advance across the White Oak Road.</p>
<p>By dusk, the Battle of Five Forks had ended. Union
troops were in possession of the disputed area. They
had cut off and captured more than 3,200 prisoners,
while suffering a loss of probably less than 1,000.</p>
<p>Now the besieging forces were in position for the first
time to accomplish Grant’s objective of cutting Lee’s
supply lines and breaking through his fortifications. The
western end of Lee’s mobile defenses had crumbled.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_67">67</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig44"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg32.jpg" alt="" width-obs="500" height-obs="694" /> <p class="pcap"><i>When Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan (above) sent cavalry and infantry crashing into the Confederate right flank at Five Forks on April 1, 1865, the Southern
commander, Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett (below), was
at a shad bake in the rear. By the time Pickett
returned to his command, both it and the defense line
had crumbled. Suddenly, Petersburg was no longer
tenable. “It has happened as I told them in Richmond
it would happen,” said Lee. “The line has been
stretched until it is broken.”</i></p>
</div>
<div class="fig"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg32a.jpg" alt="Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett." width-obs="500" height-obs="622" /></div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_68">68</div>
<p>Those Confederates who had survived the Battle of Five
Forks had fallen back to the Southside Railroad where
they rallied for a stand, but darkness had prevented a
Union pursuit. Grant’s troops were within striking distance
of the rail line, located less than 3 miles from Five
Forks. Lee now knew that Petersburg and Richmond
must be evacuated without delay or the Army of Northern
Virginia would be completely cut off from outside
help and all possible escape routes would be gone.</p>
<p>The problem of assigning a proper significance to Five
Forks is a difficult one. It is now known that Lee and
the Confederate government officials were on the verge
of abandoning their capital. In June of the previous
year the Southside Railroad had been a most important
objective of the invading army, but the plight of
Lee’s army had grown so desperate during the intervening
months that whether the railroad remained open or
not mattered little. Grant, of course, did not know this
as a positive fact, although the uncomfortable situation
of his opponents was something of which he was doubtless
aware. The real importance of Five Forks lay in the
probability that, by making it more difficult for Lee to
escape, it brought the inevitable a little closer. Lt.
Col. Horace Porter, of Grant’s staff, was positive more
than 30 years later that news of Sheridan’s success
prompted the Union commander in chief to issue the
orders for the attack that carried the city.</p>
<h2 id="c11"><span class="small">FALL OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND</span></h2>
<p>Continuously throughout the night following the Battle
of Five Forks, the Union artillery played upon the
Confederate earthworks and dropped shells into the
city. Troops were prepared for a general assault ordered
for the following dawn. At 4:40 a.m., April 2, 1865, a
frontal attack began with the sound of a signal gun from
Fort Fisher. A heavy ground fog added to the confusion
as the Federals drove in the Confederate pickets, cut
away the abatis, and stormed over the works.</p>
<p>The story of the fighting along the Petersburg front on
that spring Sunday is one of Union success over stout
Confederate resistance. Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright’s
Union VI Corps broke through the works defended by
troops of A. P. Hill’s Corps and rolled up the Confederate
line to right and left, while several regiments
<span class="pb" id="Page_69">69</span>
rushed on toward the Southside Railroad. Other elements
of Grant’s army swept away the remnants of the
Confederate lines along Hatcher’s Run. General Hill
was killed early in the day by a Union soldier near the
Boydton Plank Road while on the way to rally his men
at Hatcher’s Run.</p>
<p>The desperateness of the Southern position was shown
when, about 10 a.m., Lee telegraphed President Davis
to inform him of the turn of events at Petersburg. The
message read: “I advise that all preparations be made
for leaving Richmond tonight.” Davis received the message
while attending Sunday services at St. Paul’s
Church. He left immediately, destroying the calm of
worship, to prepare for evacuating the capital. The flight
of the Confederate government was promptly begun.</p>
<p>By midday the entire outer line to the west of Petersburg
had been captured, with the exception of Fort
Gregg. The city was now completely surrounded except
to the north. The left of the Union line finally rested on
the bank of the Appomattox River after months of
strenuous effort.</p>
<p>It now became apparent to Lee that he must hold an
inner line west of Petersburg until nightfall, when it
would be possible for him to retreat from the city. While
gray-clad troops were forming along this line built on
the banks of Old Indian Town Creek, the defenders of
Fort Gregg put up a stubborn delaying action against
the Northern advance. Approximately 300 men and two
pieces of artillery met an onslaught of 5,000 Northerners.
The outcome of the struggle was determined by
the numbers in the attacking force, but the capture of
Fort Gregg occurred only after bitter hand-to-hand
combat. The purpose of the defense had been accomplished,
however, for a thin but sturdy line running behind
them from Battery 45 to the Appomattox River
had been manned. Temporarily, at least, street fighting
within Petersburg had been avoided.</p>
<p>Blows directed at other points, such as Fort Mahone
on the Jerusalem Plank Road, were slowed after troops
of Maj. Gen. John G. Parke’s IX Corps had captured
12 guns and 400 yards of the Confederate line to the
right and left of the road. Desperate counterattacks by
<span class="pb" id="Page_70">70</span>
Gordon’s Confederates kept the Federals from exploiting
this breakthrough. Yet there was no doubt in the minds
of Lee and other Southern leaders that all hope of retaining
Petersburg and Richmond was gone. It was obvious
that, if the lines held the Union army in check on
April 2, they must be surrendered on the morrow.
The object was to delay until evening, when retreat
would be possible.</p>
<p>The close of the day found the weary Confederates concentrating
within Petersburg and making all possible
plans to withdraw. Lee had issued the necessary instructions
at 5 o’clock that afternoon. By 8 p.m. the retreat
was under way, the artillery preceding the infantry
across the Appomattox River. Amelia Court House, 40
miles to the west, was designated as the assembly point
for the troops from Petersburg and Richmond.</p>
<p>Grant had ordered the assault on Petersburg to be renewed
early on April 3. It was discovered at 3 a.m. that
the Southern earthworks had been abandoned; an attack
was not necessary. Union troops took possession of the
city shortly after 4 o’clock in the morning. Richmond
officially surrendered 4 hours later.</p>
<p>President Lincoln, who had been in the vicinity of
Petersburg for more than a week, came from army
headquarters at City Point that same day for a brief
visit with Grant. They talked quietly on the porch
of a private house for 1½ hours before the President
returned to City Point. Grant, with all of his
army, except the detachments necessary to police
Petersburg and Richmond and to protect City Point,
set out in pursuit of Lee. He left Maj. Gen. George
L. Hartsuff in command at Petersburg.</p>
<p>Petersburg had fallen, but it was at a heavy price. In the
absence of complete records, the exact casualties will
never be known, but in the 10-month campaign at least
42,000 Union soldiers had been killed, wounded, and
captured, while the Confederates had suffered losses of
more than 28,000. Although the northern forces had
lost more men than their opponents, they had been able
to replenish them more readily. Moreover, Grant had
been prepared to utilize the greater resources at his
disposal, and the Petersburg campaign had been turned
by him into a form of relentless attrition which the
Southern army had not been able to stand. The result
had been the capture of Petersburg and Richmond, but
more important, it had led to the flight of the remnants
of the once mighty Army of Northern Virginia.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_71">71</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig45"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg33.jpg" alt="" width-obs="600" height-obs="576" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Fort Mahone after its capture, 1865.</i></p> </div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig46"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg33a.jpg" alt="" width-obs="587" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Deserted Confederate huts on the abandoned Petersburg line.</i></p> </div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_72">72</div>
<p>On the Sunday following the evacuation of Petersburg
and Richmond, Lee’s troops were cut off at Appomattox
Court House, destroying any hopes they might have had
for uniting with Johnston in North Carolina. In this
small Virginia town nearly 100 miles west of Petersburg,
the Army of Northern Virginia, now numbering
little more than 28,000, surrendered to the Union
forces. Within a week of the fall of Petersburg the major
striking force of the Confederacy had capitulated. General
Johnston surrendered his army to General Sherman
in North Carolina on April 26. By early June 1865,
all Confederate forces had been surrendered, and the
Civil War was over.</p>
<div class="pb" id="Page_73">73</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig47"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg34.jpg" alt="" width-obs="655" height-obs="600" /> <p class="pcap"><i>Union soldiers on Sycamore Street in Petersburg, April 1865. For these men, basking
in the aftermath of a
successful campaign, the
war is almost over. To the
west, General Sheridan’s
cavalry is racing to cut off
the retreating Southern army.
“If the thing is pressed,”
Sheridan tells Grant, “I think
Lee will surrender.” Says
Lincoln: “Let the thing be
pressed.”</i></p>
</div>
<div class="pb" id="Page_74">74</div>
<div class="fig"> id="fig48"> <ANTIMG src="images/pmg35.jpg" alt="" width-obs="800" height-obs="665" /> <p class="pcap"><i>On April 3, 1865, with Petersburg in Union hands at last, General Grant issued
orders sending off the
Armies of the Potomac and
the James in pursuit of Lee.
While the photographer was
taking this picture, showing a
Federal wagon train leaving
the city to join in the chase,
the remnants of Lee’s army
were marching toward a
little crossroad village named
Appomattox Court House.</i></p>
</div>
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