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<h1> THE PHILOSOPHY OF STYLE. </h1><br/><br/>
<h2> By Herbert Spencer </h2>
<hr>
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<h2> PART I. CAUSES OF FORCE IN LANGUAGE WHICH DEPEND UPON ECONOMY OF THE MENTAL ENERGIES. </h2>
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<h2> i. The Principle of Economy. </h2>
<p>§ 1. Commenting on the seeming incongruity between his father's argumentative powers and his ignorance of formal logic,
Tristram Shandy says:—"It was a matter of just wonder with my worthy tutor, and two or three fellows of that learned
society, that a man who knew not so much as the names of his tools, should be able to work after that fashion with
them." Sterne's intended implication that a knowledge of the principles of reasoning neither makes, nor is essential to,
a good reasoner, is doubtless true. Thus, too, is it with grammar. As Dr. Latham, condemning the usual school-drill in
Lindley Murray, rightly remarks: "Gross vulgarity is a fault to be prevented; but the proper prevention is to be
got from habit—not rules." Similarly, there can be little question that good composition is far less dependent upon
acquaintance with its laws, than upon practice and natural aptitude. A clear head, a quick imagination, and a sensitive
ear, will go far towards making all rhetorical precepts needless. He who daily hears and reads well-framed sentences,
will naturally more or less tend to use similar ones. And where there exists any mental idiosyncrasy—where there is a
deficient verbal memory, or an inadequate sense of logical dependence, or but little perception of order, or a lack
of constructive ingenuity; no amount of instruction will remedy the defect. Nevertheless, some practical result may be
expected from a familiarity with the principles of style. The endeavour to conform to laws may tell, though slowly.
And if in no other way, yet, as facilitating revision, a knowledge of the thing to be achieved—a clear idea of what
constitutes a beauty, and what a blemish—cannot fail to be of service.</p>
<p>§ 2. No general theory of expression seems yet to have been enunciated. The maxims contained in works on composition
and rhetoric, are presented in an unorganized form. Standing as isolated dogmas—as empirical generalizations, they
are neither so clearly apprehended, nor so much respected, as they would be were they deduced from some simple first
principle. We are told that "brevity is the soul of wit." We hear styles condemned as verbose or involved. Blair says
that every needless part of a sentence "interrupts the description and clogs the image;" and again, that "long sentences
fatigue the reader's attention." It is remarked by Lord Kaimes, that "to give the utmost force to a period, it ought,
if possible, to be closed with that word which makes the greatest figure." That parentheses should be avoided and that
Saxon words should be used in preference to those of Latin origin, are established precepts. But, however influential
the truths thus dogmatically embodied, they would be much more influential if reduced to something like scientific
ordination. In this, as in other cases, conviction will be greatly strengthened when we understand the why. And we may
be sure that a comprehension of the general principle from which the rules of composition result, will not only bring
them home to us with greater force, but will discover to us other rules of like origin.</p>
<p>§ 3. On seeking for some clue to the law underlying these current maxims, we may see shadowed forth in many of them, the
importance of economizing the reader's or hearer's attention, To so present ideas that they may be apprehended with the
least possible mental effort, is the desideratum towards which most of the rules above quoted point. When we condemn
writing that is wordy, or confused, or intricate—when we praise this style as easy, and blame that as fatiguing, we
consciously or unconsciously assume this desideratum as our standard of judgment. Regarding language as an apparatus
of symbols for the conveyance of thought, we may say that, as in a mechanical apparatus, the more simple and the better
arranged its parts, the greater will be the effect produced. In either case, whatever force is absorbed by the machine
is deducted from the result. A reader or listener has at each moment but a limited amount of mental power available.
To recognize and interpret the symbols presented to him, requires part of this power; to arrange and combine the images
suggested requires a further part; and only that part which remains can be used for realizing the thought conveyed.
Hence, the more time and attention it takes to receive and understand each sentence, the less time and attention can be
given to the contained idea; and the less vividly will that idea be conceived.</p>
<p>§ 4. How truly language must be regarded as a hindrance to thought, though the necessary instrument of it, we shall
clearly perceive on remembering the comparative force with which simple ideas are communicated by signs. To say, "Leave
the room," is less expressive than to point to the door. Placing a finger on the lips is more forcible than whispering,
"Do not speak." A beck of the hand is better than, "Come here." No phrase can convey the idea of surprise so vividly as
opening the eyes and raising the eyebrows. A shrug of the shoulders would lose much by translation into words. Again, it
may be remarked that when oral language is employed, the strongest effects are produced by interjections, which condense
entire sentences into syllables. And in other cases, where custom allows us to express thoughts by single words, as in
<i>Beware, Heigho, Fudge,</i> much force would be lost by expanding them into specific propositions. Hence, carrying out the
metaphor that language is the vehicle of thought, there seems reason to think that in all cases the friction and inertia
of the vehicle deduct from its efficiency; and that in composition, the chief, if not the sole thing to be done, is, to
reduce this friction and inertia to the smallest possible amount. Let us then inquire whether economy of the recipient's
attention is not the secret of effect, alike in the right choice and collocation of words, in the best arrangement
of clauses in a sentence, in the proper order of its principal and subordinate propositions, in the judicious use of
simile, metaphor, and other figures of speech, and even in the rhythmical sequence of syllables.</p>
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<h2> ii. Economy in the Use of Words. </h2>
<p>§ 5. The greater forcibleness of Saxon English, or rather non-Latin English, first claims our attention. The several
special reasons assignable for this may all be reduced to the general reason—economy. The most important of them is
early association. A child's vocabulary is almost wholly Saxon. He says, <i>I have,</i> not <i>I possess</i>—-<i>I wish,</i> not I
<i>desire;</i> he does not <i>reflect,</i> he <i>thinks;</i> he does not beg for <i>amusement,</i> but for <i>play</i>; he calls things <i>nice</i>
or <i>nasty,</i> not <i>pleasant</i> or <i>disagreeable.</i> The synonyms which he learns in after years, never become so closely, so
organically connected with the ideas signified, as do these original words used in childhood; and hence the association
remains less strong. But in what does a strong association between a word and an idea differ from a weak one? Simply
in the greater ease and rapidity of the suggestive action. It can be in nothing else. Both of two words, if they be
strictly synonymous, eventually call up the same image. The expression—It is <i>acid,</i> must in the end give rise to the
same thought as—It is sour; but because the term <i>acid</i> was learnt later in life, and has not been so often followed by
the thought symbolized, it does not so readily arouse that thought as the term sour. If we remember how slowly and with
what labour the appropriate ideas follow unfamiliar words in another language, and how increasing familiarity with such
words brings greater rapidity and ease of comprehension; and if we consider that the same process must have gone on with
the words of our mother tongue from childhood upwards, we shall clearly see that the earliest learnt and oftenest used
words, will, other things equal, call up images with less loss of time and energy than their later learnt synonyms.</p>
<p>§ 6. The further superiority possessed by Saxon English in its comparative brevity, obviously comes under the same
generalization. If it be an advantage to express an idea in the smallest number of words, then will it be an advantage
to express it in the smallest number of syllables. If circuitous phrases and needless expletives distract the attention
and diminish the strength of the impression produced, then do surplus articulations do so. A certain effort, though
commonly an inappreciable one, must be required to recognize every vowel and consonant. If, as all know, it is tiresome
to listen to an indistinct speaker, or read a badly-written manuscript; and if, as we cannot doubt, the fatigue is a
cumulative result of the attention needed to catch successive syllables; it follows that attention is in such cases
absorbed by each syllable. And if this be true when the syllables are difficult of recognition, it will also be true,
though in a less degree, when the recognition of them is easy. Hence, the shortness of Saxon words becomes a reason
for their greater force. One qualification, however, must not be overlooked. A word which in itself embodies the most
important part of the idea to be conveyed, especially when that idea is an emotional one, may often with advantage be a
polysyllabic word. Thus it seems more forcible to say, "It is <i>magnificent,</i>" than "It is <i>grand.</i>" The word <i>vast</i> is
not so powerful a one as <i>stupendous.</i> Calling a thing <i>nasty</i> is not so effective as calling it <i>disgusting.</i></p>
<p>§ 7. There seem to be several causes for this exceptional superiority of certain long words. We may ascribe it partly to
the fact that a voluminous, mouth-filling epithet is, by its very size, suggestive of largeness or strength; witness the
immense pomposity of sesquipedalian verbiage: and when great power or intensity has to be suggested, this association of
ideas aids the effect. A further cause may be that a word of several syllables admits of more emphatic articulation;
and as emphatic articulation is a sign of emotion, the unusual impressiveness of the thing named is implied by it. Yet
another cause is that a long word (of which the latter syllables are generally inferred as soon as the first are spoken)
allows the hearer's consciousness a longer time to dwell upon the quality predicated; and where, as in the above cases,
it is to this predicated quality that the entire attention is called, an advantage results from keeping it before the
mind for an appreciable time. The reasons which we have given for preferring short words evidently do not hold here. So
that to make our generalization quite correct we must say, that while in certain sentences expressing strong feeling,
the word which more especially implies that feeling may often with advantage be a many-syllabled or Latin one; in
the immense majority of cases, each word serving but as a step to the idea embodied by the whole sentence, should, if
possible, be a one-syllabled or Saxon one.</p>
<p>§ 8. Once more, that frequent cause of strength in Saxon and other primitive words-their imitative character may be
similarly resolved into the more general cause. Both those directly imitative, as <i>splash, bang, whiz, roar,</i> &c., and
those analogically imitative, as <i>rough, smooth, keen, blunt, thin, hard, crag,</i> &c., have a greater or less likeness
to the things symbolized; and by making on the senses impressions allied to the ideas to be called up, they save part of
the effort needed to call up such ideas, and leave more attention for the ideas themselves.</p>
<p>§ 9. The economy of the recipient's mental energy, into which are thus resolvable the several causes of the strength of
Saxon English, may equally be traced in the superiority of specific over generic words. That concrete terms produce more
vivid impressions than abstract ones, and should, when possible, be used instead, is a thorough maxim of composition.
As Dr. Campbell says, "The more general the terms are, the picture is the fainter; the more special they are, 'tis the
brighter." We should avoid such a sentence as:—"In proportion as the manners, customs, and amusements of a nation
are cruel and barbarous, the regulations of their penal code will be severe." And in place of it we should write:—"In
proportion as men delight in battles, bull-fights, and combats of gladiators, will they punish by hanging, burning, and
the rack."</p>
<p>§ 10. This superiority of specific expressions is clearly due to a saving of the effort required to translate words
into thoughts. As we do not think in generals but in particulars—as, whenever any class of things is referred to, we
represent it to ourselves by calling to mind individual members of it; it follows that when an abstract word is used,
the bearer or reader has to choose from his stock of images, one or more, by which he may figure to himself the genus
mentioned. In doing this, some delay must arise some force be expended; and if, by employing a specific term, an
appropriate image can be at once suggested, an economy is achieved, and a more vivid impression produced.</p>
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<h2> iii. The Principle of Economy applied to Sentences. </h2>
<p>§ 11. Turning now from the choice of words to their sequence, we shall find the same general principle hold good. We
have <i>a priori</i> reasons for believing that in every sentence there is some one order of words more effective than any
other; and that this order is the one which presents the elements of the proposition in the succession in which they may
be most readily put together. As in a narrative, the events should be stated in such sequence that the mind may not have
to go backwards and forwards in order to rightly connect them; as in a group of sentences, the arrangement should be
such, that each of them may be understood as it comes, without waiting for subsequent ones; so in every sentence, the
sequence of words should be that which suggests the constituents of the thought in the order most convenient for the
building up that thought. Duly to enforce this truth, and to prepare the way for applications of it, we must briefly
inquire into the mental act by which the meaning of a series of words is apprehended.</p>
<p>§ 12. We cannot more simply do this than by considering the proper collocation of the substantive and adjective. Is it
better to place the adjective before the substantive, or the substantive before the adjective? Ought we to say with the
French—un <i>cheval noir;</i> or to say as we do—a black horse? Probably, most persons of culture would decide that one
order is as good as the other. Alive to the bias produced by habit, they would ascribe to that the preference they
feel for our own form of expression. They would expect those educated in the use of the opposite form to have an equal
preference for that. And thus they would conclude that neither of these instinctive judgments is of any worth. There
is, however, a philosophical ground for deciding in favour of the English custom. If "a horse black" be the arrangement,
immediately on the utterance of the word "horse," there arises, or tends to arise, in the mind, a picture answering to
that word; and as there has, been nothing to indicate what <i>kind</i> of horse, any image of a horse suggests itself. Very
likely, however, the image will be that of a brown horse, brown horses being the most familiar. The result is that
when the word "black" is added, a check is given to the process of thought. Either the picture of a brown horse already
present to the imagination has to be suppressed, and the picture of a black one summoned in its place; or else, if the
picture of a brown horse be yet unformed, the tendency to form it has to be stopped. Whichever is the case, a certain
amount of hindrance results. But if, on the other hand, "a black horse" be the expression used, no such mistake can
be made. The word "black," indicating an abstract quality, arouses no definite idea. It simply prepares the mind for
conceiving some object of that colour; and the attention is kept suspended until that object is known. If, then, by the
precedence of the adjective, the idea is conveyed without liability to error, whereas the precedence of the substantive
is apt to produce a misconception, it follows that the one gives the mind less trouble than the other, and is therefore
more forcible.</p>
<p>§ 13. Possibly it will be objected that the adjective and substantive come so close together, that practically they
may be considered as uttered at the same moment; and that on hearing the phrase, "a horse black," there is not time to
imagine a wrongly-coloured horse before the word "black" follows to prevent it. It must be owned that it is not easy to
decide by introspection whether this is so or not. But there are facts collaterally implying that it is not. Our ability
to anticipate the words yet unspoken is one of them If the ideas of the hearer kept considerably behind the, expressions
of the speaker, as the objection assumes, he could hardly foresee the end of a sentence by the time it was half
delivered: yet this constantly happens. Were the supposition true, the mind, instead of anticipating, would be
continually falling more and more in arrear. If the meanings of words are not realized as fast as the words are uttered,
then the loss of time over each word must entail such an accumulation of delays as to leave a hearer entirely behind.
But whether the force of these replies be or be not admitted, it will scarcely be denied that the right formation of
a picture will be facilitated by presenting its elements in the order in which they are wanted; even though the mind
should do nothing until it has received them all.</p>
<p>§ 14. What is here said respecting the succession of the adjective and substantive is obviously applicable, by change of
terms, to the adverb and verb. And without further explanation, it will be manifest, that in the use of prepositions and
other particles, most languages spontaneously conform with more or less completeness to this law.</p>
<p>§ 15. On applying a like analysis to the larger divisions of a sentence, we find not only that the same principle holds
good, but that the advantage of respecting it becomes marked. In the arrangement of predicate and subject, for example,
we are at once shown that as the predicate determines the aspect under which the subject is to be conceived, it should
be placed first; and the striking effect produced by so placing it becomes comprehensible. Take the often-quoted
contrast between "Great is Diana of the Ephesians," and "Diana of the Ephesians is great." When the first arrangement is
used, the utterance of the word "great" arouses those vague associations of an impressive nature with which it has been
habitually connected; the imagination is prepared to clothe with high attributes whatever follows; and when the words,
"Diana of the Ephesians," are heard, all the appropriate imagery which can, on the instant, be summoned, is used in the
formation of the picture: the mind being thus led directly, and without error, to the intended impression. When, on the
contrary, the reverse order is followed, the idea, "Diana of the Ephesians" is conceived with no special reference to
greatness; and when the words "is great" are added, the conception has to be remodeled: whence arises a loss of mental
energy and a corresponding diminution of effect. The following verse from Coleridge's 'Ancient Mariner,' though somewhat
irregular in structure, well illustrates the same truth:</p>
<p>"Alone, alone, all, all alone,<br/>
Alone on a wide, wide sea<br/>
And never a saint took pity on<br/>
My soul in agony."<br/></p>
<p>§ 16. Of course the principle equally applies when the predicate is a verb or a participle. And as effect is gained by
placing first all words indicating the quality, conduct or condition of the subject, it follows that the copula also
should have precedence. It is true that the general habit of our language resists this arrangement of predicate, copula
and subject; but we may readily find instances of the additional force gained by conforming to it. Thus, in the line
from 'Julius Caesar'</p>
<p>"Then burst his mighty heart,"<br/></p>
<p>priority is given to a word embodying both predicate and copula. In a passage contained in 'The Battle of Flodden
Field,' the like order is systematically employed with great effect:</p>
<p>"The Border slogan rent the sky!<br/>
<i>A Home! a Gordon!</i> was the cry;<br/>
<i>Loud were </i>the clanging blows:<br/>
<i>Advanced—forced back—-now low, now high,<br/>
</i>The pennon sunk and rose;<br/>
<i>As bends</i> the bark's mast in the gale<br/>
When <i>rent are</i> rigging, shrouds and sail,<br/>
It wavered 'mid the foes."<br/></p>
<p>§ 17. Pursuing the principle yet further, it is obvious that for producing the greatest effect, not only should the main
divisions of a sentence observe this sequence, but the subdivisions of these should be similarly arranged. In nearly
all cases, the predicate is accompanied by some limit or qualification, called its complement. Commonly, also,
the circumstances of the subject, which form its complement, have to be specified. And as these qualifications and
circumstances must determine the mode in which the acts and things they belong to are conceived, precedence should
be given to them. Lord Kaimes notices the fact that this order is preferable; though without giving the reason. He
says:—"When a circumstance is placed at the beginning of the period, or near the beginning, the transition from it to
the principal subject is agreeable: it is like ascending or going upward." A sentence arranged in illustration of this
will be desirable. Here is one:—"Whatever it may be in theory, it is clear that in practice the French idea of liberty
is—the right of every man to be master of the rest."</p>
<p>§ 18. In this case, were the first two clauses, up to the word "I practice" inclusive, which qualify the subject, to
be placed at the end instead of the beginning, much of the force would be lost; as thus:—"The French idea of liberty
is—the right of every man to be master of the rest; in practice at least, if not in theory."</p>
<p>§ 19. Similarly with respect to the conditions under which any fact is predicated. Observe in the following example the
effect of putting them last:—"How immense would be the stimulus to progress, were the honour now given to wealth and
title given exclusively to high achievements and intrinsic worth!"</p>
<p>§ 20. And then observe the superior effect of putting them first:—"Were the honour now given to wealth and title given
exclusively to high achievements and intrinsic worth, how immense would be the stimulus to progress!"</p>
<p>§ 21. The effect of giving priority to the complement of the predicate, as well as the predicate itself, is finely
displayed in the opening of 'Hyperion':</p>
<p>"<i>Deep in the shady sadness of a vale<br/>
Far sunken from the healthy breath of morn,<br/>
Far from the fiery noon and eve's one star<br/>
Sat</i> gray-haired Saturn, quiet as a stone."<br/></p>
<p>Here it will be observed, not only that the predicate "sat" precedes the subject "Saturn," and that the three lines
in italics, constituting the complement of the predicate, come before it; but that in the structure of that complement
also, the same order is followed: each line being so arranged that the qualifying words are placed before the words
suggesting concrete images.</p>
<p>§ 22. The right succession of the principal and subordinate propositions in a sentence manifestly depends on the same
law. Regard for economy of the recipient's attention, which, as we find, determines the best order for the subject,
copula, predicate and their complements, dictates that the subordinate proposition shall precede the principal one when
the sentence includes two. Containing, as the subordinate proposition does, some qualifying or explanatory idea, its
priority prevents misconception of the principal one; and therefore saves the mental effort needed to correct such
misconception. This will be seen in the annexed example: "The secrecy once maintained in respect to the parliamentary
debates, is still thought needful in diplomacy; and in virtue of this secret diplomacy, England may any day be unawares
betrayed by its ministers into a war costing a, hundred thousand lives, and hundreds of millions of treasure: yet the
English pique themselves on being a self-governed people." The two subordinate propositions, ending with the semicolon
and colon respectively, almost wholly determine the meaning of the principal proposition with which it concludes; and
the effect would be lost were they placed last instead of first.</p>
<p>§ 23. The general principle of right arrangement in sentences, which we have traced in its application to the leading
divisions of them, equally determines the proper order of their minor divisions. In every sentence of any complexity the
complement to the subject contains several clauses, and that to the predicate several others; and these may be arranged
in greater or less conformity to the law of easy apprehension. Of course with these, as with the larger members, the
succession should be from the less specific to the more specific—from the abstract to the concrete.</p>
<p>§ 24. Now, however, we must notice a further condition to be fulfilled in the proper construction of a sentence; but
still a condition dictated by the same general principle with the other: the condition, namely, that the words and
expressions most nearly related in thought shall be brought the closest together. Evidently the single words, the minor
clauses, and the leading divisions of every proposition, severally qualify each other. The longer the time that elapses
between the mention of any qualifying member and the member qualified, the longer must the mind be exerted in carrying
forward the qualifying member ready for use. And the more numerous the qualifications to be simultaneously remembered
and rightly applied, the greater will be the mental power expended, and the smaller the effect produced. Hence, other
things equal, force will be gained by so arranging the members of a sentence that these suspensions shall at any
moment be the fewest in number; and shall also be of the shortest duration. The following is an instance of defective
combination:—"A modern newspaper-statement, though probably true, would be laughed at if quoted in a book as testimony;
but the letter of a court gossip is thought good historical evidence, if written some centuries ago." A rearrangement
of this, in accordance with the principle indicated above, will be found to increase the effect. Thus:—"Though probably
true, a modern newspaper-statement quoted in a book as testimony, would be laughed at; but the letter of a court gossip,
if written some centuries ago, is thought good historical evidence."</p>
<p>§ 25. By making this change, some of the suspensions are avoided and others shortened; while there is less liability to
produce premature conceptions. The passage quoted below from 'Paradise Lost' affords a fine instance of a sentence well
arranged; alike in the priority of the subordinate members, in the avoidance of long and numerous suspensions, and in
the correspondence between the order of the clauses and the sequence of the phenomena described, which, by the way, is a
further prerequisite to easy comprehension, and therefore to effect.</p>
<p>"As when a prowling wolf,<br/>
Whom hunger drives to seek new haunt for prey,<br/>
Watching where shepherds pen their flocks at eye,<br/>
In hurdled cotes amid the field secure,<br/>
Leaps o'er the fence with ease into the fold;<br/>
Or as a thief, bent to unhoard the cash<br/>
Of some rich burgher, whose substantial doors,<br/>
Cross-barr'd, and bolted fast, fear no assault,<br/>
In at the window climbs, or o'er the tiles;<br/>
So clomb this first grand thief into God's fold;<br/>
So since into his church lewd hirelings climb."<br/></p>
<p>§ 26. The habitual use of sentences in which all or most of the descriptive and limiting elements precede those
described and limited, gives rise to what is called the inverted style: a title which is, however, by no means confined
to this structure, but is often used where the order of the words is simply unusual. A more appropriate title would be
the <i>direct style,</i> as contrasted with the other, or <i>indirect style</i>: the peculiarity of the one being, that it conveys
each thought into the mind step by step with little liability to error; and of the other, that it gets the right thought
conceived by a series of approximations.</p>
<p>§ 27. The superiority of the direct over the indirect form of sentence, implied by the several conclusions that have
been drawn, must not, however, be affirmed without reservation. Though, up to a certain point, it is well for the
qualifying clauses of a period to precede those qualified; yet, as carrying forward each qualifying clause costs some
mental effort, it follows that when the number of them and the time they are carried become great, we reach a limit
beyond which more is lost than is gained. Other things equal, the arrangement should be such that no concrete image
shall be suggested until the materials out of which it is to be made have been presented. And yet, as lately pointed
out, other things equal, the fewer the materials to be held at once, and the shorter the distance they have to be borne,
the better. Hence in some cases it becomes a question whether most mental effort will be entailed by the many and long
suspensions, or by the correction of successive misconceptions.</p>
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