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With the Judæans in the Palestine Campaign

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<h2>CHAPTER XIX.</h2> <div class="center">The Strategical Value of Palestine.</div> When Turkey, unfortunately for herself, ranged her forces on the side of our enemies in the Great War she severed a friendship which had lasted for the greater part of a century. Our policy had for many years been to uphold the integrity of the Ottoman Empire because, with that Power holding Palestine, our Egyptian interests were quite safe. Now that the Turkish Empire has practically ceased to exist, Palestine becomes of cardinal importance to our Eastern interests. Situated as it is at the Gate of the three Continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, its strategical, political, and economic importance is beyond computation and out of all proportion to the size of this diminutive country. Students of strategy and military history will agree that Palestine, although some distance from the Suez Canal region, dominates that main artery of our trade and commerce. The eastern boundary of Egypt, running from Rafa on the Mediterranean to Akaba on the Gulf of that name in the Red Sea, is, from a military point of view, worthless. History tells us that all down the ages armies have crossed the Sinai Desert and worked their will on the[151] dwellers by the Nile. Early in the War we ourselves were unable to hold this Egyptian Frontier and were forced to retire to the line of the Suez Canal. It is true we defeated the Turks there and drove them out of Egypt, but the risk to our communications was very grave. It is a risk that should never again be taken, and for the future the Suez Canal must be defended, at all events on the Eastern side, from its strategical frontier—Palestine. With a friendly people established in the Judæan strongholds, and with sea power in our hands, the invasion of Egypt from the East or North would be a well-nigh impossible enterprise. It was always a cause of surprise to me that we did not very early in the War seize and fortify the harbours of Haifa and Jaffa. This might easily have been done, as they were practically undefended, and the people were in their hearts pro-British. Even Gaza could have been occupied and fortified in the early days. With these three towns in our hands no Turkish force could have been organised in Palestine or used against Egypt. No army could possibly march down the maritime plain with these occupied towns menacing their flank, while the other route to Egypt by the eastward of the Jordan Valley is almost impossible for a large army. Some eighty years ago Ibrahim Pasha was forced to retire to Egypt from Damascus by this eastern route because we held the coast ports. He left the ancient capital of Syria with some eighty thousand men, and, although he fought no battle on the way, his losses from sickness, hunger, thirst, and fatigue amounted to over sixty-five thousand men. [152] This gives one some little idea of the chance we missed in not making adequate use of our sea power by seizing the coast towns in the Levant during the Great War. The physical conformation of Palestine adds enormously to its strategical strength. The country is divided into four longitudinal belts running practically throughout the length of the country from North to South. Along the sea coast run the narrow maritime plains of Philistia, Sharon, and Acre. These narrow plains stretch from the borders of Egypt to the mountains of Lebanon. The next belt of country consists of the continuation of the Lebanon range, which runs down practically unbroken through central Palestine, losing itself in the Southern Desert. This hilly range constitutes the heart of the Holy Land and comprises the provinces of Galilee, Samaria, and Judæa. The only complete break in this range occurs between Galilee and Samaria, where the Plain of Esdraelon and the Valley of Jezreel cut right across and leave an open doorway from East to West. Through this gap from time immemorial armies have marched and counter-marched to and from Egypt. The next belt of country is the great depression of the Jordan Valley, the deepest known in the world. It runs from "the waters of Merom," near the foothills of Hermon, where it is on a level with the Mediterranean, to the Dead Sea, where it is nearly 1,300 ft. below sea-level. To the eastward of the Jordan Valley runs the table-land of the Hauran, Gilead, and Moab. This rich belt[153] of territory is from twenty to sixty miles wide and ranges from 2,000 ft. to 4,000 ft. above sea-level. It loses itself to the South and East in the Arabian and Syrian Deserts. The natural frontiers of Palestine are the Mediterranean on the West, the Syrian Desert to the East, the Arabian and Sinai Deserts to the South, and the difficult mountain passes of the Lebanon to the North. Next to the sea no better frontiers can be found than mountain passes and deserts. It will therefore be seen that if Palestine is given anything like her Biblical frontiers, troops could readily be placed on any threatened point and practically make the invasion of the country an impossibility. As a matter of fact, a small national army in Palestine would make that country almost as impregnable as are the Cantons of Switzerland. It is of the first importance to British interests to further the creation of a friendly State in Palestine which would act as a buffer between herself and any aggressive neighbour to the North or East. The greatest soldiers and statesmen of the past realised that in order to obtain dominion over the East it was first of all necessary to secure the friendly co-operation of the people of Palestine. Alexander the Great knew what a help to his Greek Empire of the East the Jews would be. He therefore showed them the greatest friendship, and allowed them every possible civil and religious liberty. Later on, when Palestine came under the dominion of Rome, Julius Cæsar, the first and greatest of the Roman[154] Emperors, realized so fully that without a friendly Palestine he could not hope to overthrow the Parthians and Persians to the eastward that in order to obtain the friendship of the Jews he freed Palestine from tribute, withdrew his legions from the country, exempted Jews from serving in the army, and allowed them full liberty of conscience, not only in Palestine but throughout the entire Empire. Coming down to more modern times, we find Napoleon following as far as possible the policy of his two great predecessors. At one time, early in his career, he made an effort to restore the Jews to Palestine, and he would probably have been successful in his scheme, and made himself ruler of a French Empire in the East, only, unfortunately for him, Nelson, at the battle of the Nile, deprived him of the command of the sea. Nothing daunted by this, however, he marched his soldiers through the Sinai Desert and subdued practically all Palestine, but, owing to British sea-power, we were able to throw troops into Acre, and by his defeat at the famous siege of that place, Napoleon's eastern ambitions came to an end. Great as was the importance of a friendly Palestine to the Greek and Roman Empires, a friendly Palestine to-day is of immensely more importance to the peace and prosperity of the British Empire. Our statesmen were, therefore, but following in the footsteps of the greatest men of the past when they issued the world-famous Balfour Declaration pledging England to use her best endeavours to establish a National Home in Palestine for the Jewish people. [155] It is useless to deny the fact that England is not nearly so popular in the Near East as she was thirty or forty years ago. The Egyptians have shown us pretty clearly that they have no love for us, while it is very evident that the Arab kingdoms have ambitions of their own in those regions, which might prove a very grave menace to our eastern communications. Naturally, Turkey—or what is left of that once great Empire—realises that it is to England that she owes her downfall, while the policy of Greece, at the moment at all events, also runs counter to our own. It is very necessary, therefore, that Palestine should be colonised by a people whose interests will go hand in hand with those of England and who will readily grasp at union with the British Empire. The Jews are the only people who fulfil these conditions. They have ever looked upon Palestine as their natural heritage, and although they were ruthlessly torn from it some two thousand years ago, yet through all the terrible years of their exile they have never lost the imperishable hope of a return to the Land of Promise. They have always had a friendly feeling for this country, and if England now deals justly with Israel, this friendly feeling will be increased tenfold. They would be quite unable to stand alone in Palestine for some time, and therefore their one aim and object would be to co-operate wholeheartedly with the Power that had not only reinstated them in their own land, but whose strong arm was adequate to protect them from the encroachments and aggressions of neighbouring states. It will undoubtedly be their policy to walk hand in[156] hand with England. British and Jewish interests are so similar and so interwoven that they fit into each other as the hand does the glove. In short, when the long-expected Restoration of the Jewish people to the Promised Land becomes an accomplished fact, then the vital interests of the British Empire in those regions will be unassailable. <hr class="chap" /> [157] <div style="break-after:column;"></div>

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